Chameleon or dinosaur? A study of police management culture. by Olisa, Victor Paul
Chameleon
Or
Dinosaur?
A 
Study of Police 
Management Culture.
Victor Paul OLISA.
London School of Economics and Political Science
PhD Thesis
UMI Number: U198801
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U198801
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
British Library of Political 
and Econom ic S c ien ce
ABSTRACT.
Most of the literature on police culture has concentrated on the culture of 
lower rank uniformed officers, often referred to as 'cop culture'. This thesis addresses 
the issue of whether there is a distinctive 'management culture' in the higher levels of 
police forces. Quite clearly, the concept of management culture generally in 
organisations and specifically in the police service is a recognised and accepted one. 
However, the relationship between cop culture and management culture is an 
uncertain one.
The thesis is based on interviews with 51 superintending rank officers from 
eleven Forces. This data is used to analyse the content and dynamics of senior police 
management culture.
Over the last three decades the police service has implemented a number of 
changes in its structure and management style. Some of these have seen operationally 
self-sufficient basic command units headed by superintendents replace divisional 
units headed by chief superintendents. With the removal of the chief superintendent 
rank, superintendents are now in a hierarchical position that requires them to make 
policy decisions and control how they would be implemented.
The literature on rank-and-file police is voluminous. Research on chief 
officers, though less frequent, is increasing. Hitherto, however, there has been no 
research on this increasingly powerful and influential group of senior managers, 
although the police reforms of the last decade (and those in the pipeline) make 
superintendents pivotal in the policy-making process.
Contemporary changes in police organisational structure has placed this group 
of officers in leadership positions, with the opportunity to change both the culture of 
the organisation as well as within their own peer group. They are crucial if the 
government is to bring about its promised reform and improvement in policing 
services. This study provides the first systematic information about the characteristics 
and culture of this increasingly significant managerial tier of the police organisation. 
It concludes that superintendents are a particularly adaptable and pragmatic group, 
adjusting to necessary changes as smoothly as possible - chameleons rather than 
dinosaurs.
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FOREWORD
SOME PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS BY A CHIEF OFFICER
In this thesis, the author identifies a number of inter-related issues and factors, which 
influence the behaviour of police superintendents and through them and their 
stewardship of the managerial process, the activities of police.
The police service is significantly different to most other public sector service 
delivery organizations. The scale of the demands placed upon the service is matched 
by an exceptional range of activity and most recently by very high public expectations 
about process and performance. These combine to make policing complex and 
difficult and in turn the management of policing has become equally so.
In another sense however, the police service is very similar to all organizations and 
manifestly, leadership and vision play a vital role. In particular, any scrutiny of the 
management of the service illuminates obvious examples of the general principle that 
the conduct and visibility of senior managers has a profound effect on the 
organization. In considering the activities, style and influence of the modem 
superintendent, the author rightly identifies the recent enhancement and importance of 
their role and responsibilities. A number of factors have brought this about, including 
reductions in overall numbers, the creeping process of devolution and devolvement 
and a new performance rigor, which is centred on the basic command unit within 
forces. The pivotal influence of the superintendent rank has therefore evolved and 
become more critically influential.
In his examination of the behaviours and influence of superintendents, the author 
notes that although much has been written about the basic organizational culture of 
the police service (the so-called canteen culture) little has been written about the 
cultural behaviour of senior managers. In the last 40 years, this has certainly changed, 
accelerated probably by the high percentage of graduates now found at that rank. The 
singularity and predictability of yesterday’s senior managers have certainly been 
eroded. Not least because the hierarchical, risk-averse, disciplined work process has 
been replaced by the freedoms of devolution and entrepreneurial opportunity.
The increased importance and relevance of superintendents makes their group culture 
worth studying and defining. In doing this, the author notes a critical inter-relationship 
between the espoused values of the police service and the practiced values of the 
individual superintendent. In particular, he opines (rightly in my view) that the 
existence of espoused values alone is insufficient to influence the organization 
without some personal position being apparent and that these need to be aligned 
before maximum beneficial effect is created.
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Interestingly the author concludes with a summarized description of superintendents 
as pragmatic realists, chameleon like and adapting to change. My own experience is 
that this description does indeed fit the average superintendent who has demonstrated 
effectiveness and tangible achievement. The scale and pace of change in the police 
service has forced senior managers down this route and the broader ‘can do* 
philosophy of the service has created an expectation that they will deliver. I suspect 
however that if similar research had been done fifteen years ago the author might have 
concluded that the dinosaurs outnumbered the chameleons.
Effective management is always about making a difference, either through 
interventions or through presence. In the past, the police staff college has been 
accused of cloning senior managers in a single mould. The author’s work seems to 
suggest that an obvious singular culture at this rank has yet to establish itself.
Perry Nove
Commissioner of Police for the City of London March 2002
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION.
REASONS FOR THE STUDY.
Initiative-induced change in police practice: Perception or reality?
The large sociological discussion on police seems to portray police officers in 
conservative terms. However, more recently, discussion on what appears to be a new 
breed of senior officers portrays them as much more in line with new trends in 
management thinking and in the political and cultural avant-garde. It is claimed that 
these officers are primarily concerned with promotion to achieve this aim. The Police 
Federation has classed them as ‘Butterfly men*, but a less pejorative description could 
be chameleons, who are able to meet the exigencies of rapid change. As will be 
explored in the study, superintendents are a significant group in the police and a good 
group for assessing whether managers are chameleons or dinosaurs.
My interest in policing and police work dates back to my early childhood. I 
have not always harboured a desire to be a police officer, but With my grandfather and 
two uncles choosing the police as a career, the art of policework, albeit based in a 
different continent, was often discussed and at times hotly debated at family 
gatherings. These exchanges created in my mind some sense of awareness and, at a 
subconscious level, an interest and fascination about police officers and policework. 
However, from my early childhood through to my time at university, I had not 
seriously thought about what it meant to be a police officer or what the work might 
involve. This changed towards the end of my studies when I had decided that I would 
not pursue a career that involved the direct use of my Biochemistry degree, but 
instead had started thinking about joining the police service.
Although I had developed a strong preference for the police amongst the 
career options open to me, the strongest influence on my decision most to join was an 
initiative that a number of forces were running at the time. This was a three-day 
familiarisation programme that allowed potential recruits to experience some aspects 
of policework first-hand. This was in the early 1980s and the police service was
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being very proactive and encouraging graduates to join. Although I did not actually 
go on one of these programmes, the description by a fellow student friend of his 
experience was certainly the thing that convinced me that of my many options 
policing was likely to provide the most enjoyment. To boot, the pay was not that bad 
either.
At the time, when there were a number of organisations vying for the attention 
of young bright things coming out of university, I thought this initiative by the police 
was a very clever way to capture the attention of those people that were still 
undecided on a career and show them the more exciting elements of policework. 
However, with the benefit of several years’ operational experience it quickly became 
evident that what was on display at the familiarisation visits was not typical of 
everyday policing. Nevertheless, it certainly had the desired effect of attracting some 
young people who otherwise may not have automatically considered the police as a 
career.
Conversely, in the early 1980s there were a number of high profile incidents 
that would not have made policing an enticing career for most people. For example, 
media coverage and official reports on some of the major public disorders that 
occurred in the early to mid-1980s graphically illustrated the danger inherent in 
policework. These included the riots in Brixton, London in April 1981, followed by 
riots later that year, in Southall (London), Toxteth (Liverpool), Moss Side 
(Manchester) and in the West Midlands. The disturbances in Brixton, which took 
place over the weekend of 10-12 April 1981, resulted in 279 police officers being 
injured (Scarman 1986).
In addition to the danger of policework, the probity and impartiality of both 
individual officers and the service as a whole were called into question by the well 
documented corruption scandals covering four decades from 1960s to 2000. In the 
60s, ‘70s and 80s, the types of corrupt practices that were highlighted predominantly 
concerned Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officers seeking personal gain 
through bribery, whereas in the 90s to current times there were concerned with abuses 
of power and position (Campbell 2002). The combination of these factors was 
changing the image of the police in the eyes of the public. Reiner lucidly documents
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the transformation of the reputation of the police between 1959-81 from ‘plods to 
pigs’ (Reiner 1985: 61-82). He comments that “the tacit contract between police and 
public, so delicately drawn between the 1850s and 1950s, had begun to fray glaringly 
by 1981” (ibid). Further, and unusual at the time, some senior ranking and high 
profile officers made politically sensitive comments about suggested reforms of the 
organisation of the service.
Concerning the corruption scandals, in the 1950s a series of cause celebres, 
which included “disciplinary or legal proceedings involving alleged corruption that 
were brought against the Chief Constables of Cardiganshire, Brighton and 
Worcester”, led to the instigation of the Royal Commission on the Police in 1960. 
However, the ones that were to prove more damaging to the integrity of the service 
were the corruption scandals involving the Metropolitan Police in the late 1960s and 
‘70s, the most high profile and better remembered of which was the ‘Operation 
Countryman’ investigation. Despite the dramatic strategy of associated reforms that 
were implemented by Sir Robert Mark in the ‘70s, which created a hostile 
environment for corrupt officers and led to “some 500 policemen” leaving the force 
during his period as Commissioner, the problem was so deep-seated that further 
allegations in 1978 led to Mark’s successor, Sir David McNee, setting up ‘Operation 
Countryman’. The revelations that emerged in 1978 alleged the “involvement of 
detectives, including some in the Robbery Squad, in major armed robberies”. The 
insidious nature of the corruption and the extent to which it had penetrated the force 
was illustrated by the lamentable outcome of the investigation. ‘Operation 
Countryman’ was set up under the direction of the Dorset Chief Constable, Arthur 
Hambleton, and as Reiner explained, “A staff of eighty provincial detectives worked 
out of a building in Surrey (to avoid Met interference) for four years, investigating 
more than 200 policemen. Hambleton and his team claimed on several occasions that 
their work was being sabotaged by corrupt Yard pressure, and by the time the 
Operation was wound up only two convictions had been achieved” (Reiner 1985: 67. 
My emphasis).
On the political front, as Reiner explained the overt political lobbying by the 
police service which began in the 1970s involved officers at the highest and lowest 
ranks. For example, in contrasting the dramatic change in the public announcements
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by the Police Federation he comments that “The spectacle of James Anderton, 
Manchester’s Chief Constable, and Jim Jardine of the Police Federation, preaching at 
the drop of a helmet about the sinking state of our national moral fibre became so 
familiar a sight in the 1970s that it is hard to appreciate quite how novel the departure 
from tradition it was” (Reiner 1985: 73). This departure from tradition was to 
continue unabated. “In 1975, the Police Federation launched an unprecedented 
campaign for ‘law and order’” with the intention of mobilising “‘the silent majority’, 
to influence politicians to support the ‘rule of law’ and to reverse the liberalising trend 
in penal and social policy” (ibid). However, the campaign was condemned by many 
as signalling a dangerous departure from the established tradition of police non­
involvement in politics. Nonetheless, the Federation continued along this path and in 
“1978 it relaunched the campaign specifically to influence the 1979 general 
election...Throughout 1978 and early 1979, a stream of strikingly similar and much- 
publicised pronouncements was issued both by police spokesmen (both Chief 
Constables and the Federation) and Tory politicians as part of what the media dubbed 
the ‘great debate’ on law and order” (Reiner 1985: 74).
Further, the operational activities of the service was dragged into the political 
arena “in March 1982 when the Met released its annual crime statistics, it analysed 
them by the race of robbers as identified by victims, highlighting the stereotype of the 
black mugger.” Reiner commented that “This was an unprecedented use of official 
statistics in a manner that had clear political implications. It was widely interpreted at 
the time as an attempt to ‘mug’ Scarman” (Reiner 1985: 75).
These high profile public incidents had raised some doubts in my mind about 
policing as a career, but I had been impressed by the attempts that some police forces 
were making in the early ‘80s to attract higher-educated young people to join them. 
Convinced as I was then that these initiatives were intended to give a broader picture 
of policework, and thereby a better and more rounded image of the service, years later 
I was less convinced that these initiative had significantly increased the number of 
graduates joining the police. My experience then was that graduates were few 
amongst those joining, and even fewer were the number of black or Asian people, 
graduates or otherwise.
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In addition to the familiarisation programmes, there were a number of 
advertisements designed specifically to attract more black candidates. For example, an 
advertisement for the Metropolitan Police during this period highlighted the diversity 
of the people that were joining, with headlines such as, “There is no such thing as a 
uniform police officer in London”, over the faces of a white female officer alongside 
those of a black and a white male officers. Another one showed a black and a white 
officer in uniform under the heading, “Brothers in Law” (Benyon and Bourn 1986: 
Ch. 1). However, despite these initiatives, in 1985 there were still only 726 (0.6%) 
black police officers in England and Wales (Benyon and Bourn 1986: 29). A decade 
later, at the time I started the fieldwork for this study, the number of black police 
officers in England and Wales had risen to 2038 (1.5 %) (Home Office Digest 3 
1995). By any standards this was a meagre improvement, and on reflection I realised 
that the lack of success of this particular police initiative in trying to increase the 
number of black people joining the police was not atypical.
There were other police initiatives, directed at improving operational 
effectiveness, that had not delivered fully the intended results and outcomes. For 
example, there was policing by objectives (pbo). Fashionable in the early 1980s, this 
was described by the authors as a systematic method that could help police managers 
manage their organisations more effectively and for better results. “Based on a 
process designed primarily for use in business and industry, pbo has been extensively 
modified to take into account the extraordinary management problems inherent in the 
police enterprise” (Lubans and Edgar 1979: iii).
What was this process? Lubans and Edgar explained that it “was a process of 
planning, executing and reviewing those activities of a police organisation oriented 
toward specific desired results” (Lubans and Edgar 1979: 5). As Weatheritt 
explained, “pbo is a thorough-going attempt to apply a rational/empirical approach to 
any or all aspects of a force’s activity.” Adding, “The planning cycle lies at the heart 
of pbo. It is a means by which a publicly available force policy statement -  general 
guidelines about what a force intends to do -  is successively honed to create a set of 
force goals, then objectives and action plans... Pbo is both dynamic and results- 
oriented” (Weatheritt 1989: 41). However, in a changing social and political 
environment in which the public was becoming more assertive towards public bodies,
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the decision on the types of activities that should be used to judge effectiveness was 
no longer the sole preserve of the police. It is possible that the difference between the 
police and the public in what should be used as performance measures may have 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of pbo in bringing about immediate improvements 
(ibid). Academic studies were showing that policing was not, as had been 
consistently claimed by the police, predominantly about law enforcement. As Punch 
and Naylor explained, “because of its varied functions -  covering man’s social 
problems from birth to death -  the police service has gradually, and largely 
unwittingly, accumulated a broad range of ‘welfare’ functions. Indeed, the police 
could well be described as the only 24 hour, fully mobile, social service” (Punch and 
Naylor 1973). The activities against which police effectiveness were now to be 
measured were more varied and some were difficult to measure because these 
activities, which fell under the service rather than the enforcement category, were 
largely unrecorded by officers. Additionally, where police activities were recorded, it 
appeared that the process of recording rather than the result or outcome from the 
activity was the measure of effectiveness. It was becoming more evident that 
measuring police effectiveness would no longer be synonymous with the 
straightforward and simple process of looking at the rise or fall of crime detection 
figures.
The extent to which senior managers could set performance targets and 
corresponding action plans, and best use their resources to achieve them were now 
also measures of police effectiveness (Home Office Circular 114/83). However, as 
much as all these initiatives were meant to change the management style of police 
managers and thereby the operational practices on the ground, the perspective from 
the frontline was that not much change was happening, it was business as usual.
Why was this? Why did it seem, at least to me, that all these well-intentioned 
initiatives, which were meant to improve the image, operational and managerial 
effectiveness of the police, were not producing the intended results? These questions 
and my perception that the various initiatives, some of which I have highlighted, were 
not bringing about significant changes in police practice were the things that drove me 
to start this study. However, my original plan was to use one particular police 
initiative to examine my perceived organisational resistance to change. I therefore
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started the study with the specific aim of trying to find out why the quality of service 
initiative titled ‘Getting Things Right* (GTR) had not been widely adopted by the 
service. Additionally, I wanted to explore the reasons why it was that so many other 
police initiatives appeared to have had little discernible impact in changing police 
management style and operational practice.
In 1993, the Association of Chief Police Officer (ACPO) Quality of Service 
sub-committee launched the GTR initiative, with a corresponding document of the 
same name. The document explained that it was after the publication in 1990 of the 
ACPO Strategic Policy document titled, “Setting the Standards for Policing: Meeting 
Community Expectation”, which had been adopted by the police service as its 
blueprint for quality that the Quality of Service sub-committee was formed. The GTR 
document explained that the sub-committee had produced previously another 
document titled, ‘Strategic Priorities for 1992’, in which it was identified that there 
were six major tasks that the service needed to undertake if it was to guarantee quality 
policing in the 1990s (ACPO 1993a: 1).
These six areas were:
• Setting standards and measuring performance;
• Training;
• Promotion of good practice and research throughout the service;
• Meeting the needs and expectations of external customers;
• Meeting the needs and expectations of internal customers; and
• Police ethics.
The GTR initiative concentrated on one of the six areas; ‘meeting the needs and 
expectations of internal customers’. This initiative was a counter to the numerous 
quantitative performance measures to which the police service had been subjected and 
a typical example of which was policing by objectives. GTR was clearly aimed at the 
quality of police leadership and management with the intention of improving the 
quality of service that police gave to the community. This document explained,
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“It is widely accepted in the business world and the public service sector that the 
quality of service and customer care given to staff inside an organisation have a 
decisive effect on the service provided to the people outside the organisation. 
This report, ‘Getting Things Right’, addresses head-on the misgivings revealed 
by recent internal surveys about the quality of leadership and management in the 
police service. It defines six Key Internal Service Areas. It pinpoints the issues 
which must be tackled if the police service is to continue to move towards a 
‘culture* of quality, in which quality support and service are given to all staff and, 
through them, to our customers in the community” (ACPO 1993a: 1).
The key internal service areas were: Leading and managing people; how we 
communicate; internal organisation; managing resources; systems and procedures; 
and strategy for action.
The rationale for the initiative was described as follows.
“The report suggests that, for many years past, the police service has been 
obsessed with ‘doing things right’ -  meticulously right. Streams of standing 
orders and instructions have been issued to ensure that nothing goes wrong. These 
have instead restricted the ability of staff to use their initiative and discretion, and 
to treat each customer as an individual. It is, of course, important to ‘do right 
things’, too. That means involving staff as every level so that they have the skills 
-  and the authority -  to make decisions about the service they provide” (ibid).
The service invested a great deal of time, energy and resources to produce the 
initiative, and during its developmental stages, the intention was that it would be 
mandatory on all forces to implement it. However, at its launch this had changed; it 
was made optional for forces to implement it to the extent they felt appropriate. Good 
as the initiative and the corresponding report were, it was not widely adopted by 
forces. Those in the organisation that could have benefited most from the initiative, 
the superintending ranks, although they freely acknowledged that it was a good 
initiative which would have brought many benefits, had not shown much enthusiasm 
in implementing it.
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Why was this? After all this was an initiative that had been developed by and 
solely within the service. The service ‘owned’ it, yet it was reluctant to embrace it. If 
it could take such a cold response to one of its own initiatives, then it is not 
unreasonable to assume that it would just as easily reject any externally conceived and 
developed initiative. Unless, of course, there was compelling reasons not to do so.
What were the factors that influenced the service in general and, for the purpose 
of this study, the superintending ranks specifically, to adopt or decline initiatives that 
were intended to bring about much vaunted change in management style and 
consequently police practice? To this question I now turn, starting with an overview 
of the subjects under study, the superintending ranks.
Resistance to change.
Wreckers or reformers? The Police Federation or The Superintendents’ Association? 
Dinosaurs or chameleons? At times when an organisation faces external pressure to 
adapt in order to ‘survive’ in a changing environment, different sections within that 
organisation, perhaps defined by their respective sub-cultures, are likely to react 
differently and possibly counterproductively.
The police service has faced unrelenting calls for change and adaptation over 
many years, but the volume has increased over the last three decades, and the call 
from the present Home Secretary, David Blunkett, in Policing A New Century: A 
Blueprint for Reform, for more change, drew a strong counter-attack from the Police 
Federation. Strong enough for the Home Secretary to refer to some of the local 
leaders of the Federation as “wreckers” (.Police, 3 March 2002). In the same Police 
article, the Federation stated that the Home Secretary had shown the “same 
impatience with chief officers who were challenging some of the features of the 
Police Bill that they see as diminutions of their independence of politics and 
operational autonomy.” They then went on to ask, “Are they also wreckers?” 
However, no mention was made of Superintendents or their Association. Should one 
draw from this the conclusion that Superintendents, unlike the Federated ranks and 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) were not also wreckers? Further, if this 
was the case, could the inference reasonably be drawn that there was something
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different about the group that made their outlook different from the other two? Was 
there something different about the collective experience of this group that created a 
different cultural outlook to the other two?
However, before drawing such an inference, there is one significant question, 
which is relevant for this study, that has been asked by one commentator; "Is there a 
management culture within the British police?” (Holdaway 1989).
Over the last four decades, there has been a significant increase in the number 
of research studies, inquiries and operational work-studies into all aspects of the 
British police. A sizeable proportion of these have concentrated on the 'occupational 
culture' of operational officers. However, most of these studies have tended, on the 
main, to be portrayals of the culture or cultures of the lower ranks; constables and 
sergeants. More specifically, the uniformed lower ranks. This could justifiably lead a 
casual observer of the police to assume that there was no corresponding management 
culture within the police service, or that if there were it was either homogeneous with 
that of the lower ranks or it was not significantly different to warrant specific and/or 
in-depth study or comment. Alternatively, it could be that one of the reasons why 
there has not been a correspondingly large volume of research on senior managers is 
because it is much harder to gain access to them. For example, in negotiating access 
to the officers I wanted to interview for the study, I have no doubt that the direct 
involvement of my chief officer in writing personally to all the chief officers of my 
respondents made the granting of permission much easier. At the most senior level of 
the service, to date there has been only two empirical studies On chief officers. One 
by Reiner (Reiner: 1992a) and the other by Wall (Wall: 1998).
The concept of a management culture, generally within organisations (Johnson 
and Gill 1993), and more specifically within the police service (Reuss-Ianni 1983, 
Holdaway 1989) is a recognised and accepted one. However, although the extent of 
the relationship between management and non-management cultures cannot be stated 
unequivocally, some guidance can be taken from the work of Reuss-Ianni, in her 
study of officers from a precinct of the New York Police Department. She explained 
that the emergence of a management cop culture from the previously singular police 
culture was the outcome of a combination of factors, one of which was the new
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requirement of police managers to concentrate on accountability and productivity in 
the face of dwindling resources. British police managers were to face similar calls for 
greater management accountability in the early 1980s from central government.
Although it is readily acknowledged that the introduction of the principles of 
private sector management into the police service was started with the publication of 
Home Office Circular 114 of 1983 by the then Conservative government, one author 
has suggested that the demand for change in the police service goes back much 
further. Grange suggests that, “a history of the changes may have begun in 1974 
when the last major police force restructuring created the present 43 force structure” 
(Grange 1992: 300). Regardless of when the process started* one certainty is that the 
call has been continuous and relentless.
I shall explore with my respondents some of the incidents that have led to 
these calls for change and the extent of any consequent changes over the years. 
Moreover, I shall, through examining the different ways that my respondents have 
dealt with and managed the changes that have undoubtedly occurred, try to explain to 
what extent these have shaped and/or conversely are being shaped by police 
management culture.
Who then are those that I shall be referring to as police managers? This group 
of officers with whom I shall be examining the changes that have occurred to and 
within the police service will be drawn exclusively from the superintending rank.
Why Superintendents?
Amongst the numerous research studies, examinations of and enquiries into police 
organisational structure and management functions, two have been pivotal in 
increasing the importance and influence of the superintending rank. These were, 
Audit Commission Police Paper number 9; Reviewing the Organisation o f Provincial 
Police Forces, and the Inquiry into Police Responsibilities & Rewards that was 
chaired by Sir Patrick Sheehy (HMSO (1), 1993). Both reports works were 
continuations of the drive to improve police efficiency and effectiveness that was 
started in 1983 with the introduction of the then Conservative government’s Financial
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Management Initiative into the police service in the form of Home Office Circular 
114/83.
The Audit Commission study examined the structure of provincial police 
forces in relation to reducing management on-costs, with the aim of improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the provision of quality policing services to local 
communities. Its overriding message was that Forces should review their 
organisational structure and form basic command units, which would be accountable 
to their local communities. The Paper explained that, “although many improvements 
can be made by forces themselves, there are constraints hindering beneficial changes 
which can only be addressed at national level.” It offered that, “A national review of 
rank structure and associated pay scales should be conducted to allow more flexible 
approaches to management structures...” (Audit Commission 1991: 2)
From here the message was reinforced by Sir Patrick Sheehy with his Inquiry 
to “examine the rank structure, remuneration and conditions of service of the police in 
England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland” (Sheehy 1993). The Inquiry 
made, amongst its 272 recommendations, the following two concerning police ranks. 
Recommendation 4, was “that the ranks of chief inspector and chief superintendent be 
abolished”, and recommendation 5, which advocated the “abolition of the rank of 
deputy chief constable”.
The Inquiry Report received a hostile response from the Police Federation, and 
resistance from the Superintendents’ Association and ACPO. One outcome of a 
lively ‘debate’ of the recommendations was that, “In October 1993 the Home 
Secretary, Michael Howard, announced that he no longer accepted significant sections 
of the Sheehy Report” (Leishman et al, 1996: 14). Nonetheless, he still abolished two 
of the three ranks that the Report recommended should be abolished. The one that 
survived was that of chief inspector.
One consequence of the combined adoption of basic command units (BCUs) 
and the removal of the rank of chief superintendent was that superintendents now 
became heads of BCUs. Consequently, the removal of the chief superintendent rank, 
which previously acted as the link between policy and practice (between ACPO and
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operational superintendents), left superintendents with the dual role of policy makers 
and, as operational commanders, implementers of those policies.
With superintendents now straddling the divide between strategy and tactics 
this meant that they could decide on the policy and strategic direction of their Force 
and as BCU Commanders would have direct control of how those policies would then 
be implemented. Consequently, the ‘new’ superintendent rank had acquired a pivotal 
role in the new streamlined management structure of the police service.
Although their newly acquired status did not quite elevate them to the position 
of an elite group, nonetheless, they were now a much more powerful and influential 
one. This new and more powerful position, and the fact that there had been very few 
sociological empirical studies on officers at this rank, in contrast to the considerable 
amount of studies that had been carried out on the rank-and-file (Whitaker 1964 & 
1979, Reiner 1978, Smith 1983, Fielding 1988, Graef 1989, to list a small number of 
them), and a smaller number on those at ACPO level (Reiner 1991, and Wall 1998) 
made the occupiers of the superintending ranks an ideal group to study. One, which 
to date had not been given, as often, the opportunity to express its view on policing. I 
saw this research as a good opportunity to obtain the views of an increasingly 
influential group of officers.
Who are the superintendents?
The Audit Commission Police Papers Report 9 mentioned above that called for the 
establishment of basic command units was published in 1991, and the Report of the 
Inquiry by Sir Patrick Sheehy was published in 1993. The rank of chief 
superintendent was abolished in 1995. Before 1995, the number of officers in the 
superintending rank had already been decreasing, and the trend continued after the 
abolition of the rank of chief superintendent. The reduction in numbers was more 
pronounced in 1993 and one reason for this could be that Forces were preparing to 
implement the modified recommendations of the Sheehy Report; to remove the rank 
of chief superintendent. In fact, Forces had been reducing the number of officers in 
the chief superintendent rank since the late 1980s through changes in organisational 
structure and management practices. For example, some of the organisational and 
structural changes had involved removing the responsibility for day-to-day policing
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from divisions, which were under the command of chief superintendents, to sub­
divisions, which were under the command of superintendents (Jones 1988).
Table 1, shows not only this trend in the declining number of superintendents, 
but also that the same thing was happening with other ranks. With the reduction in all 
the ranks, there would have been fewer people below them to whom superintendents 
could delegate work. Further, with fewer of them with responsibility to make policy 
and direct operational activities, it was possible that the influence and power of this 
group of officers were becoming greater as their numbers were becoming less. A 
supporting argument for this suggestion is that power and influence would have been 
concentrated in the hands of a smaller number of people that had acquired a broader 
range of responsibilities.
Table 1. Total Police Officer Strength in the Police Service in England 
and Wales. (Home Office (1), 2001)
Police
officer
strength
Chief
Constables
DepVAsst.
Chief
Constables
Chief/
Superintendents
Chief
Inspectors
Inspectors Sergeants Constables Total police 
strength
31 Mar 90 46 188 2,052 2,261 6,695 19,207 94,310 126,777
31 Mar 91 48 183 2,034 2,256 6,764 19,501 94,667 127,495
31 Mar 92 48 180 1,995 2,222 6,736 19,739 94,650 127,627
31 Mar 93 46 176 1,873 2,133 6,767 19,632 95,501 128,290
31 Mar 94 46 158 1,668 1,990 6,652 19,377 95,915 127,897
31 Mar 95 51 155 1,414 1,842 6,559 19,132 96,027 127,222
31 Mar 96 50 145 1,318 1,706 6,272 18,832 96,521 126,901
31 Mar 97 48 145 1,290 1,679 6,164 18,811 96,914 127,158
31 Mar 98 49 143 1,230 1,609 6,050 18,603 97,072 126,814
31 Mar 99 49 151 1,213 1,604 5,936 18,738 96,150 126,096
31 Mar 00 47 149 1,226 1,574 5,941 18,500 94,518 124,170
31 Mar 01 46 149 1,218 1,552 6,012 18,601 95,899 125,682
At the time of the field study, the superintending rank was divided into the 
four levels of Basic Range and Higher Ranges 1, 2 and 3. These divisions were based 
loosely on function and firmly on salary. In terms of function, Higher Ranges 2 and 3 
were equivalent to the old chief superintendent rank, while the Basic and Higher 
Range 1 were equivalent to the old superintendent rank. In terms of pay, there were 
six pay bands within the Basic Range, two within the Higher Range 1, two within the 
Higher Range 2 and two within the Higher Range 3. However, in 2000, five years
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after the abolition of the rank of chief superintendent, the Superintendents’ 
Association successfully lobbied the Home Office to reinstate the rank of chief 
superintendent and abolish the collection of intermediary ranks that had proliferated 
since the abolition of the chief superintendent rank. The Association had argued that 
instead of streamlining the senior management hierarchy by removing chief 
superintendents, the converse had happened with the creation of two additional levels. 
This increase in the number of sub-ranks had also led to an increase in the number of 
pay bands; from nine to twelve. Consequently, the intended increased savings in 
senior management salaries that should have resulted from the removal of the chief 
superintendent rank had turned instead into increased management costs from the 
greater number of pay bands. Quite clearly the resultant increased costs and 
bureaucracy were not what the government had wanted or envisaged would happen. 
The reinstatement of the rank of chief superintendent was enabled under sections 122 
to 125 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, and came into effect on 1 
September 2001.
The changing role of superintendents: Managers or leaders?
The number of officers in the superintending rank made up around 1.0% of the total 
number of officers in the police service after the changes in 1995. Before this date, 
the percentage was slightly higher at 1.5%. Managing the delivery of policing at this 
ratio would have been demanding, however, with the structural and political changes 
that placed greater emphasis on delivering effective performance, officers in these 
ranks were now required to display more of their leadership skills in addition to their 
managerial or administrative skills. In terms of police vernacular, they were now 
required to both ‘walk the talk’.
The significance of this shift in emphasis from management to leadership, for 
the purpose of this study lies in the distinction between leaders and managers made by 
Edgar Schein. In his view, “leaders create and change cultures, while managers and 
administrators live within them” (Schein 1992: 5). The effectiveness of the change 
process depended greatly on superintendents changing elements within different 
levels (Schein 1992) of the culture, or sub-cultures (Chan 1996; Foster 2003; 
Waddington 1999a) of the service through leadership rather than maintaining the 
status quo through management and administration.
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It is possible for senior police managers to affect the culture of the service at 
three different levels. They could affect the culture as individuals at a local level and 
within their particular areas of responsibility. They could do so collectively as a 
group at Force level. They could do so as a group at national level through their 
Association. Regardless of the level at which they affected the culture of the service, 
superintendents still needed to have a similar view of the world and to be able to act 
as a group, in order to bring about a consistent change across the service. They 
needed to have their own culture. The significance of this rests on Schein’s 
explanation that,
“The process of culture formation is, in a sense, identical to the process of 
group formation in that the very essence of ‘groupness’ or group identity, the 
shared patterns of thought, belief, feelings, and values that result from shared 
experience and common learning, results in the pattern of shared assumption. 
Without some shared assumptions, some minimal degree of culture, we are 
really talking only about an aggregate of people, not a group” (Schein 1992: 
52).
I shall explore with my respondents, whether, and if so to what extent through 
shared experience and common learning, superintendents have developed some sense 
of common identity of a group. I shall use the information they provided to analyse 
whether this groupness had led to the development of a culture, and whether it had 
helped them to adapt, chameleon-like, to the changes that the service has gone 
through over the years, or whether they have remained entrenched, dinosaur-like, in 
their old familiar and comfortable ways. However, as a start and in order to examine 
the effect of the culture of senior police managers one has to look at the formation of 
this culture.
Under what conditions are leaders changing and managing culture?
I shall, with reference to the work of Edgar Schein, discuss the elements of and offer a 
definition of culture in chapter 3). However, as Schein explains, “a formal definition 
of organisational culture can tell us what culture is, but it does not tell us what cultural
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assumptions are about, why they form in the first place, and why they survive” 
(Schein 1992: 51).
He suggests that in order to understand the content and dynamics of culture, 
we must develop a model of how the core elements of a culture arise and why they 
persist. He explains that the most relevant model to use to analyse the various 
dimensions of culture “is one developed by sociology and group dynamics and based 
on the fundamental distinction between any group’s problems of (1) survival in and 
adaptation to its external environment and (2) integration of its internal processes to 
ensure the capacity to continue to survive and adapt” (ibid).
He adds that, “the issues or problems of external adaptation and survival 
basically specify the coping cycle that any system must be able to maintain in relation 
to its changing environment.” The essential elements of the coping cycle consist of 
the following,
“Mission and strategy: obtaining a shared understanding of core mission, 
primary task, manifest and latent functions.
Goals: developing consensus on goals, as derived from the core mission. 
Means: developing consensus on the means to be used to attain the goal, such 
as the organisational structure, division of labour, reward system, and 
authority system.
Measurement: developing consensus on the criteria to be used in measuring 
how well the group is doing in fulfilling its goals, such as the information and 
control system.
Correction: developing consensus on the appropriate remedial or repair 
strategies to be used if goals are not being met” (Schein 1992: 52).
He explains that although “each step in the cycle is presented in sequential 
order, any given organisation probably works on most of them simultaneously once it 
is a going concern”, and in conjunction with managing the problems of internal 
integration (ibid).
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As for internal integration, he adds that, “The processes that allow a group to 
internally integrate itself reflect the major internal issues that any group must deal 
with” (Schein 1992: 70). He suggests that they include the following,
“Creating a common language and conceptual categories: If members cannot 
communicate with and understand each other, a group is impossible by 
definition.
Defining group boundaries and criteria for inclusion and exclusion: The 
group must be able to define itself. Who is in and who is out, and by what 
criteria does one determine membership?
Distributing power and status: Every group must work out its pecking order, 
its criteria and rules for how managers get, maintain, and lose power. 
Consensus in this area is crucial to help members manage feelings of 
aggression.
Developing norms o f intimacy, friendship, and love: Every group must work 
out its rules of the game for peer relationships, for relationships between 
sexes, and for the manner in which openness and intimacy are to be handled in 
the context of managing the organisation’s tasks. Consensus in this area is 
crucial to help members manage feelings of affection and love.
Defining and allocating rewards and punishments: Every group must know 
what its heroic and sinful behaviours are and must achieve consensus on what 
is a reward and what is punishment.
Explaining the unexplained -  ideology and religion: Every group, like every 
society, faces unexplainable events that must be given meaning so that 
members can respond to them and avoid the anxiety of dealing with the 
unexplainable and uncontrollable” (Schein 1992: 70-71). The GTR initiative 
was firmly focused on ensuring that the internal integration of the police 
service was strong and capable of meeting the demands that were increasingly 
being placed on it.
Analysing police management culture.
Using the above model based on survival and adaptation to a changing external 
environment and integration of its internal processes, I shall analyse the content and
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dynamics of the culture of officers in the superintending ranks through discussing 
their policing experience under the following topics.
• Work history;
• Police function;
• Crime and its control;
• Public disorder;
• Internal management;
• Management of change;
• Social perspective; and
• Personal background.
Summary history of the research.
I started the study with the intention of conducting an evaluation of one quality of 
service initiative; ‘Getting Things Right’. There were inherent problems with doing 
this and the obvious one was that any changes that may have occurred after the 
implementation of the initiative could, at best, be claimed to have occurred during the 
period of the initiative. It would have been very difficult to attribute directly any 
changes in police management style and practice to the implementation of the 
initiative. Nonetheless, there was still the possibility of carrying out an evaluation of 
the initiative based on the perception of officers at every rank. I had planned to 
collect this information by using a combination of self-completion questionnaires, to 
collect quantitative data, and face to face interviews with a smaller sample to collect 
qualitative data. But, when it became clear that adoption of the initiative would be 
left to the discretion of each chief officer, and I found that it would not be adopted by 
most forces, I realised that it could prove difficult to collect sufficient information to 
produce a thesis for a Doctorate. At this point, I decided to revise the study and 
change the focus to examining how the social background and professional 
experience of officers in the superintending rank had influenced their style of 
management. The emphasis of the study was now redirected towards the examination 
of the personal and professional factors that could have contributed to creating a 
distinctive culture in the group, and the impact that the culture may have had on 
changing the management style of the service.
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This broadened the scope of the study from the narrow aspect of examining 
the possible effects of one quality of service initiative to examining the often-voiced 
concern within the service that many initiatives had floundered because officers in the 
superintending rank had not fully supported them. If there was some validity in this 
observation, it raised further questions. Were they resistant to changes because 
through their collective years of operational and management experience they knew 
or suspected that the proposed initiatives would not bring about the desired change? 
Alternatively, they may have become highly skilled at adapting to the constantly 
changing external environment, so that their adoption and implementation of these 
initiatives were done so smoothly that they merged seamlessly with the prevailing 
conditions?
The calls for change to the structure, management style and ultimately culture 
of the police service goes back many years, but they have increased in volume and 
regularity in the last three decades. Undoubtedly, there have been some positive 
changes, but to some, these have not been enough either in terms of their extent or in 
terms of appropriateness. Further, the police service has been accused of being 
resistant to change, preferring, at worst, to maintain the status quo and, at best, to 
make minor changes that give the impression of no change. One possible reason for 
the resistance to change could be the strong influence of police culture. However, the 
discussion of police culture has tended to be confined to the culture of the lower 
ranking uniformed officers. This study has set out to examine the extent of senior 
management culture in the service, i.e. that of the superintending ranks.
It will analyse and discuss the dimensions of the culture of police 
superintendents and how, or if, they differ from the culture of the other two main 
operational groups; Federation and ACPO. The study will examine and discuss 
whether the culture supports a progressive and adaptive style of leadership that has 
enabled senior police managers to cope with the changing external environment and 
manage the inevitable internal conflicts that have arisen. Alternatively, it will 
examine whether the culture has created a rigid and inflexible set of managers and 
administrators that have found it easier to maintain tried and tested methods of
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managing the service, which although may not have allowed the service to adapt 
adequately to contemporary demands, may have made internal integration less 
problematic.
Contemporary senior police managers in the superintending rank are being 
asked to be leaders, rather than managers or administrators. This group of officers is 
seen by the current Labour government as an important element in its vision to 
improve police performance through its reform process. As the Home Secretary said 
in his speech to the Superintendents’ Conference in September 2001, one of the 
essential elements in realising this vision “will be improving leadership in the service, 
which is central to delivering improvements in performance. This is particularly 
important at Superintendent level where effective leadership plays a key role in 
driving up performance at local level. Superintendents are at the forefront of the 
process of change” (Home Office (2) 2001).
Structure of the thesis.
The thesis is divided into eleven chapters. Following this introductory chapter, in 
chapter two, I shall discuss the research design and the methodology that I have used 
to collect and analyse my data. In chapter three I shall explore the concept of culture 
and offer a multi-layered definition of culture based on the work of Professor Edgar 
Schein. I shall then use Schein’s interpretation of culture to examine the elements of 
police culture. In chapter four I describe the social background of my respondents 
and explore their reasons for joining the police service. In chapter five, I shall discuss 
police managerialism, and highlight how this has changed over the years and how my 
respondents have adapted to the demands of contemporary police management 
problems. In chapter six I shall discuss the management of change and the methods 
that senior police managers have developed to manage the unrelenting number of 
initiatives that the service has been forced to pursue over the years. In chapters seven, 
eight and nine, I concentrate on three core operational policing functions. In chapter 
seven I shall discuss with my respondents contemporary policing issues, while in 
chapter eight I shall explore with them the subject of crime and its control. In chapter 
nine, I shall cover the topic of public disorder. In chapter ten, I shall explore the 
social philosophy of my respondents, through discussing broadly, the subject of
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fairness and the rule of law. I shall conclude the thesis in chapter eleven with an 
examination of the concept of police management culture.
The importance and significance of the group of officers that currently occupy 
the superintending rank cannot be overstated. Equally, the challenges that they face 
to create and maintain a modern-day police service that meets the needs of a number 
of diverse and increasingly demanding stakeholders cannot be underestimated. For 
example, Butler explains, in light of the recommendations made in the Sheehy Inquiry 
for the abolition of certain ranks, that,
“The major current challenge for the divisional (BCU) commander is to 
change from a style which had typically been concerned about control, 
direction and downward communication, to a leader mainly concerned about 
inspiring and encouraging people and enabling change. Unless this approach 
to management can be achieved and sustained, changes to structure and ranks 
will not in themselves improve operational effectiveness and productivity.” 
But warns, “This approach to management is more difficult and challenging 
than a more control style. It requires more people skills and person-to-person 
communication” (Butler 1994).
Starting with the method of data collection in the next chapter, I shall assess 
whether contemporary superintendents have been able to make this shift in 
management style.
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Chapter 2
METHODOLOGY.
RESEARCH DESIGN.
I started the study with the aim of evaluating an ACPO Quality of Service Committee 
initiative called ‘Getting Things Right’ (GTR). I had intended to use a combination 
of self-completion questionnaires to collect quantitative data and face to face 
interviews to collect qualitative data.
I had designed and distributed a questionnaire to 1100 officers, from constable 
to ACPO rank in eleven forces. From the analyses of the completed questionnaires 
that had been returned I soon realised that not many officers had heard of the ’GTR’ 
initiative let alone being able to ascribe to it any change they knew or perceived had 
occurred in their respective place of work. It was evident that conducting an 
evaluative study of ‘GTR’ was not going to provide sufficiently varied data to meet 
the requirements for a doctorate.
The lack of information was not due to either the return rate of the 
questionnaires, which was over 60%, nor the quality of the information provided by 
the respondents. It was more to do with the fact that the existence and or any post 
implementation effects of the initiative were not widely known by most officers at all 
ranks.
I therefore decided that to be able to collect sufficiently varied data to meet the 
requirements for a doctorate I needed to redesign the study and concentrate on 
collecting qualitative data from a restricted section of the service and using a smaller 
sample. However, by reducing the number of participants from whom I would collect 
data, I could use a predominantly qualitative methodology.
The research design of this study is based on a qualitative paradigm. 
Consistent with the way Creswell defined a qualitative study it was designed to be an
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inquiry into “understanding a social or human problem, based on building a complex, 
holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and 
conducted in a natural setting” (Creswell 1994: 1)
This is in comparison to a quantitative study, which would be an “inquiry into 
a social or human problem, based on testing a theory composed of variables, 
measured with numbers, and analysed with statistical procedures, in order to 
determine whether the predictive generalisations of the theory hold true” (Creswell 
1994: 2).
However, it would be an oversimplification to suggest by this brief exposition 
of the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research models that this study 
could be placed exclusively under the heading of a qualitative model. It could not, 
because the design is informed by the broad notion that despite the separation by time 
and space of my respondents, as a group they would have had sufficient contact, also 
shared similar positions and views, leading to commonalities of cultural perspectives 
to have been able to develop shared learning, understanding, beliefs and values that 
could have created a culture that was particular to the group. Therefore, although the 
research is designed to develop an understanding of police management culture 
through the collection of information about my respondents’ occupational experience 
in the police service, there is to some degree a testing of a hypothesis, on which the 
research is based, that commonality of experience and learning would lead to 
commonality in operational thinking and decision making.
Nonetheless, the study design is strongly oriented towards a qualitative 
paradigm. It was designed to encourage my respondents to reflect on their career in 
the police service, and in the process to evaluate some of the changes that had 
occurred during their career and the effects that some of these may have had on them 
as managers and individuals. Additionally, the study was designed to get them to 
respond intuitively to the different areas that we covered together. One of the reasons 
why I wanted my participants to respond intuitively was to counter any temptation to 
give the ‘right answers’ to my questions if they felt that their personal experience was 
somehow inadequate. I wanted to capture their views of policing, policework, and
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police management and not what they thought their views ought to have been. I 
believe that I managed to do as the following quote illustrates*
No I think that's been interesting, I, you know, I ’ve actually enjoyed 
answering some o f the questions, whether I've given you the answers you 
expect or not I  don't know. But yeah, I  found the questions were thought 
provoking and challenging, and that was o f interest. Now whether it would 
have helped both o f us had I  have had knowledge o f the specific questions 
before hand, I don't know. Probably not because you wouldn't have got a 
spontaneous answer. You'd have got a more planned, considered answer, and 
that perhaps is not what you want because you may have actually ended up 
with the party line, rather than me talking to you. (R. 5).
I felt that the most effective method by which to get my respondents to 
respond intuitively was to interview them face to face. Some of the advantages of 
using this method were firstly, it enabled my respondents to give historical 
information that I was able to use to contextualise their responses, secondly, it 
provided richer insight into their perspective and thirdly, it gave me the scope to 
control the line of questioning (Foddy 1994: 151).
However there are limitations with this method and some of these include the 
fact that my presence, as the researcher, may have created bias in my respondents’ 
response, and perhaps compounding this, not all people are equally articulate and 
perceptive (ibid).
The potential of my presence creating bias in my participants’ response was a 
real one because of my personal position. The fact that I was a serving police officer, 
I believe, helped in getting my respondents to talk openly and freely, as exemplified 
by the above quote. However, at the time I held the junior management position of 
inspector, and this position, combined with the backing for the study from the Police 
Staff College and my chief officer (information that I conveyed to my respondents 
during the explanatory discussions that I had with them before the interviews 
commenced), could well have tempted them to give the ‘right answers’.
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The tactics that I used to counter any bias in their responses were to stress the 
importance that I placed on their personal views, the fact that I was not looking for 
right or wrong answers and the unequivocal guarantee of confidentiality.
One way of judging whether or not these tactics worked is to examine the 
responses from my respondents. I believe that the comments by Respondent 5, 
quoted above, give some indication that the tactics may have had some success in 
preventing biased responses.
RESEARCH TECHNIQUES.
Respondents.
The sample.
I planned to interview a sample of officers from the superintending rank from a 
number of different Forces. However, I knew that the number of officers that I would 
be able to get to participate in the study would be determined by factors such as the 
cost of travelling to meet them at their place of work, and depending on their work 
commitments the length of time I would have with them to carry out the interviews. 
With these possible constraints in mind, I chose to interview 51 officers from 11 
Forces. I chose the Forces based on their geographical location and size, in order to 
achieve a representative mix of metropolitan and provincial Forces. I approached the 
Forces by sending two letters. One from me outlining the research proposal and 
seeking permission to interview officers from the Force. The second was from my 
chief officer giving his personal backing to the study as well as encouraging the chief 
officer of the Force to agree to my request to interview his/her officers. Of the 
original eleven Forces that I chose, two were unable to participate in the study, but I 
was able to replace them with two other ‘similar’ Forces. The reason why the two 
Forces could not participate in the study was that one was in the middle of conducting 
a large-scale survey of its staff and the other was planning to run a similar large-scale 
survey in the near future. Both felt that the work I was proposing to do could have 
adversely affected their surveys.
Having gained permission from eleven chief officers to work in their Forces, I 
was not able to choose the respondents from each Force as easily. The reasons for 
this were the combined factors of cost and access. It would have cost each Force time
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and money to have a member of staff draw up a list of all the superintendents in the 
Force, fit them into a sampling frame, draw a random sample of officers and then ask 
them if they wanted to take part in the study. To overcome this difficulty I did ask the 
Forces whether they could send me a list of their superintending rank officers without 
their names. Aside from the fact that there were some concern about the security and 
confidentiality of doing this, this was not a straightforward task for most of the Forces 
and they would have incurred some cost in drawing such a list. For these reasons, I 
had to settle for the Forces selecting the officers who would participate in the study. 
My contact person at each participating Force assured me that the officers were 
chosen randomly, and although I have no way of verifying this, I have no reason to 
doubt them.
During my time with my respondents, the issue of how or why they had been 
chosen to participate in the study was never raised. Nonetheless, I think it is 
reasonable to infer that there would have been some judgement made by my contact 
person in each Force when deciding who to approach to participate in the study, even 
if that judgement was based on the availability of an officer* For these reasons, I 
cannot state categorically that my group of respondents is a random sample.
Composition.
I interviewed 51 superintendents from 11 Forces. The composition of the sample of 
officers was 49 males and 2 females, with no officer from a Black or Minority Ethnic 
background. This breakdown is very close to the percentage of officers in this rank 
nationally in terms of gender and ethnicity, at the time of my fieldwork in 1995, as 
Tables 2 & 3 below shows.
The number of officers in the superintending ranks is shown in Table 2. The 
trend from 1990 to 2001 has been a reduction in the number of officers in this rank.
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Table 2. Total number of Superintendents in 43 Forces in England and
Year Total Male Female White Non-white
1990 2,055 2,019 36 2,051 4
1991 2,026 1,987 39 2,020 6
1992 2,073 2,030 43 2,069 4
1993 1,693 1,654 39 1,690 3
1994 1,411 1,373 38 1,407 4
1995 1,310 1,277 33 1,308 2
1996 1,288 1,248 40 1,286 2
1997 1,237 1,189 48 1,233 4
1998 1,205 1,145 60 1,199 6
1999 1,218 1,156 62 1,210 8
2000 1,172 1,109 63 1,158 14
2001 1,229 1,151 78 1,210 19
Figures supplies by HMIC Statistical Unit at the Home Office.
Table 3 shows these figures in percentages as follows.
Table 3. Percentage of Superintendent rank officers by gender and
ethnicity.
Year Total Male Female White Non­
white
1990 100.00 98.25 1.75 99.81 0.19
1991 100.00 98.08 1.92 99.70 0.30
1992 100.00 97.93 2.07 99.81 0.19
1993 100.00 97.70 2.30 99.82 0.18
1994 100.00 97.31 2.69 99.72 0.28
1995 100.00 97.48 2.52 99.85 0.15
1996 100.00 96.89 3.11 99.84 0.16
1997 100.00 96.12 3.88 99.68 0.32
1998 100.00 95.02 4.98 99.50 0.50
1999 100.00 94.90 5.10 99.34 0.66
2000 100.00 94.62 5.38 98.80 1.20
2001 100.00 93.65 6.35 98.45 1.55
The percentage distribution of my respondents in terms of gender is 4% 
female to 96% males. This is similar to the make up of officers in the superintending 
rank at the time of my fieldwork in 1995. The percentage composition of my 
respondents in terms of ethnicity is also very similar to the national picture; none of 
my respondents was from a minority ethnic group. It should be noted that 1995 had 
the smallest number of superintendents from an ethnic minority background compared 
to any other period.
However, the number of my respondents was equivalent to only 4% of all the 
superintendents in the 43 police forces in England and Wales, at the time of my 
fieldwork. Therefore, although the composition of my respondents reflects the 
national make-up, the small number means that any claim that they are a 
representative sample requires a great deal of caution.
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Personal and professional profile.
I have included the following information in order to give a fuller and more detailed 
descriptive picture of my respondents and not for comparative purposes, because such 
information is not readily available for all the superintendents in all the forces in 
England and Wales. Additionally, the information helps to support my claim that my 
respondents are more likely than not to be a representative sample. Table 4 gives the 
year of birth, age, date of joining the police and length of service of my respondents.
Table 4. Respondents’ personal details.
Respondents Born Age Sex Date of Joining Length of Service
1 1953 43 Male 1972 24
2 1944 52 M 1964 32
3 1953 43 M 1972 24
4 1947 49 M 1969 27
5 1945 51 M 1969 27
6 1945 51 M 1965 31
7 1950 46 M 1969 27
S 1950 46 M 1969 27
9 1947 49 M 1967 31
10 1946 50 M 1966 30
11 1948 48 M 1967 31
12 1956 40 M 1975 21
13 1946 50 M 1966 30
14 1948 48 M 1967 (Cadet 1965) 31
15 1948 48 Female 1971 25
16 1954 42 M 1978 18
17 1952 44 M 1969 27
18 1949 47 M 1969 27
19 1951 45 M 1970 26
20 1943 53 M 1963 33
21 1944 52 M 1964 32
22 1947 49 M 1966 30
23 1945 51 M 1968 28
24 1939 57 M 1967 31
25 1958 38 M 1979 17
26 1944 52 M 1963 33
27 1947 49 M 1966 30
28 1948 48 M 1967 (Cadet 1965) 29
29 1944 52 M 1966 30
30 1944 52 M 1964 32
31 1945 51 M 1964 32
32 1949 47 M 1968 (Cadet 1966) 28
33 1942 54 M 1967 29
34 1947 49 M 1966 30
35 1944 52 M 1964 32
36 1944 52 M 1963 (Cadet 1960) 33
37 1945 51 M 1965 31
38 1945 51 M 1965 (Cadet 1961) 31
39 1945 51 M 1968 28
40 1947 49 M 1968 28
41 1946 50 M 1965 (Cadet 1963) 31
42 1953 43 M 1972 (Cadet 1971) 24
43 1953 43 M 1972 (Cadet 1971) 24
44 1954 42 M 1976 20
45 1943 53 M 1971 25
46 1945 51 M 1968 28
47 1953 43 Female 1980 16
48 1946 50 M 1965 31
49 1951 45 M 1971 25
50 1954 42 M 1973 (Cadet 1971) 23
51 1949 47 M 1972 24
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Details of the age at which my respondents joined the police and in what 
capacity, and an aggregate of the percentage that joined at certain ages are shown in 
Tables 5 and 6 respectively below. All my respondents, like all other officers at 
whatever rank, joined as constables. At the time of the fieldwork, there was not the 
possibility of joining at a higher rank. However, at the time of writing the 
government had just raised in its 2004 White Paper on Police Reform titled Building 
Communities, Beating Crime, (Home Office 2004) the possibility of lateral entry in to 
the service
Table 5. Age at which respondents joined police service.
Respondents Age at which joined police
1 19
2 20
3 19
4 22
5 24
6 20
7 19
8 19
9 20
10 20
11 18
12 19
13 20
14 17-Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
15 23
16 24
17 17
18 20
19 19
20 20
21 20
22 19
23 23
24 28
25 21
26 19
27 19
28 17-Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
29 22
30 20
31 19
32 17-Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
33 25
34 19
35 20
36 16-Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
37 20
38 16-Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
39 23
40 21
41 17-Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
42 17-Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
43 17-Cadets. (19 joined Regulars)
44 22
45 28
46 23
47 27
48 19
49 20
50 17 -  Cadet
51 23
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Table 6. Age at which respondents joined the police
Age at which joined police No. %
16 2 4
17 8 16
18 1 2
19 12 23
20 12 23
21 2 4
22 3 6
23 5 10
24 2 4
25 1 2
26 0 0
27 1 2
28 2 4
Total 51 100
Data collection.
I chose to collect the information from my respondents by carrying out face-to-face 
interviews using a semi-structured question schedule.
The interview technique was preferable for this study for a number of reasons.
• I was going to be asking numerous open-ended questions, often followed by 
open-ended probes, and I would be recording the answers verbatim. “Such 
open-ended questions are important in allowing the respondents to say what 
they think and to do so with greater richness and spontaneity” (Oppenheim 
1992: 89).
• I could be certain that it would improve the response rate in comparison to 
using a self-completion postal questionnaire.
• I could give a better prepared and fuller explanation of the purpose of the 
study, and what I wanted from the respondents, than I could have done with a 
letter.
• I could develop some level of rapport with the respondents. Oppenheim has 
described rapport as, “this elusive quality, which keeps the respondent 
motivated and interested in answering the questions truthfully” (ibid.). 
Keeping my respondents motivated and interested was important because I 
wanted to get rich data from them and I believed that this was a way of 
achieving that.
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To establish rapport necessitates developing good conversation skillls. Kvale 
suggests that the research interview is based on the conversations of daily life and is a 
professional conversation. He defines a semi-structured life world interview as “an 
interview whose purpose is to obtain descriptions of the life world of the interviewees 
with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomenon” (Kvale 1996).
For my study, I decided to use a semi-structured interview schedule because I 
wanted to minimise any bias in the way I conducted the interviews with my 
respondents. This sounds paradoxical in light of the above statement that I wanted to 
build a rapport with my respondents. However, I was concerned that once we started 
‘discussing’ the different areas contained in the question schedule and having 
developed a rapport with each one, I may have found it difficult to stop the 
conversation drifting onto areas that my respondents and I found mutually more 
interesting. Enjoyable as this may have been for both of us, if I was unable prevent 
the interview drifting it could have yielded little comparable information from all my 
respondents.
This concern was a rational one because although Kvale suggests that the research 
interview is based on professional conversations of daily life, it is not a conversation 
between equal partners, since the researcher defines the subject of conversation and, 
to a certain extent, controls the situation. In my case, although never intended, I 
believe that the encounters with my respondents were influenced in my favour, the 
researcher, for the following reasons.
Access letter. I successfully applied to the Police Staff College to carry out the 
work under the Bramshill Fellowship Scheme (1), after I had been accepted by the 
London School of Economics to pursue the study. The reasons for applying for the 
Scheme, which provided academic support but not financial, were twofold. The first 
was that it would give the study credibility in the eyes of the chief officers from 
whom I would have to seek permission to interview their officers. This was important 
because Forces were finding it harder to accommodate the number of requests they 
were receiving from students and scholars who wanted to carry out research on the 
police. Secondly, it would guarantee me the time to conduct the fieldwork, which due 
to the research design would prove to be extremely time-consuming. To reinforce the
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credibility of the study and thereby provide further justification for chief officers to 
allow me to work with their officers, I added that the study was being carried out in 
conjunction with work that was being done by the ACPO Quality of Service 
Committee: The ‘GTR’ initiative. (A copy of this letter is shown as Appendix A). 
Not entirely certain that the above measures would guarantee me access to my chosen 
Forces, I approached my Commissioner at the time, Mr William Taylor, for his 
support and he added a personal letter to the one I was sending to the chief officers. 
(A copy of this letter is shown as Appendix B).
The combination of these two letters, the support of the Police Staff College under 
the Bramshill Fellowship Scheme, and the reputation of my supervisor, Professor 
Robert Reiner, made the offer to chief officers to use their Force as part of the study, 
one that was too good to refuse! In truth, these were the measures I felt I had to go 
through to have some certainty that I would get access to those Forces that I thought 
would be ideal for the study.
One ethical problem that these measures might have created for my respondents 
and their Forces was the possible pressure to agree to my request to work with their 
Force. I had to ensure that both Force and individual officers consented freely and 
voluntarily (Homan 1991: Ch 4).
From the Forces’ perspective, I believe the fact that two Forces were prepared to 
turn down my request to work with their officers shows that any pressure was 
resistible and not unethical. From the individual’s perspective, I always made it clear 
during the pre-interview discussion with my respondents that they did not have to 
participate in the study if they did not want to. I believe that if a participant was 
participating voluntarily then s/he was more likely to be open in their replies to the 
questions. The responses from my respondents clearly showed that they responded to 
my questions fully and openly. Additionally, one possible ethical safeguard that the 
combined measures offered was that I was under pressure to ensure that the way I 
conducted the study lived up to the reputation and integrity of the supporters of the 
study (Homan 1991: Ch. 1 & 7).
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The reason I felt I had to employ these efforts to ensure that I secured access to 
my respondents was not because the police service was still remaining secretive to 
academic scrutiny. On the contrary, it was because the service had become so 
accommodating to both internal and external requests to carry out academic studies 
that they were becoming a drain on its resources.
Pre-interview chat Once I had secured access to the Forces that I wanted to 
participate in the study, I arranged with my liaison person in each Force a time and 
date to meet the participants for the interviews. Before an interview, I met each one 
for a pre-interview chat. With some of them, we had lunch beforehand, but on every 
occasion I made sure that we had some time to discuss the aim of the study and 
policing in general before we started the interviews. The reason was to establish 
some level of rapport with each respondent, and deal with any concerns they may 
have had about participating in the study. One recurring concern my respondents 
expressed was whether they would be able to give me the answers that I was looking 
for. I explained that I did not have any pre-conceived idea of what their answers 
would or should be. I had certainly not formed any expectations of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
answers. I made it clear that what I hoped for from them were their professional and 
personal views of the different areas we were going to cover. From this, I intended to 
draw together the collective perspective of policing of all the participants.
Question schedule. This was a modification of the question schedule used by 
Reiner in his study of chief constables (Reiner 1991: 356-361). The modifications 
that I made consisted of replacing Reiner’s section on ‘External Environment of the 
Police Force’ with my ‘Management of Change’ section. This enabled me to 
concentrate more on activities of my respondents. I also removed some questions 
from the different sections that were not relevant to my study. For example, under 
Reiner’s Section A: Work History, questions 6,7,8,14, 15 and parts of question 9 that 
covered his respondents’ position as chief officers were omitted.
Even after removing and replacing some questions, there were still a significant 
number that remained the same, and in certain sections of the thesis I have been able 
to make some comparative analysis between both data sets. A typical example was 
the section on ‘Crime and its Control’. I did not show my respondents the questions
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before I interviewed them, because I wanted them to reply spontaneous and 
intuitively.
The questions (shown as Appendix C) covered the following areas:
• Work History
• The Police Function
• Crime and its Control
• Public Disorder
• Internal Management
• Management of Change
• Social Perspective
• Personal Background.
Process. I carried out the interviews between October 1995 and September 1996, 
and each was carried out in the respondent’s Force. Each interview was tape- 
recorded, with the agreement of the respondent. I decided to tape-record the 
interviews because I felt that it would enable me to collect much richer data and the 
method would lead to information that is more accurate when I transcribed the tapes. 
Additionally, it meant that the interviews could flow easier, which would enable me 
to build a rapport with my respondents.
Whilst piloting different methods for recording the interviews with officers 
from my Force, I had tried writing the replies contemporaneously. However, I found 
that this method not only made the conversation slow and repetitive because I had to 
ask my respondent to repeat some of their answers, but when I came to analyse the 
data it was very sparse in comparison to other pilot interviews I had tape-recorded. I 
therefore decided based on the results from both methods that I would tape-record the 
interviews because it was likely to yield more information through a better flow of the 
conversation.
The interviews lasted between thirty minutes and three hours. The three-hour 
interview would have continued longer had it not been that I had come to the end of a 
second tape and was then nearly an hour late from seeing my next scheduled
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respondent, and he had actually telephoned the officer I was then interviewing to ask 
him, jokingly, to release me!
Data analysis.
I transcribed all the tapes and used the qualitative data analysis software QSR 
NUD*IST (2) to analyse the data. I started using version 2 of NUD*IST, but by the 
time I had transcribed all the tapes, some two years later, a new version of NUD*IST 
had been released. The newer version -  4 -  had updated software that allowed for 
more in-depth analysis of the collected data.
However, before settling on NUD*IST as my analytical tool, I experimented 
with a variety of methods for analysing the data. For example, I started listing 
relevant comments under the different areas of the question schedule. However, I 
soon realised after doing this for a couple of interviews that this would become very 
complex and cumbersome. I then tried to note the time on each tape where each 
respondent made a valuable and relevant comment. Again, I quickly realised that by 
winding and rewinding the tapes back and forth I ran the risk of damaging them and 
losing my data.
In the end, I decided that the method that was likely to yield information that 
is more accurate was to tape-record the interviews. The recordings were then 
transcribed into Microsoft Word before they were transferred onto the NUD*IST 4 
software package, with which I then compared and analysed all the data.
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Discussion.
Asking questions and getting answers is a much harder task than it may seem at first 
sight. The spoken or written word has always a residue of ambiguity, no matter how 
carefully we word the questions and report the answers. Yet interviewing is one of 
the most powerful methods by which to understand our fellow human beings. This 
was perhaps the main reason why I decided to use face-to-face interview to collect 
data from my respondents, because the common occupational background of 
interviewer and interviewee was likely to create the empathy and understanding that 
would lead to a more open and responsive discussion between both. Of course, the 
use of a semi-structured interview and my skills as an interviewer would not have 
been, in this case, the only determinants of a more open and responsive encounter. I 
believe that the knowledge gained as a ‘participant observer’ over the years as a 
police officer would have contributed greatly to getting the best from my respondents.
As a fellow officer, I had experienced the culture of the police service through 
sharing some common learning, experiences and values with my respondents. This 
had given me a similar world-view, which I used to adapt my responses to each 
officer in order to bring out the best in each encounter. However, I was also mindful 
that the ability to see and interpret situations in a similar way as my respondents did 
not necessarily mean that our world-view was an accurate one. Our way of seeing 
could also mean that we were not seeing some things that were perhaps more 
accurate.
Nonetheless, since I was not looking for ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers, I decided 
that face-to-face interview was the ideal method with which to tease out the thoughts 
and feelings of my respondents and it provided the best method by which to better 
probe the culture of this group of officers that I had decided to make the subject of my 
study. The next chapter will discuss the social background of my respondents and its 
possible effect on the culture of this group of officers.
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Chapter 3
POLICE CULTURE.
INTRODUCTION.
In this chapter, I shall start by discussing the concept of culture, offering a definition 
based on a paradigm developed by Edgar Schein. I shall then use the definition, 
together with two recent studies on police culture by Chan (Chan 1996) and 
Waddington (Waddington 1999) to discuss the aspects of police ‘cop’ and 
‘management’ culture.
The reason for starting the chapter with a definition of culture is that 
discussions on police culture have invariably started from a position that assumes that 
the reader’s concept and understanding of culture is the same as the author’s and 
consequently authors have rarely described what the term culture is meant to signify. 
For example, Chan offers the following descriptive aspects of culture,
“Manning refers to the ‘core skills, cognitions, and affect’ that defines ‘good 
police work’... Reiner equates it with the ‘values, norms, perspectives and 
craft rules’ that inform police conduct. Skolnick Speaks of the ‘working 
personality’ of a police officer -  a response to the danger of police work, the 
authority of the police constable, and the pressure to be ‘productive’ and 
‘efficient’ in police work” (Chan 1996: 111).
Too often it is taken as a given that the concept of culture means the same 
thing to all readers, and therefore all that is necessary is for an author to move straight 
into discussing the elements and effects of police culture. This can be problematic, 
because if the reader does not have a clear understanding of what an author defines as 
culture, then there is likely to be misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the 
discussion. Therefore, to obviate any misunderstanding or misinterpretation it is 
important to offer a definition of culture before delving into the discussion.
47
DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL PARADIGM.
The word culture is a ubiquitous term that means different things to different people. 
For example, in everyday usage the layperson often uses it to describe someone who 
is educated, well mannered and sophisticated, such as when an individual is described 
as ‘cultured’. At the other extreme and in a more formal and technical sense, 
anthropologists use culture to describe the rituals and customs that a particular social 
group has developed to guide and inform its behaviour and actions.
In the study of management theory and practice over the last two decades or 
so, organisational researchers and managers have used the term to describe “the 
climate and practices that organisations develop around their handling of people or to 
refer to the espoused values and credo of an organisation.” (Schein 1992: 3). As 
Schein points out, “in this context managers speak of developing the ‘right kind of 
culture’ or a ‘culture of quality,’ suggesting that culture is concerned with certain 
values that managers are trying to inculcate in their organisations. Also implied in 
this usage is the assumption that there are better or worse cultures, stronger or weaker 
cultures, and that the ‘right’ kind of culture will influence how effective organisations 
are” (ibid).
This latter quote is a good example of the way that the police service has used 
the term in the recent past. ACPO Quality of Service Committee’s message has been 
predominandy about improving the culture of the police service so that it would be 
better able to deal effectively with the demands and expectations that are currendy 
placed on it (ACPO 1993a).
However, the complexity of such a simple managerial desire lies in the fact 
that the concept of culture can and does mean different things to different people. To 
some, it is a complex concept, while to others it is a simple one. For some it is a part 
of an organisation, for others it is the organisation. Therefore, there has not always 
been a consensus both internally and externally on what police culture is, or how the 
culture could or should be influenced to bring about desired changes. The police’s 
own internal document (Getting Things Right) on how to bring about a change in 
management style and consequendy a change in cultural perspective offers an 
elaborate and interrelated menu of options that is anything but straightforward in its
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implementation. One of the main reasons for the complexity lies in the different 
meanings given to the different aspects of culture.
Schein’s definition of culture helps to explain the existence of multiple 
meanings through the development of a three-tiered model. He suggests that, “if an 
abstract concept is to be useful to our thinking, it should refer to a set of events that 
are otherwise mysterious and not well understood”. From this point of view, he adds 
that, “we must avoid the superficial models of culture and build on the deeper, more 
complex anthropological models”. He argues that, “culture would be most useful as a 
concept if it helps us better understand the hidden and complex aspects of 
organisational life”, and that, “this understanding cannot be obtained if we use 
superficial definitions” (Schein 1993: 3).
Towards a paradigm.
According to Schein, a commonly ascribed meaning of culture emphasises one of its 
critical aspects, which is the idea that certain things in groups are “shared or held in 
common. ” Some of the other major categories of phenomena that are associated with 
culture in this sense are the following:
1 “Observed behavioural regularities when people interact: the language they 
use, the customs and traditions that evolve, and the rituals they employ in a 
wide variety of situations.” In policing terms, this category is exemplified by 
what Smith and Gray (1983) described as the ‘working rules’ that police 
officers use to modify their behaviour during their interactions with members 
of the public. This exemplifies Waddington’s (1999) appreciative description 
of police oral culture. However, as will be made clear later, this may only 
reflect one level of police culture and not the culture.
2 “Group norms: the implicit standards and values that evolve in working 
groups, such as the particular norm of a ‘fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay’ 
that evolved among the workers in the Bank Wiring Room in the Hawthorne 
studies (for example, Homans 1950)”. In terms of the police, the analogy 
would be that officers should maintain solidarity with others of similar rank, 
and treat those of different ranks differently, possibly as ‘outsiders’. For 
example, the type of situation that developed in some police precincts in New
York City following the report of the Knapp Commission on corruption in the 
1970s (Reuss-Ianni and Ianni 1983).
3 “Espoused values: the articulated, publicly announced principles and values 
that the group claims to be trying to achieve, such as ‘product quality’ or 
‘price leadership’.” A contemporary manifestation of this aspect of culture 
with reference to police management would be the publication of force values 
and statements of purpose.
4 “Formal philosophy: the broad policies and ideological principles that guide a 
group's actions toward stockholders, employees, customers, and other 
stakeholders, such as the highly publicised ‘HP Way’ or Hewlett-Packard.” In 
the police service, these are now published in documents such as policing 
plans. A few years ago, they would have been published as Police Charters.
5 “Rules o f the game: the implicit rules of getting along in the organisation, ‘the 
ropes’ that a newcomer must learn to become an accepted member, ‘the way 
we do things around here’”. The socialisation process to which new members 
are subjected in order to establish themselves in the organisation in general 
and their place of work in particular (Fielding 1988, Graef 1989).
6 “Climate: the feeling that is conveyed in a group by the physical layout and 
the way in which members of the organisation interact with each other, with 
customers, or with other outsiders.” The overt display of the perception of 
them and us in the sense that officers perceive themselves as the protectors of 
the ethical and moral standards of society. Without their overt and visible 
presence, the fragile control and harmony this creates in society would be 
damaged, which would lead to chaos and anarchy. This view is typified by the 
argument of the ‘thin blue line’.
7 “Embedded skills: the special competencies group members display in 
accomplishing certain tasks, the ability to make certain things that gets passed 
on from generation to generation without necessarily being articulated in 
writing (for example, Peters and Waterman 1982).” Recognising and 
respecting a good villain, and not confusing him with a ‘toe-rag’. Knowing 
how to get a ‘cough’ from an offender, skills that only comes from practical 
experience gained through dealing with villains. The suggestion is that the 
skills required to perform these important tasks properly can only be gained 
through professional experience ‘on the job’ and they are not acquired easily
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through book learning. One acquires them through long, hard practical 
operational experience.
8 “Habits o f thinking, mental models, and/or linguistic paradigms: the shared 
cognitive frames that guide the perceptions, thoughts, and language used by 
the members of a group and are taught to new members in the early 
socialisation process.” There is a debate about the difference between what is 
articulated in the ‘canteen’ and what is acted out on the streets. Police 
officers’ thoughts and words expressed in private are not translated directly 
into action on the street (Waddington 1999a).
9 “Shared meanings: the emergent understandings that are celebrated by group 
members as they interact with each other.”
10 "Root metaphors" or integrating symbols: the ideas, feelings, and images 
groups develop to characterise themselves, that may or may not be appreciated 
consciously but that become embodied in buildings, office layout, and other 
material artefacts of the group. This level of the culture reflects group 
members' emotional and aesthetic responses as contrasted with their cognitive 
or evaluative responses.”
Schein explains that “all of these concepts relate to culture and/or reflect 
culture in that they deal with things that group members share or hold in common, but 
none of them are ‘the culture’ of an organisation or group” (Schein 1992: 8). He 
suggests that the reason why we use the word culture instead of many of the others 
available to describe regular behaviour patterns such as, “norms, values, rituals, 
traditions, ” is because the word culture adds two other critical elements to the 
concept of sharing. One of them is that the word implies “some level of structural 
stability in the group.
“The other element that lends stability is patterning or integration of the 
elements into a larger paradigm that ties together the various elements that lie at a 
deeper level. Culture somehow implies that rituals, climate, values, and behaviours 
bind together into a coherent whole. This patterning or integration is the essence” of 
what Schein, means by culture (ibid).
51
This integration of the different elements of culture in to a coherent whole 
comes about through the accumulated learning of a given group, and it covers the 
behavioural, emotional, and cognitive elements of the group members’ total 
psychological functioning. However, “for shared learning to occur, there must be a 
history of shared experience, which in turn implies some stability of membership in 
the group.” Therefore, “given such stability and shared history, the human need for 
parsimony, consistency, and meaning will cause the various shared elements to form 
into patterns that eventually can be called a culture” (ibid).
Naturally, not all groups develop integrated cultures in this sense. On the 
contrary, as those who have spent time with the police would have experienced, 
different groups from the same station will police the same area in different ways. 
The values and norms of these groups will not always be the same. Moreover, 
different ranks and functional units within the service will display different cultural 
elements, which may work at cross-purpose with other elements, leading to situations 
full of conflict and ambiguity. “This may result from insufficient stability of 
membership, insufficient shared experience, or the presence of many subgroups with 
different kinds of shared experiences” (ibid).
Equally, “ambiguity and conflict also result from the fact that each of us 
belongs to many groups so that what we bring to any given group is influenced by the 
assumptions that are appropriate to our other groups” (Schein 1992: 11). Schein 
suggests that if the concept of culture is to be of any use it should draw our attention 
to those things that are the product of our human need for stability, consistency, and 
meaning. The consistency of the observed behaviour that Waddington describes as 
the oral culture (Waddington 1999(1): 118)), which is common amongst officers that 
are separated by time and location and which as he has acknowledged consist of 
derogatory sexist and racist language by officers, suggest that it must provide some 
stability and meaning to officers’ occupational environment. Schein adds, “Culture 
formation, therefore, is always, by definition, a striving towards patterning and 
integration, even though the actual history of experiences of many groups prevents 
them from ever achieving a clear-cut paradigm” (Schein 1992: 11).
52
The question is “if a group’s culture is that group’s accumulated learning, how 
do we describe and catalogue the content of that learning?” Schein explains that “all 
groups and organisational theories distinguish two major sets of problems that all 
groups, no matter what their size, must deal with:
1. Survival, growth, and adaptation in their environment (this is analogous to 
Chan’s (1996) concept of ‘Field’; and
2. Internal integration that permits daily functioning and the ability to adapt 
(this is analogous to Chan’s concept of ‘Habitus’).”
Learning can and does take place at different levels for the individual and 
groups. Schein adds that “in conceptualising group learning, we have to note that 
because of the human capacity to abstract and to be self-conscious, learning occurs 
not only at the behavioural level but also at an abstract level internally. Once people 
have a common system of communication and a language, learning can take place at a 
conceptual level and shared concepts become possible.” It is this deeper level of 
learning that Schein suggests get us to the essence of culture and which must be 
thought of as “shared basic assumptions” (Schein 1992: 11).
“Shared assumptions derive their power from the fact that they begin to 
operate outside o f awareness. Furthermore, once formed and taken for 
granted, they become a defining property o f the group that permits the group 
to differentiate itself from other groups, and in that process, value is attached 
to such assumptions. They are not only ‘our’ assumptions, but by virtue o f our 
history o f success, they must be right and good. In fact, we tend not to 
examine assumptions once we have made them but we take them for granted, 
and we tend not to discuss them, which make them seemingly unconscious. I f  
we are forced to discuss them, we tend not to examine them but to defend them 
because we have emotionally invested in them” (Schein 1992: 12).
Towards a definition.
From his experience and study of the concept, Schein offers the following definition 
of culture.
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“A pattern o f shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its 
problems o f external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as 
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems ” 
(Schein 1992: 12)
This definition introduces two elements that have so far not been discussed. 
These are socialisation and behaviour. The issue of socialisation concerns whether 
culture can be learned through anticipatory socialisation or self-socialisation, and 
whether new members could discover for themselves what the basic assumptions of a 
group are. Schein suggests that culture could be learned through both anticipatory 
and self-socialisation. He adds that one of the major activities of any new member 
when they join a group is to decipher the norms and assumptions that are operating 
within that group. However, this deciphering can only be successfully achieved 
through understanding the rewards and punishments that long-time members mete out 
to new members as they experiment with different kinds of behaviour. “In this sense, 
a teaching process is always going on, even though it may be quite implicit and 
unsystematic. If the group does not have shared assumptions, as is sometimes the 
case, the new members’ interaction with old members will be a more creative process 
of building a culture. Once shared assumptions exist, however, the culture survives 
through teaching them to newcomers. In this regard culture is a mechanism of social 
control and can be the basis of explicitly manipulating members into perceiving, 
thinking, and feeling in certain ways” (Schein 1992: 13).
The definition of culture offered above does not include overt behaviour patterns, 
despite the fact that some such behaviour would reflect cultural assumptions, 
especially formal rituals. Part of the reason for this is that “overt behaviour is always 
determined both by the cultural predisposition (the perceptions, thoughts and feelings 
that are patterned) and by the situational contingencies that arise from the immediate 
external environment. Behavioural regularities could thus be as much a reflection of 
separate but similar individual experiences and/or common situational stimuli arising 
from the environment.” Therefore, “when we observe behaviour regularities, we do 
not know whether we are dealing with a cultural manifestation” or an individual 
reaction to situational stimuli. Schein suggests that only after we have discovered the
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deeper layers that he has defined as the essence of culture can we specify what is and 
what is not an ‘artefact’ that reflects the culture (Schein 1992: 14). This explanation 
of behavioural regularities appear at odds with most analyses of police culture, which 
suggest it is a result of work process interaction, where common problems structure 
similar modes of coping, which are then transmitted by interaction. However, using 
the following example, it is arguable that there is no dissonance between both 
explanations. Twenty years ago, it was common practice for junior officers, 
instinctively, to stand when a senior officer, particularly one of ACPO rank, walked 
into a room. Today, the practice is not as widespread nor carried out as instantly, but 
is still done by some officers in some forces. The reasons why today a relatively 
smaller group of officers still behave this way could be a reflection of separate but 
similar individual experiences, or a cultural manifestation, but one that is losing its 
significance.
Analysis of Culture.
In analysing culture, Schein separates the concept into three categories and makes a 
clear distinction between the superficial level he terms ‘artefact’ with the other, 
deeper levels of ‘espoused values’ and ‘basic assumptions’. The term level is used to 
describe the degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to the observer. He 
uses this distinction of the different levels to explain that “some o f the confusion o f 
definition of what culture really is results from not differentiating the levels at which 
it manifest itself. These levels range from the very tangible overt manifestations that 
one can see and feel to the deeply embedded, unconscious basic assumptions, which 
he defines as the essence of culture. While in between these extremes lie ‘espoused 
values’, which are the norms, and rules of behaviour that members of the culture use 
as a way of depicting the culture to themselves and others” (Schein 1992: 16).
Levels of culture.
Taking an in-depth look at the three levels to which Schein adheres, they provide 
some objectivity to the discussion of culture.
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Figure 3.1. Levels of Culture (Schein 1992:17)
Artefacts
Espoused Values
Basic Underlying 
Assumptions
Visible organisational structures and 
processes (hard to decipher)
Strategies, goals, philosophies 
(espoused values)
Unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, 
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings 
(ultimate source of values and action)
Artefacts
This is the surface, superficial and most visible of Schein’s three-level 
representation of culture and it consists of “all the phenomena that one sees, hears, 
and feels when one encounters a new group with an unfamiliar culture.” It includes 
“its language, manners of dress, emotional displays, myths and stories told about the 
organisation, published list of values, observable rituals and ceremonies.”
The importance of this level of the culture is that although every facet of a 
group’s life produces artefacts, nonetheless, it is easy to observe and very difficult to 
decipher. This creates a problem in classifying the different descriptions of culture.
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As Schein observes, “in reading cultural descriptions, one often notes that different 
observers choose to report on different sorts o f artefacts, leading to noncomparable 
descriptions”. However, “if the observer lives in the group long enough, the meaning 
of artefacts gradually become clear”. He warns that, “it is especially dangerous to try 
to infer the deeper assumptions from artefacts alone because one’s interpretations 
will inevitably be projections o f one’s own feelings and reactions” (Schein 1992:18). 
(My emphases). Although not directed at his interpretation of police oral culture, 
Waddington makes a similar point when he suggests that “there is the distinct 
possibility that the literature on the police sub-culture tells us more about the 
peculiarities of academic life than it does about the distinctiveness of the police” 
(Waddington 1999a: 292).
Espoused Values.
This is the second level of the model and it reflects the ideals rather than the substance 
of the group. Schein offers an explanation of how this level is developed by 
suggesting that, “when a group faces a new task, issue or problem, the first solution 
proposed reflects some individual’s own assumptions about what is right or wrong, 
and what will work or not work.” However, whatever is proposed at this stage to deal 
with the new task or resolve the problem will only have the status of a value from the 
point of view of the group, regardless of how strongly the proponent may believe he is 
uttering absolute truth. “Until the group has taken some joint action and its members 
have together observed the outcome of that action, there is not as yet a shared basis 
for determining what is factual and real” (Schein 1992: 19).
If the group acts on the proposal and it is successful, in that it produces the 
suggested results, and if the group has a shared perception of that success, then the 
perceived value will gradually start a process of “cognitive transformation. First, it 
will be transformed into a shared value or belief and, ultimately, into a shared 
assumption (if action based on it continues to be successful)” (ibid).
However, “not all values undergo such transformation. First, the solution 
based on a given value may not work reliably. Only values that are 
susceptible to physical or social validation (i.e. that are confirmed only by the 
shared social experience of the group) and that continue to work reliably in
57
solving the group’s problems will become transformed into assumptions. 
Second, value domains dealing with the less controllable elements of the 
environment or with aesthetic or moral matters may not be testable at all. In 
such cases consensus through social validation is still possible, but it is not 
automatic.
“Such values typically involve the group’s internal relations, where the test of 
whether they work or not is how comfortable and anxiety free members are 
when they abide by them...A set of values that becomes embodied in an 
ideology or organisational philosophy thus can serve as a guide and as a way 
of dealing with the uncertainty of intrinsically uncontrollable or difficult 
events.
“Values at this conscious level will predict much of the behaviour that can be 
observed at the artificial level. But if those values are not based on prior 
learning, they may also reflect what Argyris and Schon (1978) have called 
espoused values, which will predict well enough what people will say in a 
variety of situations but which may be out of line with what they will actually 
do in situations where those values should in fact be operating” (Schein 1992: 
21). This is the premise of Waddington’s Police (Canteen) Culture article 
(Waddington 1999a).
“If the espoused values are reasonably congruent with the underlying 
assumptions, then the articulation of those values into a philosophy of 
operating can be helpful in bringing the group together, serving as a source of 
identity and core mission... Often such lists of values are not patterned, 
sometimes they are even mutually contradictory, and often they are 
inconsistent with observed behaviour.” The consequence is that “large areas 
of behaviour are often left unexplained, leaving us with a feeling that we 
understand a piece of culture but still do not have the culture as such in hand” 
(Schein 1992: 21).
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Basic Assumptions.
Schein defines these as assumptions that have become so taken for granted that one 
finds little variation within the cultural unit. Adding that,
“in fact, if a basic assumption is strongly held in a group, members will find 
behaviour based on any other premise inconceivable... They tend to be those 
we neither confront nor debate and hence are extremely difficult to change. 
To learn something new in this realm requires us to resurrect, re-examine, and 
possibly change some of the more stable portions of our cognitive structure... 
Such learning is intrinsically difficult because the re-examination of basic 
assumptions temporarily destabilises our cognitive and interpersonal world, 
releasing large quantities of anxiety.
“Rather than tolerating such anxiety levels we tend to want to perceive the 
events around us as congruent with our assumptions, even if that means 
distorting, denying, projecting, or in other ways falsifying to ourselves what 
may be going on around us. It is in this psychological process that culture has 
its ultimate power. Culture as a set of basic assumptions defines for us what to 
pay attention to, what things mean, how to react emotionally to what is going 
on, and what actions to take in various kinds of situations. Once we have 
developed an integrated set of such assumptions, which might be called a 
thought world or mental map, we will be maximally comfortable with others 
who share the same set of assumptions and very uncomfortable and vulnerable 
in situations where different assumptions operate either because we will not 
understand what is going on, or, worse, misperceive and misinterpret the 
actions of others.
“The human mind needs cognitive stability. Therefore, any challenge to or 
questioning of a basic assumption will release anxiety and defensiveness. In 
this sense, the shared basic assumption that make up the culture of a group can 
be thought of at both the individual and group levels as psychological 
cognitive defence mechanisms that permit the group to continue to function” 
(Schein 1992: 22). How does this definition of culture help us better
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understand the concept of police culture? I shall now turn to this question in 
the next section of this chapter.
Police culture.
The concept of police culture is one that has been widely studied. Skolnick provided 
a sketch of what he described as the policeman’s ‘working personality’, which he 
defined by the three central elements of, the potential of ‘danger’, linked to ‘authority’ 
and set within a context in which efficiency is demanded. Danger makes the officer 
especially attentive to signs of potential violence and lawbreaking. The requirement 
on the officer to enforce laws provide authority but, together with the element of 
danger, produces and reinforces police solidarity and social isolation. (Skolnick 2005: 
264).
Van Maanen argues that the element of suspiciousness leads officers to 
identify and group citizens into various classifications, one of which is ‘Assholes’ 
(Van Maanan 2005: 280). The stigmatization process, he says, has three stages: 
‘affront’, ‘clarification’, and ‘remedy’. Affront involves some challenge to the 
officer’s authority; clarification is the process by which the officer determines what 
this affront ‘means’; and remedy is the course of action taken in response to the 
clarification of the nature of the affront. The importance of this, Van Maanen argues, 
is that the process is close to the heart of the patrol officer’s definition of his task 
providing, among many other things, a practical and moral justification for his 
existence (ibid).
Cotterrell (1984) provides a useful summary of the different explanations of 
police culture, from both British and American studies, but in line with most of the 
studies on the topic, it covered exclusively the culture of operational police officers.
The ‘‘locus classicus” for discussing the analyses of the voluminous work on 
‘cop culture’ is the Politics o f the Police by Robert Reiner. He explains that, “The 
culture of the police -  the values, norms, perspectives and craft rules -  which inform 
their conduct is, of course, neither monolithic, universal nor unchanging. There are 
differences of outlook within police forces, according to such individual variables as 
personality, generation or career trajectory, and structured variations according to
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rank, assignment and specialisation. The organisational styles and cultures of police 
forces vary between different places and periods.” Adding that “The culture survives 
because of its ‘elective affinity’, its psychological fit, with the demands of the rank- 
and-file cop condition” (Reiner 1985: 86).
Over the years, since the above comments by Reiner, the social and political 
environment in which policing is carried out has changed considerably. 
Consequently, there have been subtle changes in some of the characteristics of police 
culture, but the elements that form the core culture and sub-cultures remain the same. 
In his syntheses of the voluminous social research on police culture, Reiner identifies 
the following core elements of ‘cop culture’.
“Mission-Action-Cynicism-Pessimism”. Where officers strongly believe that 
“policing is not just a job but a way of life with a worthwhile purpose, at least 
in principle...The purpose is not conceived of as a political enterprise, but as 
the preservation of a valued way of life and the protection of the weak against 
the predatory.” For them, “The mission of policing is not regarded as irksome. 
It is fun, challenging, exciting, a game of wits and skill.”
Despite the fun and excitement to be had in carrying out the arduous task of 
preserving this valued way of life, “police officers rapidly acquired a set of views, 
which have been rightly described as ‘cynical’, or ‘police pessimism’. Policemen do 
develop a hard skin of bitterness, seeing all social trends in apocalyptic terms, with 
the police as a beleaguered minority about to be over-run by the forces of barbarism. 
This pessimistic outlook is only cynical in a sense - in the despair felt that the 
morality which the police officer still adheres to is being eroded on all sides” (Reiner 
1985: 89).
“Suspicion. ” Reiner explains that, “Suspiciousness is a product of the need to 
keep a look-out for signs of trouble, potential danger and clues to offences. It is a 
response to the danger, authority and efficiency elements in the environment, as well 
as an outcome of the sense of mission” (Reiner 1985: 91).
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“Isolation/Solidarity. ” These features of social isolation and internal
solidarity are ones that are often discussed by observers of police activity. The 
feature of solidarity operates both within the organisation between different ranks and 
functional groups, and without the organisation between the police and those outside. 
With the external aspect of solidarity sometimes explained as having a malign 
influence on police at times of police malpractice. Therefore, “Internal solidarity is a 
product not only of isolation, but also the need to be able to rely on colleagues in a 
tight spot, and a protective armour shielding the force as a whole from public 
knowledge of infractions. Many studies have stressed the powerful code which 
enjoins officers to back each other up in the face of external investigation.” (Reiner 
1985: 92).
Concentrating on the aspect of solidarity and isolation that can lead to internal 
conflicts, Reiner explains that, “some of these are structured within the rank hierarchy 
and the force division of labour, say between uniform and detective branches. It is 
true that these internal conflicts may often be over-ridden by the need to present a 
united front in the face of external attacks. However, this is not always so. The 
fundamental division between ‘street cops’ and ‘management cops’ can be reinforced 
in the face of external investigation. ‘Management cops’ are derided by the ‘street­
wise’ operational officers. The depth of the gulf is due to the different, often 
contradictory, functions of the two levels”(ibid).
In addition to this internal division between managers and the rank-and-file, 
the service perpetuates a broader division, between itself and the public. “The them 
and us outlook which is a characteristic of police culture makes clear distinctions 
between types of ‘them’ (as well as of ‘us’).” The different typologies of ‘them’ 
include, Good class villains; Police property; Rubbish; Challengers; Disarmers; Do- 
gooders; and Politicians.
Since the publication of these typologies in 1985 one incident has changed the 
social and political environment of policing and raised the status of one of the groups 
classified as ‘them’. This is the publication in 1999 of the Report of the Inquiry into 
the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The Report, followed by the subsequent legislative 
and procedural changes on defining and dealing with both racist incidents and racist
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crimes have raised the profile and status of people from minority ethnic groups. 
Whereas people from minority ethnic groups could unwittingly have been placed in 
the category of police property before the publication of the Report, now they can 
wittingly be placed in the category of Disarmers. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry 
Report and the subsequent public interest it generated forced the government to take 
positive steps to address the inadequate service that black people received from public 
sector organisations. For the police service, the government set targets for all forces 
for the recruitment, retention and progression of people from minority ethnic groups 
to become police officers, special constables and civilian staff (Home Office 1999). 
Internally, the police produced comprehensive guidelines on dealing with ‘hate 
crimes’ (ACPO 2000). The sum of all these changes was the increased importance 
and profile of people from minority ethnic groups in their encounters with the police 
service.
The concept of police culture and the fact that it influences the way police 
officers see the world and behave in it is readily accepted. The extent of how readily 
attitude, verbally expressed, is translated into action is a subject of debate, (Smith and 
Gray 1983, Waddington 1999(1)) and it is a point to which I shall now discuss, using 
in particular the studies by Waddington (1999a), Chan (1996) and Schein (1992).
Similar perspective.
There are many aspects of police culture on which the highlighted three, and many 
other, studies agree on. These include, i) loose definition of culture, ii) the existence 
of sub-cultures, iii) the aspect of them and us, iv) the liberal use of derogatory 
language to describe some citizens, and v) core/fundamental elements of the culture 
and its sub-cultures. However, although there is essentially only one difference 
between the studies, which is the strength of the link between language and action, it 
is such a fundamental one that its significance overshadows the similarities. 
Nonetheless, I shall start with the similarities.
Loose definition. Schein is clear on this point, explaining that the concept of 
culture has been the subject of considerable academic debate over a number of years, 
and that there are various approaches to defining and studying it. However, he argues 
that it creates difficulties for both the scholar and practitioner if definitions are fuzzy
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and uses are inconsistent. Chan reinforces this view with the observation that “the 
concept of police culture in the criminological literature is loosely defined” (Chan: 
111). Waddington’s description of an oral culture infers the existence of other types 
police cultures or sub-cultures. Although not stated explicitly, there is an implied 
existence of an operational and action-based sub-culture (Waddington 1999). Many 
of the studies of police culture acknowledge that what they are describing is the 
culture or sub-culture of the uniformed patrol ranks, while a much smaller number 
have highlighted the distinction between street cop and management culture 
(Holdaway 1989; and Reuss-Ianni and Ianni 1983). Nonetheless, the definition of 
culture remained loose.
Culture and sub-cultures. Schein’s three-level model of culture allows for the 
existence of police sub-cultures, where the term level refers to the degree to which the 
cultural phenomenon is visible to the observer. Waddington’s description of police 
(canteen) sub-culture and his use of the phrase “oral culture” (page 288) also implies 
the existence of sub-cultures and places this aspect of the sub-culture neatly into the 
espoused values level of Schein’s model. One of Chan’s ‘four major criticisms’ of 
the way police culture has been conceptualised is the “failure of existing definitions of 
police culture to account for internal differentiation and jurisdictional differences”. 
Adding that her research in New South Wales support the suggestion by Manning of 
‘three sub-cultures of policing’ (Chan 1996: 111).
Them and us and derogatory language. The following sentence on the 
identification and grouping of citizens into various classifications by Van Maanen, 
which Newbum (2005) describes as one of the finest opening sentence in all policing 
literature illustrates clearly the depth of this feeling of them and us, because no police 
officer would ever place him or herself in this category.
“The asshole -  creep, bigmouth, bastard, animal, mope, rough, jerkoff, clown, 
scumbag, wiseguy, phoney, idiot, shithead, bum, fool, or any of a number of 
anatomical, oral, or incestuous terms -  is part of everyday policeman’s world” 
(Van Maanen 2005: 280).
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Both Chan and Waddington are clear and unequivocal that patrol officers use 
such derogatory words to describe some citizens, as are many other studies of patrol 
officers, and senior officers (Reiner 1992: 205). The conditions that lead to the use of 
such language is fairly clear when one considers the referents of police culture, 
‘isolation/solidarity’, ‘suspicion’, ‘cynicism’, ‘pessimism’, ‘conservatism’ and ‘racial 
prejudice’ (Reiner 1985: Ch 3). However, the reason why such language is used is 
debateable. Waddington suggests that it “operates as a palliative rather than as a 
guide to future action” (Waddington 1992(1): 295), but this explanation intuitively 
forces one to ask, a palliative for what? Since, as Waddington himself asks, “If 
policing is mundane and boring, why do police officers expend so much time trying to 
convince each other and themselves that it is action-packed?” (ibid: 294). Is it a 
palliative from the mundanity and boredom? Schein’s contention that “All group and 
organisational theories distinguish two major sets of problems that all groups, no 
matter what their size, must deal with: (1) survival, growth, and adaptation in their 
environment and (2) internal integration that permits daily functioning and the ability 
to adapt” (Schein 1992: 11), offers possible support for Waddington’s explanation for 
these aspects of police culture and sub-cultures. From Schein’s own analysis of 
groups surviving in and adapting to their external environment he concludes that 
“culture ultimately reflects the group’s effort to cope and learn and is the residue of 
that learning process” (ibid: 68). The distinction between them and us and the use of 
derogatory descriptive terms for some citizens could be a coping mechanism for 
operational officers. The sub-categorisation of ‘them’ (Reiner 1985: 94-97) and the 
process of story telling and the sharing of experiences between officers that have had 
dealings with different groups of ‘them’ and those that have not, would enable the 
development of a common outlook and consistently similar language among officers 
separated by time and space.
From his analysis of managing internal integration Schein argues that “groups 
must develop explanations that help members deal with unpredictable and 
unexplainable events, the functional equivalent of religion, mythology, and ideology” 
(Schein: 92). Here lies the difference between Schein and most other researchers’ 
interpretation of the link between language and action, and Waddington’s. If the use 
of language is a means of helping members deal with unpredictable and unexplainable 
events then it is inconceivable that attitude, expressed verbally, would not influence
65
action. It may not lead to violent or aggressive action, which may be the obvious 
forms of discriminatory behaviour, but logic suggests it must have some direct 
influence on behaviour.
Core elements.
Schein defines the core elements of culture as basic assumptions, i.e. those that “have 
become so taken for granted that one finds little variation within the cultural unit” 
(Schein 1992: 21). There is agreement among researchers of the existence of some 
core elements of police culture and sub-cultures. Waddington describes them as 
‘fundamentals’, while Chan, even though she points out that her research had 
highlighted three sub-cultures of policing, her arguments still infer that some elements 
are common to all three sub-cultures. This is not to suggest that police culture is 
monolithic and unchanging, but it does provide an explanation for the similarity in 
outlook of police officers from different parts of the world (Waddington 1999b: Chi).
Differences.
Waddington is unequivocal that the derogatory and racist language uttered by officers 
in the privacy of police canteen and vehicles does not manifest itself in officers’ 
actions on the street. For him, “the talk that constitutes much of what passes for 
police sub-culture provides little explanation of police behaviour” (Waddington 
1999(1): 289). This proposition is at odds with other studies on police culture. Now, 
the majority is not always right, but the weight of research studies places, at the very 
least, a question mark over the persuasiveness of his argument. Schein’s three level 
model of culture could, at a stretch, offer some support for Waddington’s argument, 
where his ‘oral culture’ would fit into the level of espoused values offered by Schein. 
However, the support is not strong, because as Schein explains “Though the essence 
of a group’s culture is its pattern of shared, taken-for-granted basic assumptions, the 
culture will manifest itself at the levels of observable artefacts and shared espoused 
values, norms and rules of behaviour.” Warning that, “it is important to recognise in 
analysing cultures that artefacts are easy to observe but difficult to decipher and that 
values may only reflect rationalisation or aspirations. To understand a group’s 
culture, one must attempt to get at its shared basic assumptions and one must 
understand the learning process by which such basic assumptions come to be” (Schein 
1992: 26). Language that has little relevance to activity is meaningless, and for police
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officers, separated by time and space, to use similar language and to do so 
consistently when it does not have a strong link to action appears illogical.
Waddington quotes research studies, and the reanalysis of those studies which 
support his argument that the racism expressed verbally by officers in the privacy of 
their patrol cars or in the canteen were not translated into racially discriminatory acts 
in the way those same officers dealt with incidents (Waddington 1999(1): 288). 
Racially discriminatory behaviour does not have to take the form of aggressive or 
intimidatory action, which is the type of behaviour Waddington alludes to when he 
argues that racist language is not translated to racist behaviour. Racist behaviour can 
include subjecting black and minority ethnic people to a course of action that the 
white majority would not be not subjected. For example, using police stop and search 
data, the details of black people are disproportionately record than those of white 
people. One explanation offered by patrol officers is that they record the details of 
black people because they are more likely to complain. There is some validity in this 
claim because according to the 2002/03 Annual Report and Accounts o f the Police 
Complaints Authority there was a noticeable difference by ethnicity in the areas of 
stop and search and racially discriminatory behaviour. The PCA pointed out that in 
its 1994/95 annual report one in four of the people stopped and searched came from 
minority ethnic communities (page 88). Adding that “although the total number of 
allegations this year was relatively small (153), there continue to be a statistical over- 
representation of black complainants (28.8 per cent compared to 14.0 per cent in the 
overall breakdown of complainants). Similarly, 53.7 per cent (269) of all allegations 
of racially discriminatory behaviour were from black complainants, compared with 
22.6 per cent (113) of allegations made by Asian complainants, 17.8 per cent (89) 
from white complainants...” (ibid). In essence, and with some justification from 
figures of recorded complaints, officers completed stop and search forms for black 
people for reasons of self protection. Now considering that there is no power under 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to detain -  not arrest -  someone for the 
purpose of completing their details on a stop and search form, it is a remarkably 
consistent practice by officers separated by time and space. Co-incidentally, it is a 
practice that is as consistent as the use of racist language by officers separated by time 
and space. The reason offered by officers for this practice is that it is done for self 
protection, but the consistency of the practice leaves one wondering whether the real
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reason is to do with exercising control and authority over black people who are on the 
streets at the time when officers carryout stop and search. This combined over­
representation of black complaints among those people stopped and searched and 
those alleging racially discriminatory behaviour lend some support to the proposition 
that racist and derogatory language can and does translate into behaviour.
Further, racially discriminatory behaviour on the street can take the form of 
inaction. This was exemplified by the behaviour of some officers who attended the 
scene of the attack on the black teenager Stephen Lawrence in 1993. There inaction 
towards Duwayne Brooks, who was with Stephen at the time he was attacked, based 
on stereotyping contributed to loss of valuable evidence. The Inquiry stated, “We 
have to conclude that no officer dealt properly at the scene with Mr Brooks.” Giving 
the reason that they, “were driven to the conclusion that Mr Brooks was stereotyped 
as a young black man exhibiting unpleasant hostility and agitation, who could not be 
expected to help, and whose condition and status simply did not need further 
examination or understanding. We believe that Mr Brook’s colour and such 
stereotyping played their part in the collective failure of those involved to treat him 
properly and according to his needs” (Macpherson 1999: 15). Racist language does 
not have to be expressed in positive action, it can manifest itself in inaction based on 
racist attitude.
Summary
The basis of Chan’s study, which was a review of the “concept of police culture and 
its utility for analysing the impact of police reform”, is similar to this one, which 
focused on the concept of police management culture for the same reason. Although I 
agree with much of what she has to say about police culture, in the sense that it 
reflects the exposition of culture offered by Schein, there are elements of what she 
offers as police culture that are not the culture, in the sense that they are not basic 
assumptions, but are only part of police culture, in the sense that they are either 
espoused values or artefacts. For example, in her critique Of existing theories on 
police culture, she presents four major criticisms of the way police culture had been 
conceptualised by commentators such as Reiner, Manning and Skolnick (page 111) on 
the subject. The first one is that cop culture was often described as though it was a 
monolithic, universal and unchanging phenomenon. She quoted the study by Reuss-
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Ianni and Ianni, which made the distinction between cop culture and management 
culture, and offered the results of her own research that was carried out in 1992 in 
New South Wales to argue that a theory should account for multiple cultures within a 
police force and variation in cultures among police forces. Using the model 
developed by Schein, it is possible, looking at culture at the level of espoused values, 
to have multiple cultures. However, at the level of basic assumptions, which is the 
essence of any culture, I would argue that all three highlighted studies, and other 
studies that describe the existence of core elements of police culture, would support 
the proposition that there are elements that are similar to the different police sub­
cultures. However, because the sub-cultures are visible at the artefacts and espoused 
values levels it is relatively easier to change these levels of the culture than it is to 
change the basic assumption level. For example, the use of derogatory and racist 
language, which reflects the ‘oral culture* offered by Waddington, has changed 
substantially over the years, from a position where officers openly used racist and 
derogatory language to some citizens, to the position today where, although it is still 
practised by some officers, it is done in ‘safe* environments and by the minority not 
the majority. However, if one takes the element of authority as one of the core 
elements of the different sub-cultures of the police and considers the attempts that 
have been made to diffuse the police hold and control of it, it is evident how difficult 
it has been to do this. For example, the Police Federation have voiced very clearly 
their displeasure at the government’s introduction of Police Community Support 
Officers (PCSO), which they have consistendy argued is policing on the cheap. They 
have argued very strongly that they should not be given police powers, which would 
mean police personnel (who are not sworn officers) having the same level of authority 
to control citizens as regular sworn officers. ACPO have voiced their concern at 
suggestions that a chief officer from an adjoining force or a senior manager from an 
outside organisation could take over the reigns of ‘failing’ forces. This would lead to 
significant reduction in the authority of ACPO in general and chief officers in 
particular.
Her second criticism “relates to the implicit passivity of police officers in the 
acculturation process” (page 111) adding that current theories do not recognise the 
interpretive and active role of officers in structuring their understanding of the 
organisation and its environment.. This criticism could be levelled at Waddington’s
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exposition of police canteen sub-culture, because the implication is that officers 
engage in the use of is derogatory and racist language unquestioningly. The third 
criticism is that current theories do not situate culture in the political and social 
context of policing. Schein’s model addresses this criticism, since it advocates that 
one of the conditions under which cultural changes occur is when an organisation has 
to adapt to changes in its environmental (which may be social or political) in order to 
grow or survive. Her final criticism, which is related to the first three, is that an all- 
powerful, homogeneous and deterministic conception of the police culture insulated 
from the external environment would leave little scope for a cultural change. The fact 
is that police culture is all these things, although not insulated from the external 
environment, and for this reason, it does leave little scope for change. As Schein 
explains, “any challenge to or questioning of a basic underlying assumption will 
release anxiety and defensiveness. In this sense, the shared basic assumptions that 
make up the culture of the group can be thought of at both the individual and group 
levels as psychological cognitive defence mechanisms that permit the group to 
continue to function. Recognising this connection is important when one thinks about 
changing aspects of a group’s culture, for it is no easier to do than to change an 
individual’s pattern of defence mechanisms. In either case the key is the management 
of the large amounts of anxiety that accompany any relearning at this level” (Schein 
1992: 23). Waddington also makes this point of fundamental elements of the sub­
culture acting as psychological defence mechanisms that permit the group to continue 
to function.
Concerning Waddington’s study, he concluded from his review of the 
literature on police sub-culture that what occurs in the canteen is expressive talk 
designed to give purpose and meaning to inherently problematic occupational 
experience. This conclusion and the premise on which it is based is problematic in 
the sense that he describes the actions of officers on the street in deterministic terms 
and the language that officers use in the canteen in voluntaristic ones, and from this 
base decides that the link between what officers do and what they say is a very weak 
one. At best, the problem with his conclusion is that it describes police occupational 
culture at the artefact and espoused values level according to the definition of culture 
offered by Schein. At worst, it is a weak explanation of police encounters with 
members of the public, for the following reasons. Firstly, the nature of the majority of
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police encounters with the public are not problematic or confrontational, therefore 
explaining the language that officers use in the canteen as “expressive talk designed to 
give purpose and meaning to the inherently problematic occupational experience”, 
disregards the bulk of police/public encounters and concentrates on the exceptional 
ones, which are likely to be problematic and therefore could require a palliative. In 
essence, what Waddington does is to base his interpretation of police culture on his 
and other researchers’ recognisable actions (for example, aggressive act) of officers’ 
encounters with members of the public, instead of the far greater number of activities 
(for example, non aggressive routine stops) that officers carry out on the street. 
Additionally, it would be interesting to get an explanation of their perception of the 
nature of the police public encounter from those members of the public that officers 
speak so disparagingly about in private, but treat honourably in public. One intuitive 
question that follows from Waddington’s assertions is, who is likely to be the better 
judge of whether an officer’s behaviour has been racist during an encounter; the 
officer, the independent researcher, or the person on the receiving end?
Secondly, the argument that the canteen is an arena of action separated from 
the street, where in contrast to the street officers act before their peers is not 
sustainable in light of the description, given by Chan in her study, of the behaviour of 
officers during their encounters with aboriginal people during the making of the 
television programme Cop It Sweet(a). Police officers, like members of any other 
occupational group, will behave ‘naturally’, in an environment that they consider to 
be safe -  such as in a police canteen, and will modify their behaviour in an 
environment that is not, such as in public view (although on the face of it, this does 
not appear to have been the case for the officers in Redfem).
In the final analysis, my conclusion is that I support both Waddington and 
Chan’s arguments that the taken for granted concept of police culture should be 
reconceptualised to “one that is ‘appreciative’, rather than condemnatory” 
(Waddington), and according to Chan, “one which recognises its interpretative and 
creative aspects, as well the legal and political context of police work.”
I would argue, based on my analysis of the studies on culture and police 
culture, that the core elements (basic assumptions) of police culture and its sub­
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culture, regardless of different ranks and functional or specialist units, are similar and 
conceptually could be seen as monolithic and homogeneous. The difference in the 
culture, or the sub-cultures as some commentators describe it, arises from the 
differences in espoused values and artefacts of the different ranks and functional or 
specialist units. I would argue that the “core referents” of police culture; “the sense of 
mission; authority; the desire for action and excitement; and ‘Us/Them’ division of 
the social world with its in-group isolation and solidarity on the one hand, and racist 
components on the other; and its suspicion and cynicism”, is the same within and 
between Forces. I shall discuss this point in more detail in the final chapter, after I 
have covered, in the following chapters, the issues that have caused senior police 
managers to adapt to their external environment in order to survive, and to integrate 
the internal processes of the service to ensure the capacity to Continue to survive and 
adapt.
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Discussion.
Culture is a protean term, it can mean different things to different people. When the 
term has been used to describe the norms and behaviour of police officers, the 
description has more often been confined to the uniformed lower ranks, with the 
management rules used as the norm against which the indiscretions of the rank-and- 
file are judged.
Culture can be a useful diagnostic tool with which to examine how the service 
in general, and particular ranks and functional groups within it, construct their 
occupational world and cope with the demands, from sources both internal and 
external, that are placed on them. However, in order to make sense of the complexity 
of organisational life we must avoid the superficial models of culture to describe how 
organisations and groups within them function. This is one reason why I have chosen 
to use the analytical model of culture developed by Edgar Schein to explore the 
culture of police management.
Schein*s model works at different levels. At the level of basic assumptions, it 
helps explain the significance of the core features of police culture (which I shall do 
later in chapter 11). Some people have used the analogy of an onion to describe the 
concept of culture as being layered. Inferring that as one peels off the different layers 
of an organisation, one peels off the different manifestations of the organisation’s 
cultural traits, until the core of the culture of the organisation is reached.
My interpretation of Schein’s model is that the basic assumptions are the 
elements of an organisation’s culture that are common to all the different levels and 
functional areas of the organisation. The cognitive defence mechanisms to which 
individuals and the organisation turn in times of internal conflict and external 
pressure.
The espoused values provide the explanation for sub-cultures and the 
difference between different functional groups. As Reiner described, the different 
orientations between management and street cop “reflect the two ways police 
organisations have to face in a class-divided hierarchical social order. Downwards by 
the rank and file, to the groups controlled with varying degrees of gusto and finesse;
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and upwards by the professional police chiefs, to the majority public and elite who 
want an acceptable face to be placed on what is done in their name” (Reiner 1992: 
137).
Artefacts are the outer garments, the visible and easily interpretable features of 
the organisation, factors that are obvious to visualise but difficult to interpret on mere 
observation. For example, it is easy for a third party observer to construct the 
meaning of a police/public, however, it is very likely that their interpretation differ 
markedly from that of the person at the receiving end of such encounter. In summary, 
what the independent observer sees is not necessarily what the recipient at the end of 
the police/public encounter is getting.
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Chapter 4.
PERSONAL BACKGROUND.
INTRODUCTION.
The cognitive lenses through which police officers see the social and professional 
world are shaped by such factors as social class and educational attainment. The 
depth and clarity of that vision would be affected by such factors as career 
progression, their hierarchical and functional positions within the organisation, and 
the socialisation process of the organisation (Fielding 1988).
The professional milieu in which policing is carried out can change very 
swiftly depending on the personal values and professional integrity of the leader of 
the organisation. Any sudden change in the professional mood of the organisation 
could have devastating consequences for an officer that was unable to recognise and 
readjust their behaviour accordingly or was too slow to adapt to the change. A 
contemporary illustration would be the case of the deputy chief constable of Surrey 
Police, who in September 2000 was tried and acquitted at Southwark Crown Court for 
offences of sexual assault that he was alleged to have committed in 1998 against 
female employees working at the Force’s headquarters. (Guardian, 9 September 
2000). There were strong suggestions by officers in the force that the character of the 
new chief officer helped change the working environment to one in which the staff 
felt confident to voice their allegations. Although the deputy was acquitted at Crown 
Court, he remained suspended from duty by his Police Authority, which later charged 
him under the Police Discipline Regulations with a number of similar offences. 
(Guardian, 12 September 2000). Although he never faced a disciplinary hearing, he 
never returned to the police service.
The character, personal and professional values and integrity of a leader, 
(which is what superintendents are consistently being reminded they are expected to 
be), can determine the credo of an organisation. This can consequently determine the 
occupational behaviour and working practices of individuals and groups within that 
organisation.
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In this chapter, I shall discuss how factors such as, social background, 
educational attainment, professional training, occupational and general life 
experiences, the socialisation process of police work, and the credo of the service 
have contributed to the formation of a group culture, and consequently prepared my 
respondents for the complex and demanding role of a modem day senior police 
manager.
SOCIAL ORIGINS.
Age and Family background.
The year of birth, and consequently the age range of my respondents, covers a broad 
period from the late 1930s to the late 1950s, as illustrated in Table 7 below. 
However, despite their years of birth spreading over two decades, the majority of 
them -  82 per cent - were bom between 1944 and 1954. The significance of this fact 
for the purpose of the study is that the majority of my respondents would have grown 
up under very similar social and political conditions, which may have led to them 
developing similar social and political outlooks.
Table 7. Range of respondents’ dates of birth.
Range in year of birth. 1939-1958 No. of officers
1939 1
1940 0
1941 0
1942 1
1943 2
1944 7
1945 8
1946 4
1947 6
1948 4
1949 3
1950 2
1951 2
1952 1
1953 5
1954 3
1955 0
1956 1
1957 0
1958 1
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Concerning family background, it is one means by which different studies 
have categorised people into different social class groups. Additionally, some 
commentators have written widely on the topic of people from a particular social class 
displaying specific class cultures. For example, in his book, The Uses o f Literacy that 
was first published in 1958, Richard Hoggart describes eloquently the changes in 
working-class culture during the preceding thirty or forty years as they were being 
encouraged by mass publications (Hoggart 1992). Therefore, there is a recognised 
connection between social class and culture, and the concentration on my 
respondents’ family background is done for the purpose of trying to find out what 
effect, if any, their social class culture has had on their occupational group culture.
Discussion of the concept of class can be a complex and problematic 
endeavour. Marshall et al suggests that it can be defined in a number of different 
ways that include, for example, ownership and non-ownership of the means of 
production; control of various assets within bureaucratic organisations; possession of 
marketable workplace skills and income. Sometimes, occupational prestige scores, 
arranged in hierarchical fashion or, more loosely, in terms of generalised social 
standing in the community at large are taken to define social class (Marshall et al 
1997: 21).
One aspect of the discussion of social class that is not problematic is that, 
“The existence of a class structure, however this is defined, implies an unequal 
distribution of power and advantage” (Marshall et al 1997: 8). However, how this 
unequal distribution of power and advantage is translated into tangible career benefits 
to the individual is, once again, problematic. For example, is power or advantage, or 
both, directly reproduced in each case where it exists, or does each individual 
phenomenon or a combination of them merely influence outcomes?
The reason for using the concept of class as a framework within which to 
discuss the background of my respondents is to find out if inequalities in opportunities 
are translated into inequalities of outcomes. Alternatively, it may be that hard work, 
luck, or a combination of both factors had a greater influence on my respondents’ 
career progression, rather than their social origins.
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For the purpose of my discussion on the possible effects of social class, I have 
chosen to use Halsey’s analysis suggesting that the sources of inequality are of two 
fundamental kinds. He argued, firstly, that individuals have particular interests in life, 
and because there is scarcity in the means available to satisfy those interests, these 
interests potentially imply conflict. Secondly, human beings are evaluating animals, 
and because they have preferences and distinguish between better and worse in all 
things, they continually compare themselves with others with respect to all human 
attributes, and behave accordingly towards each other. This, therefore, leads to 
hierarchies of virtues, taste, sexual attractiveness, occupational skill, artistic talent, 
sporting prowess, and so on. He concludes, “Social relations reflect these as invidious 
comparisons, deference and disrespect, admiration and contempt. Evaluation, given 
scarcity, also implies conflict” (Halsey 1986: 18).
On the nature of inequality, the concept can take one of two forms; it could 
mean either the inequality inherent in the different positions of the social class 
divisions, or the inequality of access to the different class divisions.
For the analyses of my data I shall use the definition of class based on the occupation 
of the fathers of my respondents, and shall focus on those occupations as indicators of 
the advantage and power that accrue to their holders. Put simply, I shall focus on 
whether inequality of access and opportunity leads directly to inequality of outcome. 
(However, it should be noted that the Registrar General’s Classification was recently 
changed to use ‘autonomy’ in the workplace as a key indicator. This makes inter- 
generational comparisons problematic)
The reason is to find out whether the inequalities in power and advantage that 
drive social mobility in society in general were reproduced in the police service, and 
in particular in the career progression of my respondents. In addition, I shall attempt 
to assess which of the following two factors had the greater influence on their career, 
ascription or achievement.
For society in general, Marshall explains that, “Twenty years on we would 
appear to have arrived at conclusions broadly similar to those reached by the 
researchers who conducted the Oxford mobility inquiry. Using the data available
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from the British survey for the International Social Justice Project, we have found that 
substantial absolute rates of upward and downward mobility coexist alongside relative 
class mobility chances which have remained largely unchanged throughout the years 
covered by the two studies -  in effect most of this century up to the present day. 
Class boundaries seem to be neither more nor less permeable now than they have been 
in preceding decades. Rather, sectoral shifts towards non-manual work have created 
additional ‘room at the top’, but this has not been accompanied by greater equality in 
opportunities to get there from social origins embodying different degrees of class 
advantage” (Marshall et al 1997: 59).
Social class of respondents.
Using the Registrar General’s five-class model of classification, the majority of my 
respondents’ fathers (when my respondents were 18 years old and around the time 
they joined the police) were from social class C (49 per cent). Within this category, 
which is sub-divided into the upper Cl and lower C2 sub-classes, 8 per cent were 
from Cl while 41 per cent were from C2.
There were 16 per cent from social class B, and the same percentage from social 
class D. None of my respondents was from social class E - Unskilled Manual 
workers. These divisions are shown in Table 8 below.
79
Table 8. Social class origins of superintendents, constables, and chief
constables.
Social Class % Rank and 
File(a) 
(1978)
%
Superintendents
(1996)
% Chief 
constables(b) 
(1991)
Group A (I) 2.4 2 2.5
Group B (II) 14.9 16 30.0
Group C1 (III -  non-manual) 16.7 8 17.5
Group C2 (HI -  manual) 36.9 41 45.0
Group D (IV) 19.1 16 2.5
Group E (V) 3.6 0 2.5
Police Officer/Security Guard 14 8 15
Retired/Dead - 9 -
(Military/agricultural background) 6.5 - -
N=168 N=51 N=40
Total 100 100 100
(a) and (b). The explanatory notes for these headings are at the end of the thesis.
The year in brackets were when the respective studies were carried out
I have placed the figures from my study against those obtained by Reiner in 
his studies of the Federated ranks (Reiner 1978) and ACPO (Reiner 1991). I have not 
done this in order to compare the different figures because this would be meaningless, 
for the following reasons. The samples for all three studies were collected differently, 
for example for his study on chief constables Reiner’s sample was virtually the 
population of chief officers, whereas my sample was a small fraction of the 
population, which I had very little control in collecting. The purpose of all three 
studies was different: the study of the Federated ranks was to find out about unionism 
in the police service; that on chief constables was researching an elite group; whilst 
mine was examining the culture of middle management. The periods, social and 
political conditions under which all three studies were carried out were also different. 
These reasons, individually and collectively, make any strict comparison of the data 
unreliable. However, since the studies were carried out on members of the same 
social institution, all of which would have had similar grounding in their career in the 
police, it is possible to use the data from all three studies to illustrate some
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commonalities amongst the three distinct groups that make up the majority of the 
police service. (A sizeable segment consists of civilian staff and since the fieldwork 
an increasing number carrying out uniformed visible patrol function is now made up 
of Police Community Support Officers). A broad interpretation of all the data might 
support a prior assumption that superintendents should fit between the Federated 
ranks and ACPO, in terms of social class, if class as a determinant of advantage and 
power was directly translated into outcomes. However, this linear interpretation 
might be too simplistic.
Relating the figures on social class distribution of my respondents with those 
of chief officers and constables, the data shows that twice as many chief officers were 
from social class B, than either my respondents or constables; 30 per cent of chief 
officers compared to 16 per cent of my respondents and 15 per cent of constables. 
This would tend to indicate that ascription played a more influential part than 
achievement in the distribution of power and advantage. In contrast, the larger 
percentage of my respondents from social class D would indicate that achievement 
was more of a reason for the success of my respondents.
The number of chief officers from social class Cl is similar to those for the 
Federated ranks (when the number of police fathers are added to this social group), 
but double those of my respondents. In this case, the distribution was 32 per cent for 
chief officers, 16 per cent for my respondents and 31 per cent for the Federated ranks. 
The number of chief officers from social class B, is double that from the Federated 
ranks and my respondents. Again, if ascription were of greater significance than 
achievement in the distribution of power and advantage, then we would expect chief 
constables to have led the three groups, followed by my respondents, with the 
constables in third place. This was the case. It should be noted though that the higher 
social class backgrounds are less likely to be directly ascription; people in this group 
have more opportunities to achieve. However, because of the closeness of the 
proportion of my respondents and constables in social class B, and the large 
difference in Class Cl, it is reasonable to argue that although ascription may have had 
some influence in the distribution of power and advantage in the police service, 
interpreted in terms of the position held by the different groups, achievement appears 
to have had the stronger influence for my respondents. The above figures provide
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some evidence that my respondents (repeating the caution of small non-random 
sample) attained their position through achievement rather than ascription.
EDUCATION AND QUALIFICATIONS.
In discussions on social mobility, it is generally acknowledged that there is a direct 
link between social origins, educational attainment and social destinations. However, 
the effect of each component on the others is not so clear-cut. For example, Marshall 
et al asked whether it is possible to construct a meritocratic defence of class 
inequalities in mobility chances by explaining the association between origins and 
destinations in terms of unequal distribution of ability. Some critics of social mobility 
have sometimes claimed that it was, and proponents of meritocracy have 
conventionally taken it to be an argument about the role of education in class 
reproduction. In answering this question, Marshall has cited the work of two different 
commentators on this topic to argue for and against the claim. Firstly, he offers a 
supporting view of this position by explaining that in the view of Talcott Parsons, 
“educational expansion played a crucial role in effecting the historical shift from 
ascription to achievement, as the principal determinant of status in advanced 
societies” (Marshall et al 1997: 70).
In contrast, he explains that, “From his analysis of the data gathered for the 
Oxford Mobility Study of 1972, A. H. Halsey concluded that among men in England 
and Wales there was a decreasing influence of origins on destinations and a tightening 
bond between educational attainment and occupational outcomes. However, Halsey 
also reported that an individual’s class origins were increasingly associated with his or 
her level of educational achievement, a finding that he interprets as being inconsistent 
with the idea that industrial societies are characterised by a secular trend towards 
greater meritocracy. For this reason, although ‘education is increasingly the mediator 
of the transmission of status between generations’, still there has been no reduction in 
the overall influence which social origins exert on destinations” (Marshall et al 1997: 
72). One is tempted to summarise these arguments as, the educated go a long way but 
the educated rich go even further. In addition, children of the rich will be better 
educated, cet. par.
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With my respondents in particular, and police officers in general, education is 
not restricted solely to state education. In the following two sections, I shall discuss 
the mandatory and optional professional training that officers receive during their 
career. These include, for new recruits substantial legal training on criminal matters, 
which is reinforced and expanded when officers move on to specialist posts, such as 
Criminal Investigation Departments. In addition, on promotion officers receive 
management training of various quality and complexity, depending on their rank and 
the functional post that they occupy. Therefore, any discussion on education has to 
take into account what I shall term ‘professional education’ (Jarvis 1983; Southgate 
1988), in addition to recognised state education. One of my respondents alluded to 
this concept of ‘professional education’ while responding to the question of what the 
highest education level was that he had reached. He said simply,
“Joining the Police Force” (R. 30).
The reason for concentrating on the education of my respondents is to find out 
whether inequality of access to education, which was possibly a result of inequality of 
opportunity created by social stratification, manifested itself in inequality of 
attainment.
Table 9, which gives the figures for my respondents alongside those for constables 
and chief officers, shows that the majority of my respondents went to either 
Secondary Modem or Grammar schools. 41 per cent went to Secondary Modem and 
33 per cent to Grammar school.
Juxtaposing the data highlights some marked differences in the number of officers 
from the three groups who went to Grammar and Secondary Modem schools. 
However, the differences between the groups of those who went to other secondary 
educational establishments are not so great.
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Table 9. Types of school attended.
Type of school % Rank and 
File(c)
%
Respondents
% Chief 
Constables (d)
Secondary Modem (Elementary) 34.0 41 5.0 (12.5)*
Comprehensive 6.5 8 -
Technical 7.7 8 5.0
High - 4 -
Grammar (Senior secondary) 45.9 33 77.5
Public (Private) 6.0 4 5.0
Elementary - - 7.5
Not Known 2 -
N=168 N=51 N=40
Total 100 100 100
♦This figure is the combined Elementary and Secondary figures.
For Grammar school attendance, over twice the number of chief officers went to 
Grammar school in comparison to my respondents, and nearly one third more 
constables went to Grammar school than my respondents did. These figures, when 
viewed alongside the difference between the number of my respondents and chief 
officers from social class group Cl, tend to support the position that class inequality is 
not related to unequal distribution of ability. Further, it is not possible to extend the 
claim, at least for my respondents, to cover mobility chances, firstly because my 
respondents, as a group, had been super mobile compared to constables. Secondly, it 
may be that because more of the constables were already from this higher social class 
group, they were content where they were and had no aspirations for further upward 
social mobility.
Substantially more of my respondents went to a Secondary Modem than did chief 
officers, 41.0 to 5.0 per cent. However, when the combined category of Secondary 
modem/Elementary, (the combination used by Reiner in his 1992 study) is used, the 
difference is reduced slightly, but it is still significant nonetheless at 41 per cent to 
12.5 per cent.
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The analyses of the origins of those of my respondents (33 per cent) that went 
to Grammar school showed that, 64 per cent were from social class C; 5 per cent from 
class B; 5 per cent from class A; and 11 per cent from class D. The remaining 15 per 
cent either were officers whose fathers were police officers or were deceased.
Nearly three quarters of my respondents were from the top three social class 
categories. This difference, in particular, and that for the proportion of Grammar 
school attendees in the three main groups in general, tended to lend support to the 
suggestion that class origin did lead to unequal access to education. This equates with 
Halsey’s finding for the general population in his 1980 study (Abercrombie and 
Warde 1995: 362).
My data showed a bias towards the higher social classes concerning access to 
education, which raised the question of whether opportunity in terms of access was 
reflected in educational attainment. Did the fact that those from the higher social 
classes had greater access to educational opportunity equate to them obtaining higher 
and/or better qualifications? I turn to this point next.
Of the 17 officers who went to Grammar school, eight (47 per cent) ended up 
as graduates. Two (11 per cent) went to university straight from school, and six (35 
per cent) obtained their Degrees after joining the police. This was in contrast to those 
that went to Secondary Modem, where none of them went to university straight from 
school. The seven (33 per cent) officers who went to Secondary Modem school who 
did obtain a degree did so after joining the police, a similar figure to the Grammar 
school officers that gained their degrees after joining the police. The qualifications 
gained by my respondents at school are shown in Table 10 below.
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Table 10. Qualifications gained by respondents.
Type of school
(No. of respondents)
None CSE O level A level Higher Degree
(Before)
Degree
(After)
Not
Known
Secondary Mod (21) 8 1 8 (+1 
RSA)
0 3 0 7 3
Comprehensive (4) 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 0
Technical (4) 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 TS
Cert.
High (2) 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0
Grammar (17) 0 0 9 7 2 6 1
Public (2) 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0
Not Known (1) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 10 2 22 11 4 4 16 4
The first four boxes (None; CSE; O & A levels) are the qualifications obtained before leaving 
secondary education. The next three boxes (Higher, Degree-before, Degree-after and the Not Known 
box) are the qualifications obtained after leaving school.
In the Higher box for those that attended Secondary Modem are HNC and HND qualifications. While 
for the Comprehensive pupil the qualification is Diploma in Management Studies, where the pupil left 
school with only O levels.
In terms of the total qualifications obtained by my respondents, 10 had no 
formal qualifications either from school or after joining the police. This is 20 per cent 
of my respondents, and is a high percentage for a group of people that occupy a 
significantly influential position in the police service.
The remaining 41 respondents between them had 2 CSEs, 22 ‘O’ levels, 11 
‘A’ levels, 4 Higher National Diplomas and 20 degrees. From these figures, I can 
postulate, with reasonable confidence that for my respondents it appears that unequal 
access to state education is reflected in educational attainment.
Educational attainment
Inequality in access to state education for my respondents, although it appears a 
significant factor before joining the police service, does not appear to have adversely 
affected their progression through the ranks. One reason for this is probably that a 
third of my respondents who went to secondary modem school were given the 
opportunity, in the police service, to pursue and obtain a tertiary educational 
qualification. However, some of them did mention that they felt that they may have 
progressed faster and further had they had a better state education or qualification 
before joining. Some went further and suggested that with a better education they 
may not have joined the police. Implying that they would have pursued a higher 
status occupation or career, as the following replies to the question whether they 
would rejoin if they had their life over shows.
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“Yes, but I would be rejoining as a better qualified person. Without sort of 
making excuses, my educational background was very difficult before I joined 
the police service. Not so much my education was difficult; my lack of 
education was a tremendous barrier to me. Whereas, if I  had my life over 
again I  think I would probably hopefully end up at University and then come 
into the job then. (R. 14)
No, I  wouldn’t, no. Probably not, because I wouldn’t have wasted the most 
important years o f my life. (R. 12)
Analysis of all the formal qualifications obtained by my respondents’ shows 
clearly that they considered formal qualification of such importance that they studied 
for and obtained a variety of formal qualifications after joining the police. The 
implied reason for this appears to be that it was necessary for career progression.
Table 11 below lists some of the formal qualifications (‘A’ level and higher) 
alongside the number of my respondents who had them. The different types of formal 
qualifications held by officers ranged from ‘O’ levels, to ‘credits’ obtained through 
examinations passed for studies towards Open University Degrees.
Table 11. Formal qualifications held by respondents.
Qualification Number of 
respondents
%
A level 7 14
HNC/Diploma 4 8
First Degree 15 29
Postgraduate Degree 5 10
No qualification 4 8
Others 16 31
N=51
Total 51 100
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The importance my respondents attached to formal educational qualification 
was highlighted by the fact that only four (8 per cent) had no formal qualification by 
the time they had reached the level of superintendent. This contrasts with ten (20 per 
cent) who left school, and joined the police, with no formal qualifications. It may 
well be, as some of them claimed, that obtaining a formal qualification helped them 
gain promotion.
If police officers had to negotiate their careers (be it in terms of moving 
laterally through the different specialist posts or vertically through the ranks), relying 
predominantly on their formal education, then perhaps I could limit my discussion of 
educational attainment solely to formal qualifications. However, this is not the case 
because officers receive a considerable amount of professional training throughout 
their service, regardless of whether they remain in the same rank and post for their 
entire service or they move into different specialist posts at the same or different 
ranks. (I use the term specialist post because other than uniform territorial divisional 
duty any other posting, such as Traffic, Territorial Support Group or Criminal 
Investigation Department, is generally considered a specialist posting by police 
officers). An indication of the different types of training they received is shown in 
Table 12 below.
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Table 12. Training and courses my respondents had received during their
career.
Resp. Sp Crse Sgt Insp. JCC ICC s e e Carouse
1
DeL Trg Pub.
Order
Eq.
Opps.
1 X X X X
2 X X X(3)
3 X X X X(3) X
4 X X X X X
5 X X
6 X X X X X
7 X X X X X X X
8 X X X
9 X X X X X
10 X X X X
11 X X X X X
12 X X X X
13 X X X X X X
14 X X X X X
15 X X X X X X X X
16 X X X X X X
17 X X X X X
18 X X X X X X
19 X X X X X
20 X X X X X
21 X X X X
22 X X X X X
23 X X X X X X X
24 X X X X
25 X X X X X X
26 X X X X(4)
27 X X X X X X X
28 X X X X
29 X X X X
30 X X X X X X(3) X
31 X X X X X
32 X X X X X
33 X X X
34 X X X X X(3)
35 X X X X X X(4)
36 X X X X X
37 X X(2) NO NO X(3)
38 X X X X X
39 X X X X X
40 X X X X(4)
41 X X - - - - - - -
42 X X X X X X(4)
43 X X X
44 X X X X X X X
45 X X X X X(4)
46 X X X X
47 X X X X
48 X X X X X X
49 X X X X X
50 X X X X
51 X X X X X
(X=received training/course. Number in brackets indicates different level of specialist post training. Sp 
Crse=Special Course. JCC=Junior Command Course. ICC=Intermediate Command Course. SCC=Senior 
Command Course.)
The importance of training is recognised by the service, and given a high 
priority accordingly. In its Police Paper number 4; The Management o f Police 
Training, the Audit Commission pointed out that police officers receive twice as 
much training a year as public sector employees. Almost two and a half times more
89
than private sector employees, and nearly four times more than private sector 
manufacturing employees (Audit Commission 1989).
Although the Paper described predominandy skills-based operational training 
for officers, it pointed out that “Training is especially important in the police service 
because it operates in a constantly changing environment.” Further, it claimed that 
“The service is exemplary in its recognition of this and devotes around eight per cent 
of its resources to training.” The significance of all this for this discussion is as the 
Paper explains, ‘Training is a key element in shaping the style and quality of any 
organisation and its ability to respond to new developments” (Page 1).
Skills-based operational training at an effective level informs officers on 
‘what’ to do, through legal and procedural knowledge. Training on the ‘how’, which 
takes place at the affective (emotional) level, comes from the information and 
education in areas such as general supervisory and management skills, human 
awareness, interpersonal skills, cultural diversity, racial awareness, and emotional 
intelligence (Goleman 1996). This is my concept of professional education. Its 
importance here is that it is the type of learning that is more likely to affect the culture 
of the group.
Professional education is very important for officers. However, given a 
preference, most would opt for legal and procedural training, probably because their 
perception is that legal and procedural training gives them the tools to do the job: 
fighting crime and catching villains. In reality, the majority of officers’ time is not 
spent catching villains or enforcing the law. It is spent doing the things that 
professional education would give them the skills to do more easily or, some would 
suggest, better. However, this type of policework can be demanding and problematic 
for officers. As illustrated by Punch quoting an officer explaining his policing 
preference, who stated, “I’d rather take on an armed hood than answer a call about a 
family squabble” (Punch 1979: 111). The message is clear and the required action 
simple. The training received at the cognitive level tells officers ‘what’ to do ‘when’ 
the law is infringed, which generally means arrest when there is sufficient evidence. 
However, training on knowing ‘how’ to deal with situations where the law is silent or 
ambiguous would come from professional education, but if officers have not received
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this type of education then dealing with such situations would become problematic 
and precarious. From my professional experience, I know that changes in 
contemporary police training are trying to give officers more professional education.
Professional Education.
When one looks at activity analysis studies on what operational officers do, it is clear 
that policing is not concerned predominandy with enforcing the law. Policing is 
concerned principally with activities other than law enforcement. This is contrary to 
the views of the rank-and-file. It is also the interpretation of most observers of police 
occupational culture.
Maurice Punch quoted from a 1965 American study by Cumming et al that 
analysed telephone calls from the public to the police over an 82-hour period. In the 
study, “Cumming concluded that more than half the routine calls to the police 
involved demands for help and some form of support for personal and interpersonal 
problem.” Further, he pointed out that a replication study in the United Kingdom 
“came to a similar conclusion with ‘service’ calls numbering 49.3 per cent in a new 
town, 61.1 per cent in an old established town, and 73.0 per cent in a country town 
with a rural area”(Punch 1979: 106).
A recent study by David Bayley produced similar findings. His results 
showed that “What the police do is strikingly similar around the world. Among the 
forces in the five countries studied [Australia; Canada; England; Japan; and Wales] 
about 60 per cent of police personnel patrol and respond to requests from the public, 
15 per cent investigate crime, 9 per cent regulate traffic and 9 per cent administer” 
(Bayley 1996: 29). Thus law enforcement accounts for only a small part of officers’ 
routine professional activity. Most of the time, officers are called upon to deal with 
situations that require professional knowledge. Therefore professional education (i.e. 
that gained through training at an affective level) is important as it gives officers the 
skill to deal with the types of situations they encounter more often.
It is likely that as they progressed up the rank officers would receive more 
professional education. At the level of constable, professional education would have 
been delivered nationally under programmes such as quality of service, human
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awareness, interpersonal skills and diversity training. At a local Force-level, this type 
of education would have been given through initiatives such as the Metropolitan 
Police Service Plus Programme of the early ‘90s.
Up to the level of superintendent, there are certain core training courses that 
all officers have to attend, some of which are specific to certain ranks. For example, 
upon promotion, sergeants and inspectors receive supervisory and management 
training respectively.
For chief inspectors, the core training course for this rank was the Junior 
Command Course. Like the sergeants and inspectors’ course, this will contain some 
topics and subjects that fall under my category of professional education, such as 
staff-development and motivational skills training.
For the rank of superintendent, the main training course was the Intermediate 
Command Course. For those superintendents that were destined for ACPO ranks, the 
core, and mandatory, course is the Strategic Command Course (formerly known as the 
Senior Command Course).
For the majority of my respondents, the most common course they could have 
taken as superintendents was the Intermediate Command Course. However, officers 
at this rank, unlike those in the other ranks, did not have to attend the Intermediate 
Command Course, and there were some of my respondents that had not attended this 
course. Nonetheless, these officers would have attended the other courses at the 
different ranks up to superintendent, which was the case with all my respondents. 
Every one of them had received the sergeant and inspectors’ Development Courses, 
while only one had missed the Junior Command Course (Police Staff College 1982). 
This officer was an exception because he had not attended one training course at the 
Police Staff College during his service, which at the time of the interview was just 
over thirty years. This was and is highly unusual.
For the Intermediate Command Course, less than half of my respondents had 
attended it. Only 45 per cent of them had been on this course. Such low attendance 
by officers in this rank is not necessarily a problem because higher police training, of
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which these Command courses are a part, also included Carousel courses. These are 
short duration courses on specific subjects, such as community relations, which are 
available to officers at chief inspector level and above. They were designed to 
provide “short, problem centred training in areas of direct and contemporary need” 
(ibid: 2). Therefore, there were other opportunities for officers who had not attended 
the Intermediate Command Course to gain professional education by attending some 
of the Carousel courses.
Slightly more of my respondents (47 per cent) had been on at least one 
Carousel course than had attended the Intermediate Command Course. Additionally, 
it appeared that some officers might have been using the Carousel courses as an 
alternative to the Intermediate Command Course. Because, of the two groups of 
officers that had attended either course only 41 per cent had attended both the 
Intermediate Command and a Carousel course.
Prior Work Experience.
The majority of my respondents had some experience of employment before joining 
the police service, as shown in Tables 13 & 14 below. Of them 67 per cent had 
worked before joining, either as a Cadet or as a full-time officer. This figure is 
similar to Reiner’s figure for chief constables, where 70 per cent of his sample ‘had 
some experience of outside employment before joining the police’ (Reiner 1992: 61).
Table 13. Type of work officers did before joining police service.
Type of Work No of 
resp.
% of Total
Joined as Cadet with no prior work experience 13 25.0%
Joined as Cadet with prior work experience (6 months) 2 4.0%
Total number with prior work experience 34 67.0%
Joined straight from university 2 4.0%
Breakdown of those with prior work experience
Those with up to one year prior work experience 8 23.0%
Those with 1-4 years prior work experience 6 18.0%
Those with over 4 years prior work experience 20 59.0%
Distinction between manual and non-manual work
Manual work 5 15.0%
Non-manual work 29 85.0%
N=51
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Table 14. Type and duration of work each officer did before joining.
Resp. Type of Work Duration (Yr.)
1 Clerk in DHSS 2
2 Milkman 1.5
3 Barrow boy; Shop Assistant -  Before Joining Cadets 1
4 Labourer; Clerk in Solicitor’s office 6
5 Clerical/Administration Assistant 8
6 Shop Assistant in a Butchers 5
7 Shop Assistant in Tescos 1
8 No
9 Clerical Assistant in Gas Board 4
10 Security Guard-type role in Factory 3
11 No -  Joined Cadets
12 No -  Joined Cadets
13 Art Designer/Drawing for Magazine/Comic (Fleet Street) 3
14 No -  Joined Cadets
15 Royal Air Force 5
16 Graduate; Organisation Methods Analyst 2
17 No -  Joined Cadets
18 Labourer in Brewery; Milkman 1
19 Bank Clerk 1
20 Trainee Management with National Coal Board 5
21 Trainee Management with Potteiy Company 1
22 No -  Joined Cadets
23 Graduate; Accountancy with Deloitte Touchd 1
24 Merchant Navy 11
25 Graduate University
26 Sign Painter in Father’s business 4
27 Clerical Assistant with Local Authority 8 months
28 No -  Joined Cadets
29 Civil Service; Lorry Driver 5 (2.5; 2.5)
30 Fabricator in Engineering Company 4
31 Clerical Work with London Transport 2
32 No -  Joined Cadets
33 Army -  Guardsman 6
34 No -  Straight from School but not as a Cadet
35 Factory; Office Assistant 4 (2.5; 1.5)
36 No -  Joined Cadets
37 GPO; Stove Enamelling in Factory 5 (3; 2)
38 No -  Joined Cadets
39 Merchant Navy 6
40 Army -  Anti-Tank Gunner 5
41 No -  Joined Cadets
42 No -  Joined Cadets
43 No -  Joined Cadets
44 Graduate University
45 Type of work not stated 8
46 Sales and Marketing in Motor Trade 8
47 DJ; Dancer; Own Business; In the Theatre 6
48 Apprentice Engineer before joining Cadets 6 months
49 Clerk in DHSS 4
50 No -  Joined Cadets
51 Trainee Manager in Retail Store; Factory; Door to door salesman 6
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Most of the work they had done before joining was neither casual nor short­
term, which perhaps emphasised the strong attraction of the police as a career for 
those of my respondents who joined from another occupation. For example, two of 
the seventeen officers who joined as Cadets had been employed prior to joining the 
Cadets. One had worked as a Barrow Boy and a shop assistant for the combined 
period of a year before joining, while the other had worked as an apprentice engineer 
for six months before joining.
Of the 67 per cent of my respondents that had been employed before joining 
the police, 23 per cent had prior work experience of less than one year, 18 per cent 
had prior work experience of between 1-4 years, while 62 per cent had over four years 
experience. Generally, 15 per cent of those that had been employed before joining the 
police had been engaged in manual work while the remaining 85 per cent had held 
non-manual work.
The significance of highlighting the types of work that my respondents had 
done before they joined the police and the length of time they had held the jobs lies in 
the discussion on the education of my respondents in particular and police officers in 
general. In the discussion on professional education, although not openly stated, the 
point can be made that some previous work experience and the consequent social 
contact would have improved the individual’s knowledge on matters such as human 
awareness and interpersonal skills, which forms the main part of professional 
education. The types of work, in contrast to work that did not involve extensive 
contact with other people, that most of my respondents had done would have provided 
this type of knowledge. These included employment in the Department of Health and 
Social Security dealing with claimants of social benefits; shop assistants in large 
supermarkets; trainee managers in public and private sector organisations; sales 
person in the motor trade; and working in a factory. The majority of the jobs involved 
working with people. These were ideal experiences for those who would later pursue 
an occupation where the practitioners were considered more as artisans than 
professionals, and where the bulk of the work involved communicating with people 
with the aim of maintaining order and resolving conflicts.
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ORIENTATION TO WORK.
Is policing the job, as it is often described in police vernacular, or simply a job? 
Several years ago, it would have been considered an insult to pose such a question to 
a serving police officer. The majority would have castigated you for not referring 
correctly to policing as the job. Policing was seen as a vocation, dedication to a way 
of life. However, today the conviction is not so strong. At the time of writing I had 
been involved with delivering Diversity Training to every employee in my own and 
other forces and police training establishments nationally. During some of this 
training, I often heard officers, from all ranks, comment that they and their colleagues 
no longer viewed policing as a vocation. They saw is as just a job, like any other. 
The often expressed reason for this view was the Report by Sir William Macpherson 
into the murder of the Black teenager Stephen Lawrence. Their reasoning goes 
something like this: Since the publication of the Report, the police service had 
received an inordinate amount of criticism about the professional competence of 
officers in general, and about their racist attitude and its manifestation in operational 
street policing in particular. Officers’ interpretation of the term Institutional 
Racism(e) was that it meant that each officer was a racist, who practised direct racial 
discrimination against Black people. Consequently, this meant that the police service 
was a racist institution. Although this explanation was given in the context of stop 
and search, which by implication restricted the dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours 
to operational officers on the street, this interpretation was not expressed solely by 
constables and lower rank supervisors and managers, but also by senior managers.
Officers at all levels felt that Black people, in toto, disliked and distrusted the 
police. This was to such an extent that if Black people were stopped in the street, 
regardless of whether or not it was a legitimate stop it was believed they were very 
likely to complain about the officer carrying out the stop. (As discussed in chapter 
three, the statistics published by the Police Complaints Authority on complaints 
against the police provides some support for this belief). According to officers, the 
sole reason for this was that all Black people thought that the police organisation was 
institutionally racist. The solution advocated by senior, middle and junior ranking 
officers, was not to stop Black people, because it was too much grief. Some junior 
officers added that some senior officers had instructed them to follow this course of
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conduct, advising them not to stop Black people because it would inevitably result in 
some form of complaint against them.
The significance of this brief discussion for the purpose of the study is the 
revelation of uniformity in the thinking of officers from the different ranks and 
functional posts. In a way it questions the assertion made by officers that policing is 
no longer a vocation but now just a job like any other, because the reality might be 
that the culture of the police service is so embracing that these expressed views are in 
contrast to the actions of officers on the street. All officers might still feel strongly 
that policing is the job and the expressed views about not stopping black people could 
either be a distraction or denial of their true and deeper feelings about policing, which 
is seen as a mission to protect society and rid it of the ‘bad’ elements within. 
Unfortunately, young black men would appear to fall into this category of ‘bad’ 
elements in society since they are often portrayed as the main offenders for muggings 
(Hall et al 1978) and street crimes, which although low in numbers compared to the 
total number of crimes recorded, are the ones that are likely to create the greatest 
amount of fear. Perhaps this was one reason why the proportion of searches carried 
out on black and Asian people in London had grown in the last five years, despite a 
substantial fall in the overall numbers of searches, according to figures published by 
Scotland Yard, and under Section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. (The Daily 
Telegraphy 9 April 2002). These figures contradict the claims by officers on the 
training course that they were reluctant to stop people from Black and Minority 
Ethnic groups.
Reason for joining.
Taking into account the dramatic changes that have occurred over the last three 
decades, in terms of the change in the diversity of the population and the different 
demands that have been placed on the police service over this period, were the 
reasons why my respondents joined the police markedly different to those of today’s 
recruits?
This question is important for a number of reasons. For example, as implied 
by current officers, contemporary social problems might play a significant part in the 
reasons why people joined the police. Secondly, if officers could fulfil whatever
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ambition they had for joining the police service, it would be reasonable to expect that 
they would more likely be satisfied with their career in the police.
The reasons why my respondents joined the police service could be divided 
into the two broad categories of ‘instrumental’ and ‘non-instrumental’ ones, as 
described by Reiner (Reiner 1991). ‘Instrumental’ refers to the “extrinsic, material 
aspects of the job such, as pay, status, security, or career prospects, and ‘non­
instrumental’, indicating the intrinsic features of the work itself, such as the interest or 
the social utility of the role.” However, it would be an oversimplification to suggest 
that the reasons given for joining the police could clearly be placed into one or the 
other of the above two categories. Some of the reasons given by my respondents 
included a combination of both types of motive, and as Reiner points out, “Indeed all 
work is to some extent instrumentally motivated in a market economy, so the 
difference is really one of emphasis” (ibid). One thing that can be stated with 
certainty about my respondents is that they were not motivated by money. Only one 
of them mentioned pay as the reason for joining.
Most of my respondents cited predominantly non-instrumental reasons for 
joining the police. This was similar to Reiner’s findings in his studies of chief 
constables and the Federated ranks. Within this category were motives such as 
joining for a more interesting job, the hope of excitement and variety, and the desire 
to be a police officer. The following quotes exemplify these motives:
The reason for joining the police I  think, basically it just seemed like a pretty 
exciting job. It was just as simple as that really. It was something that I, I  
worked for three years in an office in the civil service and I just thought 
Christ! I  couldn *t do this for the rest o f my life, sitting in an office. I  need 
something that’s going to offer me opportunity for career advancement, and, 
but at the same time offering a bit o f excitement, and a challenge. (R. 49).
Yeah, I was brought up in —  which throughout the ‘60s was a Borough force. 
They wore white helmets. They were all above six foot and it was a childhood 
ambition and I always wanted to be a policeman, and that was it. Very 
simple. (R. 3)
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The predominantly instrumental reasons for joining the police, such as, 
housing, security, or career prospects, were expressed as follows:
Yeah, I  was a young married man who lived in South London with no prospect 
of housing, decent housing and —  Police offered me the prospect o f decent 
housing. (R. 2)
I  tell you exactly what it was. I was in a very boring clerical job with the 
North Thames Gas Board and I  wanted to get married. I  was looking round 
for somewhere to live and I had no prospect, you know, to buy a house at the 
time, take out a mortgage or rent one very successfully. And in the local 
newspaper, there was an advert for — Police, which actually advertised a free 
house that went with the job and it was honestly no more than that. That 
actually attracted me to the police service. Totally, the wrong reasons I know, 
but that is why I  joined, to get a house, to get married. (R. 9).
One obvious problem of trying to categorise officers’ motives for joining the 
police into specific groups, as I have done above, is that it simplifies what in essence 
is a complex decision making process. One that involves considering a number of 
factors simultaneously, rather than considering them in a linear and sequential 
fashion. For example, family connection and influence, combined with the prospect 
of housing and pursuing a uniformed service, illustrate the complex nature of the 
different reasons that influence the decision to join:
Yes I  was, I spent the last two years o f my Army service at Pirbright, where I 
was an instructor at the Guards Depot and during that time I met my wife to 
be down there. My uncle was a serving officer in —  Constabulary; he was 
also an ex-Guardsman, as was another uncle o f his. But coming from a 
military career, I  suppose you are looking for something more structured. I  
didn't have any educational qualifications as such, because they weren't 
about, certainly in my time. And I  suppose coming from that environment, it 
was an environment that you, there was also a problem at home because I  
came from Derbyshire. My father was a butcher and I did go back for a short
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time working with him, but at the time if I ’m honest, wife to be down here, 
father up there, where do your loyalties lie? (R. 33).
This quote illustrates the attraction of the police service for those people who 
had been in a structured environment and had grown used to that way of life and 
wanted to continue with it. Equally, it illustrated that the certainty and stability it 
offered in terms of employment security and material possession were a great 
attraction.
SATISFACTION WITH POLICE CAREER.
All except one of my respondents were satisfied with their careers in the police 
service. The officer who expressed dissatisfaction gave a reason that suggested he 
was dissatisfied because of a recent unsuccessful attempt to gain promotion. Here is 
the officer’s response to the question of whether overall he was satisfied with his 
career in the police service.
“No. I failed to get the ACC's job a couple o f weeks ago. " (R. 23)
The likelihood is that had the officer got the ACC’s job he would not have been 
dissatisfied. Should he get the post before he retires then it is likely that he would 
answer differently if he were asked the question again. It appears then, that the 
degree of satisfaction depends on the level of success an officer achieves in his career. 
For example,
Professionally yes, not totally because I had a, looking at my own competence 
and trying to be reasonably objective about it, but I'm a qualified assessor and 
practise the skills regularly, and I've recently been evaluated again by Val 
Morris and come out okay, so I'm reasonably proficient. I  would say that I'm 
sad I  didn't get the chief superintendent rank, and the fact that I  didn't get it 
because they did away with it that just frustrates me. And I  potentially could 
see me ideally as being a good ACC. I  don't honestly ever see me as being a 
chief. I'd  be lying if I  said that, it would have been nice. I've seen worse 
people than me get to chief but that's not the standard to go by. But once I 
had this ailment then all thoughts o f going on Strategic Advance Course had
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to go. So, in that sense, besides that one reservation professionally, I've got 
no doubts. But unfortunately on the personal side I ’ve only achieved that level 
of competence, and indeed in the role that Vm in now, by sacrificing my 
personal life to such an extent that I  regard that as to be the worse mistake 
Vve ever made in my life. And Vm still doing it. And if ever any advice people 
ask me, particularly young PCs, I  say, try and keep a balance between your 
personal and professional life. You ’11 be a better professional if you ’ve got an 
interesting domestic and family life, including being aware about society, 
having friends outside the police service and everything else. University was 
brilliant for me in that respect, it was as though suddenly I  looked this way 
instead o f that way. And no, I ’ve deservedly suffered because o f my total and 
utter devotion to workload. Looking back that was a very bad thing to do 
personally, and it made a lot o f others suffer, a lot o f others suffer. (R. 18).
Although nearly all my respondents (98 per cent) expressed satisfaction with 
their career in the police service, when asked if they would rejoin only 70 per cent 
said they would. These figures are very similar to those obtained by Reiner in his 
study of chief constables; all of whom were satisfied with their careers and 78 per 
cent of who would rejoin (Reiner 1991: 70). The percentage of my respondents who 
would rejoin is higher than the number of Federated ranks who would do so; 51 per 
cent (ibid).
Despite the very high number of my respondents who were satisfied with their 
career in the service, and the substantial number that would rejoin if they had their life 
over, nearly half of them (49 per cent) had seriously considered leaving the service at 
some time in their career. Of those who had considered leaving, only three (12 per 
cent) had done so in their probationary period. The rest (88 per cent) had done so at 
various stages in their careers and at the different ranks from constable to chief 
superintendent. Overall, my respondents, as a group, expressed a high level of 
satisfaction with their careers, despite the fact that some careers had not always been 
as successful as the officers would have preferred.
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Of the 30 per cent who might not rejoin, the majority would not do so because 
they felt the police service, as a career, was no longer held in high esteem. Besides 
those who were positive as to whether or not they would rejoin, there were a group 
who were uncertain, and the reason for the uncertainty was primarily because of the 
changes that had occurred within and without the service. What they had witnessed 
over the years was deterioration in the circumstances and content of policework. Both 
attitudes were illustrated by the following quotes.
I don’t know if I  would join today. One o f my fundamental concerns is 
although the police force needs to be run effectively and efficiently, the drive 
towards running it as a business does fill me with some concern and if you’re 
not careful that you ’U, your drive through it as a business supersedes what 
you’re trying to do as far as delivering service to people, and that area is a 
cause o f concern to me. (R. 28).
Very interesting question, I  don’t know Victor, I really don’t know. I  often 
think that I could have done well in working for myself; for my own business 
and I  often think that’s probably that I ’m slightly arrogant. But I  think with 
the amount o f determination and hard work I  am willing to put into anything I 
would have been successful doing that, and sometime I think I  would have 
liked to have been my own boss and made the decisions. That’s because I 
actually think I know best on occasions, and because I ’m willing to learn from 
other people I  don’t think I ’m that arrogant that I  won’t listen to somebody 
who came up with a better idea. I  don’t have any problem with saying, that is 
a better idea... So I have to say that I  don’t know but if someone influenced me 
like my mother and father did to get me into the police service then maybe I ’ll 
do it again. (R. 47)
Even where there was a positive response in terms of rejoining, some of my 
respondents had some reservations. These were because of the recent changes that 
were being forced on the police and failure of the service to implement some 
necessary changes. For example:
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That’s always a difficult question really, I  don’t know how to answer that 
because you’ve got a completely different perspective and I  mean if I  were a 
youngster now, knowing what I  know and the changes that have been, and the 
potential changes, I ’ll probably answer no. But there again none o f us know 
that when we join. So if I  were joining as a youngster who really didn’t know 
much about the service, and if you talk to the youngsters, I mean I  talk to the 
probationers fairly frequently, they’re so full o f life and idealism, I ’m sure I  
would be too. So I think the answer has got to be yes, I  just would. (R. 7)
Discussion.
This chapter has analysed the social origins of my respondents, their 
approaches to work and their degree of satisfaction with their careers. Most of my 
respondents came from manual working-class backgrounds, with a secondary 
education that was not as high, academically, as chief officers and the Federated 
ranks. On the face of it one would have predicted that the educational attainment of 
my respondents would have fitted somewhere between those of chief officers and the 
Federated rank. One reason for this puzzling result might be because the sample was 
not a random one. However, they appear to have made up the deficit on joining the 
police, since a proportionately higher number of them obtained a variety of secondary 
and tertiary formal state qualifications, in addition to ‘professional qualifications’ 
through police-delivered, and police-sponsored external training courses.
Their attraction to policing varied from the pragmatic (did not have the 
qualification to pursue an alternative career, or they joined to obtain good housing), to 
a complex combination of reasons, such as excitement, variety, family influence and 
childhood ambition. Whatever the reason, all my respondents expressed a 
considerable degree of satisfaction with their careers overall. Where there was 
dissatisfaction, the reasons were either temporary and would have been reversed with 
promotion, or frustration at the changes the police service was being forced to 
undertake and, paradoxically, changes that they thought the service should pursue but 
was not doing. In short, my respondents were a group of pragmatic realists, who used 
their modest social origins to achieve significant positions of influence in their chosen
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career. I can claim with confidence that their achievement was down to merit. Put 
simply, for them success=meritocracy.
The analysis of social origins, educational attainment and career progression 
of my respondents would support the argument that their successful advancement in 
the police service has been due predominantly to merit (by which I mean intelligence 
plus effort) rather than wealth and social position. However, this discussion on 
meritocracy is set tightly within the closeted world of the British police. The gender 
and ethnic composition of police forces does not support the argument of meritocracy. 
At the time of the fieldwork (1996) the number of people from a BME background in 
higher education was 13 per cent compared to just over 2 per cent in the police service 
(Higher Education Statistics Agency; Home Office 1998). In terms of intelligence 
measured by higher educational learning then the percentage of BME people in the 
police service should have been higher than 2 per cent, if entry into and by inference 
career progression was based on merit: none of my respondents was from a BME 
background. Nonetheless, restricting the discussion to the police service in general 
and my respondents in particular, and adding the caveat about non-random sample, it 
is still tenable to propose that for my respondents success has been extricably linked 
to merit.
The similarity of my respondents to chief officers was (as Reiner described his 
chiefs) that they were, “Predominantly of working-class origin, their degree of moral 
identification with, commitment to, and satisfaction with their work is more akin to 
that of established professionals” (Reiner 1991: 73). The significance of this is that 
my respondents could be thought of as blue-collar workers with a white-collar 
mentality, and their hard work and determination helped them translate their thought 
processes into practical realities.
104
Chapter 5
POLICE MANAGERIALISM.
INTRODUCTION.
In this and the next chapter, I shall examine how police managers have dealt with the 
internal integration of different ranks, functional units and processes to ensure the 
capacity to continue to adapt and develop, by concentrating on the changes in police 
managerialism and the management of change. As mentioned in chapter one, this is 
one means by which we can analyse, and thereby understand the content and 
dynamics of the culture of the police service in general, and senior police managers in 
particular.
The form and style of police management has changed over the years. Control 
and discipline were the most appropriate adjectives with which to describe the style of 
police management from the formation of the new police to the early 1970s 
(Critchley: 150; Reiner 1985: Ch 2). The structure was based on the hierarchical style 
of militaristic ranks, and the behaviour of officers was regulated by a strong discipline 
code. All of which was designed to ensure Strict adherence to the organisation’s 
proclaimed norms and values. Over the years the style of management has changed, 
which has allowed the lower ranks the opportunity to influence policy decisions. 
Some would bemoan this, claiming that it has become more relaxed and participative 
in style and form.
In the past as individuals, officers could practise the art of practical policing 
on the street with relatively unfettered discretion, but in the station, their individual 
voices carried far less weight and influence when it came to matters of force policy. 
To gain some credible involvement in the determination of force policy rank and file 
officers had to make their contribution collectively through the Police Federation. 
However, even this mechanism did not guarantee significant access to policy-making 
forums in forces.
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Consultation and the Police Federation.
Senior police managers jealously guard their prerogative to make decisions on the 
direction of their forces and were reluctant to allow the rank and file, through the 
Federation, much access to their level of control of the organisation. My respondents 
expressed this in a variety of ways. The overwhelming majority of them thought that 
it was desirable that since the Edmund-Davies Report of 1978, the rank and file, as 
represented by the Police Federation, had gained a more significant consultative role 
in the determination of force policy.
A common reason that they expressed for this aspiration was that it was better 
for the senior managers to be able to ‘take the rank and file along’ with them on their 
(senior managers’) decisions on the direction in which they wanted to move the 
organisation. They typically expressed this view as follows.
Yes. I f  you take your staff with you and actually talk to them about what 
you're proposing to do, not just the Federation, I  mean I  think it's quite, for a 
guy like me who's very supportive and pro Federation, I've only had one 
meeting in three years with the Federation reps. Although I  ask them every 
year would they like monthly meetings, quarterly meetings, 6 monthly 
meetings, they don't want one because they find me easily approachable if 
there's a problem, they pick up the \phone and in any case they haven't got a 
problem and I've only had one problem in three years. Now I know a lot o f 
my colleagues have sort o f monthly confrontations sometimes, well you don't 
have to have that if you talk to them, they're only after people's welfare and 
rights which are given under Police Regulations. I f we're abusing them as 
managers we ought to be called to account, they fought for those bloody 
Regulations and rights to actually stop exploitation and if we're ignoring them 
and getting round them then we should be brought to account. (R. 9).
This view was also typical of other respondents’ comments, particularly in the 
way it made the subtle distinction between consulting and informing. The Edmund- 
Davies Review in 1978 recommended the implementation of a formal structure that 
would allow senior managers to consult with the Police Federation on the formulation
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of force policy. Although the majority of my respondents expressed the view that this 
was a desirable aim, the language that was used to express their agreement with the 
recommendations suggested a desire to inform rather than to consult. For example,
I f  you get to the state and we had one instance recently, where we didn 't do 
something because the Federation were against it, despite the fact it was a 
better approach, I  think that's wrong, because we're here to manage. They're 
there to do, it was a bit bold as I say, I  do think their view should be taken into 
account. We shouldn't be in a position where they're managing because 
we're not taking action, because they don't manage they go to the status quo, 
change is useful and good. (R. 8).
Nonetheless, whatever the style of language used to express their agreement 
with the suggestion about consulting the Federation in the formulation of force policy, 
my respondents’ overwhelming view was that agreed with the sentiments of the 
recommendations. They also had the foresight to extrapolate the principles of the 
Edmund-Davies report to cover the contemporary conditions in the service; in 
particular the absence of a formal consultative mechanism for civilian staff in the 
service.
I  think it’s desirable and indeed I think it's essential in modem day 
management practices, where we've got away from the, you will do as you're 
told, to a more consultative approach, so that you actually take people with 
you. Sometimes I think we've gone too far with it because it does delay 
decisions and that's always a problem with consulting, and it also can be 
viewed as, they cannot make a decision. We get it now, well tell us what to do 
and we'll go and do it, and there is still a place for that as well I  have to say in 
certain situations. But I  think it's essential that you take on board all the 
consultative, or all the various bodies within any organisation. You 
mentioned the Federation but a significant number o f employees now are non­
police staff and do not have the same degree o f representation as their 
Federated colleagues. It's not right either. (R. 6).
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The art of consultation is not simply to seek and gain consensus on every 
single matter on which a decision has to be taken, but to be able to make an 
acceptable professional judgement on which matters there should be consultation. If 
senior officers can get this right then the suggestion that has been made by my 
respondents is that the rank and file would be happy to accept the notion of 
consultation before making policy decisions. The argument is that the rank and file 
do not want to be concerned with every matter of policy, but are predominantly 
interested in those matters that affect their personal circumstance within the service. 
For example,
Desirable yes. Wanted? Debatable, I  would say. I  think, certainly, I  get a 
feeling of yes it’s nice to be involved and we would like to have our views 
asked, but you’ve gone too far. Certainly, it’s the feeling in our organisation 
to the extent that we’re having trouble making decisions, because we’re just 
consulting with everybody, and the rounds o f consultation seem to go on in a 
never-ending fashion. To the extent that some officers will turn round and 
say, when are you going to make a bloody decision? You know, just tell us 
what’s going on. Give us something to do and we’ll go out and do it, you 
know, why are we keep talking about it? So, I think it is desirable and I  would 
say that I  would have liked to have played a bigger part in what we were 
doing when I was a younger officer and I  think they do, but we must be very, 
very careful not to get them absolutely fed  up with the process. In our desire 
to consult everybody, it becomes an unwieldy, long event, trying to get round 
to a decision and that’s happening to us on an increasing number o f occasions 
and we’ve got to find a way o f controlling that. It’s almost like saying; we’re 
never going to do anything in this organisation *til the whole 2,950 agree. 
Well it’s never going to happen! So, I think that it’s the skill I  suppose o f 
managers to actually sense the depth o f consultation that’s required on an 
issue. There are things dear to the heart o f officers, you know. I f  you’re 
going to have a, like recently most Forces have gone through the sort o f baton 
selection and things like that, that’s really important, they’d have been really 
hurt if they were not asked. On the other hand, there are other issues, perhaps 
management issues, where they couldn’t care less and we’ve got to learn, you
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know, where we stand. So I  think there is a balance to be had, so the word 
you said, is it desirable, yes it is desirable, but beware* (R. 10).
Power and influence.
Although the majority of my respondents agreed with the idea of reaching policy 
decisions through consultation, the reality of the decision making-process highlighted 
the reluctance of senior officers to relinquish their inherent power and influence in the 
process. Typical examples are as follows.
Yes, I think it is. Vm almost a Jekyll and Hyde, I do sign up to the 
participation o f empowerment, but I  also believe in the legitimacy o f authority, 
that we are not in a democracy, that I  take a pragmatic approach. I f  you can 
take people with you and if your policies and decisions can be improved as a 
result o f their contribution, then it must be better than not having them with 
you and not improving your decisions as a result o f their contribution. So, I  
agree with that. The bottom line is, does it empower people to prevent 
progression, and the answer to that is no. So I think that’s a very difficult 
scenario, but no I mean it’s a matter o f principle. So I think it’s positive, 
although there’s a lot o f crap said about joint ownership and all that sort o f 
thing. (R. 12).
Well I ’d challenge whether they have in the first place.
[In theory, they’re supposed to have.]
Well in theory as far as they have a Consultative Committee with the Chief 
Constable and his ACPO Colleagues. They, if they have a position within 
management meetings, you know, within policy and strategy meeting groups, I 
would suspect they would say that they don’t, by and large because o f the 
autonomy o f Chief Officers and perhaps even the autonomy o f Divisional 
Commanders, who whereas might be given an arena to express their views, 
they don’t take much notice o f them. (R. 43).
Who says that they’ve gained a more influential role in Force policy? I ’m not 
so sure that is true.
[The whole idea of the report was to bring that about.]
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I think the most thing that people remember about Edmund-Davies is the pay 
side o f it, but certainly there is a greater involvement o f all levels o f the 
Federated ranks. Vm not so sure, I  think, you know, they may have more 
influence as to how policy is implemented, but I ’m not quite sure that I  agree 
with the statement that they necessarily add more influence in the formulation 
of policy. (R. 16).
I t’s desirable but the extent to which it’s realistic and made much impact, and 
again I can only speak for this Force, it’s limited. (R. 23).
A consistent concern expressed by my respondents was that consultation could 
be used as a reason to prevent or stall decisions being made. Even where there was 
clear and unambiguous support by my respondents for the recommendation that 
senior officers should consult with rank and file officers and their representative, there 
was this rider that those who practised consultation should not be accused, unjusdy, of 
being indecisive.
I think it’s difficult to know how far one goes, because at the end o f the day I 
think managers are there to manage. But I am actually by the way the 
Secretary o f the Superintendents’ Association, so clearly those issues are quite 
dear to my heart in terms o f some of the things we’ve been involved in, but I  
think it’s got to be accepted by the organisation that we’ve gone through a lot 
of change. There is a lot to do still, and if we’re going to make things work, 
you’ve got to have the understanding and the desire by the people on the coal 
face to actually agree the principles and the way you’re going and lots o f 
issues linked to it...Yes you must involve people in decision making and get 
their ideas but at the end o f the day there’s got to be some key people making 
decisions like, ‘OK I ’ve heard everything you’ve said, I  have to plan, this is 
where we go. ’ You’ve got to have the leadership there as well otherwise you 
can end up by saying, ‘well what do you think?’ and then you get no direction, 
so you’ve got to have the strength and leadership to take it forward. (R. 15).
Despite the substantial number of my respondents that qualified their 
acceptance of the proposition (39 per cent of the 46 that were asked the question)
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slightly more (45 per cent) expressed their desire for consultation unequivocally. A 
typical example is as follows.
Yes I think it is. I think it’s very important if you are going to have a 
committed workforce, they have to feel that anything they raise or particular 
issues that they raise, there is an avenue for doing that and I think there is an 
important element in that they also need to be consulted and encouraged to 
develop their own ideas and put forward their own ideas, in terms of how 
organisations should develop. I ’m a very strong believer in that and I think 
there are many very good ideas that come from all levels o f the organisation 
and I  don’t think it should be seen as the prerogative o f one particular part o f 
the organisation only to have the ideas or only to have the power to implement 
those ideas. So I think it has to be a two way process. Yes at the end o f the 
day people have to make decisions, but they need to make decisions on the 
best available advice and on some issues the widest possible consultation, 
because it effects the day to day policing often and those officers who are 
actually going to carry out those particular duties. (R. 44).
Are there any problems for managers or management?
Some of my respondents’ replies implied that if the process of consultation posed 
problems for management, then the problems lay elsewhere other than with the 
managers. The following quote typified their views on this subject.
Consultation hasn’t posed any problems for police management. It is the case 
that on occasion decisions don’t meet with Federation approval because we 
all have our own agendas and I  think as managers our agenda is to get the job 
done. Whereas perhaps welfare and comfort issues are higher on the agenda 
of the Federation: Ottawa shifts for a start [Officers worked longer shifts but 
had more rest days]. There are people who work them who tell me they’re 
absolutely marvellous. From a managers’ viewpoint, they’re a disaster, but, 
you know, that’s one the Federation has won and we haven’t. So there are 
different outlooks, but if we didn’t consult as frequently as we did, I ’m sure we 
would have quite bad problems with the rank and file. (R. 36).
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Desirable as it was, practising consultation with the rank and file through the 
Federation did cause some problems for senior managers. For example,
Well I  can answer that in a more general way. I think that whenever you make 
any kind o f policy making participative, which is what that attempted to do, 
you slow down policy making. And then at the end people then sort o f display 
schizophrenic attitudes to it. Because the Federation complain, the workforce 
and everyone complains that you can't get any decisions out o f people when 
they have to make a decision, and yet participative policy making slows the 
decision making down. So yes, it does create difficulties for management, but I  
would have thought that once you've got it right the gains outweigh that 
because the gains are that you exploit the creativity. I  mean that is the whole 
purpose o f participative management isn't it; you exploit everyone's creativity, 
accepting that the top people aren't the only ones that are creative. So, if we 
get it right I  think the gains outweigh the problems. (R. 1).
It will if we don't start to recognise their involvement and if we don't take that 
along with what we’re trying to achieve. So there is this element, 
consultation's fine but you mustn't restrict it to those people that can shout the 
loudest. At the moment the Federation can shout the loudest because every 
police officer up to the rank o f chief inspector is a member o f the Federation, 
whether they've paid their dues or not, they're still a member. Now whether 
or not the views are properly represented by their full time representatives, 
that's a different argument altogether. (R. 6).
At the time of the fieldwork representative Associations such as the National 
Black Police Association and the British Association of Women Police officers were 
in existence but were not as prominent in terms of public recognition and their 
participation in the formulation of force and national policy as they are today. 
However, as mentioned by some of my respondents, at the time of the interviews, 
civilian staff in the police service did not have the same level of access to senior 
managers to be able to influence the formulation of force policy. The position is 
different today and the existence of all these different representative groups, that at 
times demand participation in the formulation of force policy, has made the work of
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senior managers more challenging. It is also affecting the style of police 
management, contributing to a shift towards a more participative and co-operative 
management style.
Yes it has, because again it’s, we’ve been in a culture where it’s far easier to 
dictate what’s going to happen. Told people to get on with it and bring about 
change and it’s very hard, particularly at the top o f an organisation to accept 
the fact that somebody down the bottom end may have better views than 
yourself, and I  think it becomes very much a status issue and an ego problem 
that some people, senior managers in the organisation, have difficulty 
grabbing that point. So yes, I  think it does pose problems. (R. 14)
RELAXED DISCIPLINE.
The change in management style, in particular the greater degree of participation of 
more sections of the organisation has been construed as a relaxation in the former 
authoritarian disciplinary style of police management, which manifested itself in a 
highly structured deferential behaviour towards senior managers.
I  think it is because if we don’t have consultation, and I ’m constantly talking 
about communication, but if we don’t have that, those lines o f communication, 
well then managing change is very difficult for a start of, introducing change 
is very difficult. The culture of the police is resistant to change, and I  think 
that on a number o f occasions where the Federation have actually been 
involved in the consultative process that a number o f changes have perhaps 
been more easily implemented than they might have been otherwise. So I think 
it is important, and one has to recognise it, the Federation does represent the 
bulk of the police service. I  think the Police Federation is more often consulted 
by national government and by various other bodies. I  mean yesterday I was 
asked by one of my Federation reps here, he said, I ’m going to see the HMI, is 
there anything you want me to mention to him? I thought well, here is one o f 
my PCs asking me, you know, pass a message to, you know, I  thought like 
there’s something not quite right here, however, that’s good. (R. 49).
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My respondents’ experience of consulting with lower ranking officers was 
quite different from their experience of the relaxation in management style that has 
been a consequence of the consultation regime. Examples of the type of problems 
that this relaxation has caused for them were varied and for some difficult to accept.
An often-expressed problem by my respondents was erosion of the power to 
control officers by directing them not only to act but also how to. Although examples 
of the incidents they gave were minor in comparison to the operational demands that 
officers routinely faced, the simple fact that they felt that they had lost the power to 
dictate to rank and file officers how they should conduct themselves had created real 
tensions.
Yeah, I  grew up with the old authoritarian approach and I sometimes regret 
the apparent passing of that approach. I  think at the moment we*re in a 
transitional period and at times there*s some confusion and anxieties. I  mean 
for instance, this is a Monday, I  use this as an example, car parking on this 
site is, there *s no clarity about it. There is insufficient car parking to cater for 
the number o f vehicles that the staff who use this site wish to bring onto the 
site. We had a hierarchical priority parking system, which everybody 
recognised, many resented, but they knew it and they followed the rules. That 
was dispensed with and now there* s chaos, it*s like the law o f the jungle, first 
come, first served. Lots o f apparent anomalies are often debated amongst the 
staff, i.e., that the most recent rookie now occupies the space where the chief 
constable used to park and he* s got to walk miles and so on and so forth in the 
rain, and all sorts o f things that are mentioned. So if that*s a reflection o f the 
way we*re moving then it*s not good because it’s confusing. I  think what’s 
needed is, yeah let’s by all means change our, you know, let’s become less 
authoritarian, but let’s be clear about everything as well and we do sometimes 
lack that. (R. 29).
Yes, I  mean it’s that relaxed; certainly there is less distance now between the 
ranks than there used to be. Certainly, when I was a PC, you saw your 
inspector on parade and, you might see him occasionally during a tour o f 
duty. But there was very little contact and exchange o f information and
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certainly if you got up to Superintendent rank, I  mean you just never saw them 
and they always lived in a different world and you had no idea what they did, 
and I think that has become compressed and in some ways we've taken the 
mystique I  suppose out o f senior management, which you know, I  haven 't got a 
problem with. I think it's healthy in many ways. It means that senior officers 
have got to earn the respect o f their officers far more so than they ever had to 
before. They weren't bothered before really what the rank and file thought o f 
them because they'd had nothing to do with the rank and file. So I think when 
you've got that compression it's bound to be more difficult, it's more 
challenging, it's going to raise more problems. So, yes it's certainly become 
more difficult and more challenging. (R. 16).
Where senior managers have had trouble, it appears to have been due to their 
inability to adjust to the change from a linear one-dimensional approach to managing 
their people to a more complex participative multi-dimensional interaction with their 
staff. The most often used example was in the control and direction of officers during 
public order situations. Under these conditions my respondents’ view was that there 
was no room for negotiations and interpretation of given orders. As far as they were 
concerned, orders by senior officers had to be obeyed and instructions had to be 
carried out to the letter. For example,
It has relaxed. The difficulty it poses is that there are occasions when we are 
militaristic, and we have to give an order without explaining it and expect it to 
be obeyed instantly. I f  you are used to consulting and discussing, it then 
comes as a tremendous surprise to the person when they get a direct order, go 
there, do that, no questions, get off. And sometimes there's a conflict between 
the two. It’s the same conflict where you ask a constable one day to have a 
helmet and be walking down the high street friendly and the next minute 
you're putting you're wired kit on and he's there with a baton laying into a 
group who are attacking. (R.31).
The problems created by relaxation in the style of management tend to point to 
some moral dilemmas in the way senior managers are required to embrace
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contemporary management practices. This leaves an impression that the reality is 
very different from the expressed views. The bottom line is,
I ’ve seen a thin veneer o f relaxation through phraseology used, but behind the 
curtain to power the same swingeing condemnation and statements are made 
about people who, apparently have aired their views, who prejudiced, purely 
capable, still capable o f prejudice, and marked, victimised I suppose, which is 
popular, for something which never appears on their staff appraisals or 
appraisals, whatever. There’s been a lot o f rhetoric about the relaxation of 
discipline and management styles, the old liberal shaking out and being 
involved, and being allowed to participate. I  haven’t seen any great signs o f 
it. I ’m looking hopefully day after day, we could kid Ourselves that we live in 
a lot different and more enlightened world, but it’s not the case. (R. 20).
Any benefits from relaxation in discipline?
Regardless of the difficulties that some of my respondents had with adjusting to the 
relaxation of management style and discipline, many of them (68 per cent of the 22 
that answered the question directly) saw some benefits in this change.
Oh yes, I think if you manage it in the right way I think there are a lot o f 
benefits to be had because there are people out there at constable rank, you 
know, and civilian at the lower grades that have got that talent and ideas and 
have got things to offer and if you ’re prepared to allow them in and to listen to 
them and give them the opportunity to influence things which are happening 
on a wider basis, well then I  think it’s to everyone’s benefit. (R. 16).
Oh yes, you will only get the full potential from people if they’re happy, if they 
understand what’s going on, they understand what they’re doing is important, 
you’ll only get to that point with consultation. When I joined, you did things 
and you did a lot o f damn stupid things because you were told to do it, and 
there was absolutely no room for argument and discussion at all. (R. 31).
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CONTEMPORARY MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
One of the changes brought about by implementation of some of the 
recommendations made in the Sheehy Inquiry was the removal of the rank of chief 
superintendent. Although the service managed to create four levels within the 
superintending rank, when there had been only two before the change, the number of 
officers within that rank was 38 per cent less at the time of my interviews than it was 
just before the publication of the Sheehy Inquiry Report three years earlier.
Over the same period, there was an increase in the workload; there were more 
reported crimes and the police were called to more incidents. The combination of the 
reduced number of officers in the superintending rank; structural changes in the 
organisation, such as the adoption of Basic Command Units, which were headed by 
superintendents; and the increase in workload, created additional problems for my 
respondents, as senior police managers. I asked them what management problems 
they faced generally as superintendents, in light of the above mentioned changes, and 
more specifically in the particular role that each occupied at the time.
New pressures on the superintendent rank.
The main general problem for my respondents in their position as superintendent 
came from the restriction on their ability to wield the power that once came with the 
rank, but which was not always available with contemporary management styles. As 
one respondent explained, the issue of involving staff in the decision making process 
can at times still created tensions for managers.
I  think coming with the general relaxation there has been, as a superintendent 
sitting here ten years ago, you can make policy, you can decide this and 
decide that You didn’t need to consult with anybody unless you, you know, 
felt you had to. In fact, it’s probably a sign o f weakness if you consulted with 
too many people, you just made decisions and people had to live with it. So, I  
think the problem’s come with that consultation process. Because once you 
start talking to people about how you do this, what should our policy be on 
this? What policy posts should we have? In other words what posts should we 
fill, come-what-may, and where should we have the shortfalls? But o f course,
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those questions are never, well, the question’s easy, but the answer is never 
easy, because different people will have different views. So I  think it’s 
actually reconciling the different views that you have on the various issues, 
because you’ve asked the question, you’ve got lots o f feedback, and then 
somehow you’ve got to work out an answer from the feedback. I  think that’s 
where the problem comes, and people expect to be consulted today! (R. 5).
On a broader note, this problem reflected the wider changes that were taking 
place in forces nationally. The pace of change over the last decade had been 
relentless. This coupled with the demands on forces to implement and work towards 
a number of performance indicators that would measure the extent of their 
effectiveness and efficiency would have left most senior managers wondering what it 
was that they were being asked to try and achieve, and trying to do more with less 
resources (in terms of finance and personnel). This was reflected in some of the 
responses given by my respondents.
I  think probably just two. One is managing time at a personal level and 
there’s two wings to that. One simply is there are not enough hours in the 
day. Since we restructured there is the same amount o f work or more for 
fewer officers to deal with and no matter how much time you put in, there’s 
always a demand for more. For example, I ’m on the verge o f a four-day 
weekend off, Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday. Tomorrow I ’ve got an 
invitation to go to an all morning meeting at Headquarters. On Thursday the 
Home Secretary was going to drop in to this Division for a visit, luckily he 
isn’t. Saturday and Sunday we’ve got a Specials weekend, training the 
Specials. So I shall work one day at the weekend, so o f my four-day weekend, 
I  shall work one day, that’s consistent and I  mean, although I worked 12 hours 
yesterday and during the night I had one pager message to deal with, no two, 
and one ‘phone call at half past midnight this morning for a PACE decision. 
So there are not enough hours in the day and I actually don’t know the 
answer. The other thing I find is being on Division, people think my job is 
wonderful and easy and I can go out and play golf when I want to or 
whatever. First o f all, I ’ve given up golf about six or seven years ago! My 
diary is largely dictated to by others, I  am not in control o f my own diary, if
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the Chief Officer wants to speak I've got to be available. I f  one o f the Chief 
Executives or if a Councillor or one o f the MPs wants to speak to me Eve got 
to be available. I f  there are civic functions, there is an expectation I will be 
there whether or not Pm on duty. Pm not complaining, i fs  just the time. So, 
that's the main issue. The other problem is and you may come onto this 
specifically, if you're going to, stop me, is managing change and that's been a 
real tough problem. This Force restructured almost two years ago, seems like 
yesterday. April ‘94 we restructured and I  will say it was done in a real rush, 
a dreadful rush and from my perspective, the command team I  worked with 
and the management team, which includes the Inspectors, we didn't know the 
identities o f our team until about a month before we were restructured. So, we 
had no opportunity as a team to get to know each other, let alone start to plan 
how we run the Division. This particular Division was formed o f three former 
subdivisions, which had independent commands, which were lost and quite 
different working practices. The former subdivisions were former different 
Divisions so there was a real radical change in terms o f apron strings being 
broken and a new Division being forced together and we had to look to 
another group o f people that we’d not formerly spoken to and the first year 
was tough. It was tough for us because there was an awful lot to do and it was 
tough because there was a lot o f resistance by the PCs and some unhelpful 
resistance, which made it even harder than it was. So, we had a difficult year 
and that change is still going on, so that's been quite difficult as well. (R. 7).
This quote highlights, though not explicitly, the difficulties that can arise when 
groups with different working norms and rules are brought together without sufficient 
time together to agree on one main style of working. A Consequence for senior 
managers is the challenge of managing the internal integration of the newly formed 
group.
Well generally, I  would say the major problems now are associated with, I  
was going to use the word planning but I suppose with the organisational 
issues as against day-to-day management o f your own department or your 
Division. The things that are forced upon you, the need to deliver things on 
time, to set targets, to achieve targets, to budget for things, to play a part in
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developing policies, implementing policies, managing change. All concepts 
that were outside the sphere o f the manager at the same level a number of 
years ago. Then it was very much about, is the police work getting done? 
What incidents occurred last night, have they been dealt with? Who's done 
what? Who's arrested who? Who's done a good job? What serious crime 
have we got? That used to be what the day was about. Now the day is about, 
why are we overspending in this area? Why are we not meeting our target on 
this? What about if I  get asked about this? What about when I go to the 
Community Meeting tonight and I have to explain so and so, what am I  going 
to say? So I  think the whole perspective o f management o f someone at 
superintendent level has changed dramatically...from worrying about police 
work to worrying about the management o f police work. Someone's got to do 
it, all the worrying about that used to go to the Centre years ago, now it's 
done out there where the service is delivered. So I think that's the major 
change. For me personally, the biggest thing I've got to do is coping with that 
change. (R. 10).
Well I  think there's a broader problem this, a thinning out o f the management 
structure has caused us a problem. 25% o f our Superintendents got taken out, 
a significant number o f Chief Inspectors and our workload has increased 
significantly and that makes life interesting and challenging but there's a fine 
line to be drawn.
Secondly, I  think really coming to terms with some o f the new management 
concepts in terms o f business objectives and planning and all that sort o f 
thing. So it's coming to terms with ourselves as managers, but also in being 
able to, if we come to terms with them and how we come to terms with them, 
then how we relate to other people who haven ’t come to terms with them and 
how we can pass that information on and how we get things done, to those 
objectives. So that's a big problem, it's an issue. I  think the other 
management issues are prioritisation o f resources. Now that ties up the first 
one I said about workload as well, but as a culture and I think that related 
back to a very early question that I  answered, is that we say we prioritise, we 
say we’re going to become more focused, but a job comes in and we still say 
we've got to do it. Now there's got to be some hard choices made and some o f
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those hard choices are not going to make us popular and you cannot do that in 
isolation. No one individual can adopt the prioritisation and the focus, the 
whole organisation has to do it. Everyone's not working, we speak the speak, 
talk the language but the reality is different and that is a very big problem. So 
it's a management o f resources, the prioritisation o f resources and the 
budgetary constraints within which you have to operate because that impacts 
upon budgets and I think the different stages that people are at, at 
understanding what's going on, that's a problem as well. (R. 12).
Regardless of the role that my respondents held, they all seemed to experience 
a similar problem. This was one of lack of time to deal with the increased amount of 
work that they are now forced to undertake. The reduction in the number of officers 
in the superintending rank has led to an increased amount of work for the remaining 
few. Equally, the reduction in the other ranks has made it difficult to delegate work 
without transferring more problems down to lower management levels.
As exemplified by the quotes in this chapter, according to my respondents the 
work of the superintending rank is becoming greater in quantity and complexity. 
However, a cynic might say that a group of workers that was put under pressure 
through a combination of reduction in their numbers and increased demand for 
improved outputs and outcomes, would if they were remotely politically astute, reply 
that their workload was becoming greater and more complex. Therefore, in this 
regard I do not think my respondents’ comments would be different from any other 
group of contemporary public-sector workers. However, and more importantly, it 
does not mean that it is not accurate.
ACCOUNTABILITY
Police accountability takes many forms; accountability to the law; to government; and 
to the public (Loveday 2000: Ch 13; Reiner and Spencer 1993; Cox, 1986: Ch 13; 
Scarman 1986; Boateng 1985: Ch 15; Baldwin and Kinsey, 1982: Ch4). The 
previously described changes to the structure of police forces, in particular the change 
to Basic Command Units, which has created in some cases large self-sufficient 
autonomous units means that the subject of police accountability to the public should
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perhaps be focused at the BCU level rather than force level. Although this was the 
case at the time of writing, with BCUs now being inspected by HMIC, it was not the 
case at the time of the interviews with my respondents. I explored with them the 
concept of accountability to outside bodies, in their particular role at the time. Other 
than those officers that occupied the position of divisional commanders, it was 
difficult for most to envisage how they could be accountable to outside bodies. For 
this reason, and in order to give the discussion some practical relevance rather than 
leaving it largely theoretical, I have concentrated on those of my respondents that 
occupied the positions of divisional commanders at the time.
Before turning to the types of outside bodies to which divisional commanders 
felt they were accountable, some comment should be made about the claim by 
superintendents in other posts who felt that they could not be accountable to outside 
bodies. Their claim is plausible because until there was a major scandal in that area 
of policework, which was exposed to the public either through a public inquiry or 
secret recording of dysfunctional activities, the officer in charge of those particular 
areas would not be held to account publicly. Contemporary examples would include 
the senior detectives involved in the botched investigation of the murder of the black 
teenager Stephen Lawrence, and the senior managers in charge of training, human 
resources and recruiting following the exposures in the Secret Policeman 
documentary that was shown on terrestrial television in June 2003. This programme 
exposed free and uninhibited use of racist language and behaviour by a number of 
new recruits at a police regional Training Centre in Northwest England.
In general, most of the work of criminal investigation departments, training, 
human resources, and recruiting do not interact with the public in the same way as 
general uniform patrol work. One consequence of this is that as the public does not 
have routine contact with officers working in these policing areas, they are not as 
aware of how the police work and would not routinely hold them to account
The different types of outside bodies to which divisional commanders see 
themselves as accountable include different ‘Watches’, such Neighbourhood and 
Business; local media, which included local newspapers and radio stations; and 
members of parliament living in their area. However, the Police Consultative
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Committee Group (PCCG) was one outside body that featured consistently as the one 
to which most of my respondents felt that they were and had to be accountable.
I quarterly have to go to the PCCG and present to them the quarterly report 
on how we're getting on with our objectives. Now the Press are there, it is 
quite a wide representative organisation, there are local councillors on it, 
members o f the police authority, local traders, somebody representing 
neighbourhood watch, victim support, youth, disabled, ethnic minorities...It's 
the same report, quarterly report that I  put through to the Review that 
eventually go to the Police Authority. So yeah, there isn't anything from that 
point of view secretive; we put up front what our targets are. We have four 
nightly media conferences, two radio stations, seven different newspapers. So, 
from the point o f view o f public accountability I  feel, (a) that I  am, and (b) that 
I  do respond reasonably to that. (R. 4).
I  think I have a dual accountability. I  know you've said outside bodies but I, 
we always see my prime accountability to be the Chief Officers. Then 
secondary to that I am accountable to the —  [Town] Police and Community 
Consultative Group. They expect —  [Town] Division to deliver on the areas 
that we've identified as, through consultation, as being of priorities. So, I  am 
certainly accountable to them. Having said that I  don't think PCCGs work 
terribly well because what they tend to deal with is low-level stuff rather than 
the direction that the Division is taking. I  know the next time I go to the 
PCCG, I'll get far more questions on kids playing football outside somebody's 
house kicking a ball against a wall, than I  will on real issues where they ought 
to be influencing me. But that, I  can't do much about that, that's the public 
coming in and I've got this problem and I've got that problem, OK fine we'll 
sort out your problems. A part o f that accountability is because the chairman 
of our PCCG is a member our Police Authority, as is the vice-chairman, and 
of course they both have the ear o f the Chief Constable, So if you like there's 
a sort o f pressure therefrom both sides, although they, in effect... they don't 
have a sanction against me, I  know that if we don't go some way to matching 
their expectations because they've got the ear o f the Chief Constable I'll get it
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from the other side. So there is that indirect pressure from a different 
direction. (R. 5).
Besides PCCG there are a number of other statutory bodies to which senior 
managers in certain role have to account for the way they perform their duty. For 
example, the head of a Complaints and Discipline Department (which would now 
come under a Professional Standards Departments) would be accountable to the 
Police Complaints Authority. (Since the field study was carried out, the IPCC 
replaced the PCA from 1 April 2004).
I deal with the PCA, the Police Complaints Authority. I  regularly correspond 
with them; they supervise certain investigations, the more serious complaints 
against the Police. So I  have a quite involved level o f contact with the PCA. 
To a lesser extent also with the DPP on criminal allegations, our files go to 
the Director o f Public Prosecutions, so we're accountable there. We’re also 
accountable to the Police Authority Sub-Committee that looks at complaints 
against the Police and I have to prepare a report and I  report to them on a 
quarterly basis about the level o f complaints and what we’re doing, the type o f 
investigation we’ve got going. There’s quite high level o f accountabilities I ’d 
say. (R. 17).
Some of my respondents gave examples of where they felt that they were 
accountable to non-statutory outside bodies. These included the following,
Well we are the liaison point for HMIC for example. We will meet the HMIC 
staff officers prior to inspection. Also my Department’s responsible for our 
statistics and management information as well in this Department, and o f 
course we do raise many instances direct with the Home Office and the Audit 
Commission. Each year the District Auditor will come into this Department 
and he will look at all our documents relating to the National Performance 
Indicators and he will verify the fact that the information we provide is 
accurate information because he will actually check it. What is really a 
source documents? Where you get this information from and I want to see it? 
So we spend time doing that. And again through ACPO we will be asked to
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respond say to the Quality o f Service Committee because we also have quality 
of service within the Department. Certainly activity analysis we deal with, all 
these kind o f these, so we either directly or indirectly have a reasonable 
amount o f contact with outside bodies through public service. (R. 22)
In the personnel world there's not direct accountability in sort o f the true 
sense, but there is accountability to organisations such as the, what was the 
Personnel Standards Leads Body, it's now been renamed the Employers, I 
can't remember, EOSC [Employment Occupational Standards Council] 
anyway, EOSC is the new initials o f it. They've worked very closely with 
ACPO in developing work to do with standards in the personnel world, and 
that is sort o f set o f standards, which we are expected to adhere to. The 
Commission for Racial Equality, Equal Opportunities Commission, a whole 
host o f agencies which monitor employment practices and procedures, to test 
your fairness. Whilst they don't have direct, we're not directly accountable to 
them; clearly there is a framework there, which we are expected to work 
within, so there is an expected professionalism that we need to aspire to. (R. 
25).
Other bodies, it's not so much accountability as co-operation with multi­
agency things. The Association o f Voluntary Organisations, we have a lot o f 
dealing with them. Local Authorities and various organisations, there's an 
organisation called Drink Wise, Drug and Alcohol Counsel, locally. You 
know, the list is endless and I  feel in co-operation, I  mean accountability is a 
quid pro quo really, in a sense that, you know, we accommodate them where 
we can so that they will accommodate us, rather than a demanding 
accountability, and that's how I  see that. (R. 29).
Discussion.
Structural changes to the police organisation, legislative changes in police procedures, 
and changes in contemporary social attitudes have created a very different work 
environment for modem day senior police managers. These changes have forced a
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relaxation in management and discipline styles, which some of my respondents have 
found very difficult to come to terms with.
In addition, the reduction in the number of officers in the superintending 
ranks, the increase in workload, and the change in emphasis on the matters on which 
senior managers should concentrate have reduced the time available to them to reflect 
on and evaluate their efficiency and effectiveness as managers. Although some found 
the cumulative effects of the changes demanding personally, they nonetheless 
collectively were stoical about getting on with the work they were being paid good 
money to carry out, as they saw it. Regardless of the specific role they occupied they 
were confident that they were properly accountable for the much increased influence 
and power they now wielded.
This chapter has illustrated how senior police managers have developed a 
remarkably similar outlook and solution to common problems of internal integration 
and external pressure. The language that they used to describe the problems and their 
solutions to them were also very similar, despite the fact that time, space and 
functional and operational responsibilities separated them.
All these points support a proposition that senior police managers can 
reasonably be described as a group that, through some common experience of similar 
problems and some shared learning on how to tackle some of these problems, has 
developed some of the components of a group culture. For example: i) group norms 
such as the standards and values that they articulate around working long hours in 
order to keep on top of their workload; ii) informal philosophy such as their 
collective outlook and belief that they are accountable as individuals for their position 
both to internal and external stakeholders; iii) espoused values, concerning matters 
like consultation, with the public articulation of support for the concept of 
consultation with junior officers, when the reality is often the contrary. I shall return 
to these components in more detail in my discussion on police management culture in 
chapter eleven.
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Chapter 6
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE.
INTRODUCTION.
Sir Colin Marshall, the then Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive of British 
Airways wrote in the foreword of the book Ignition that,
“One constant factor has run all the way through my working life, from the 
time that I left school and put to sea as a cadet purser, through my days with 
Hertz and Avis car rental companies in Europe and the United States, then 
with Sears retail group in London and subsequendy during my time at British 
Airways. That constant, paradoxically as it may sound, is change. The future 
holds many uncertainties, but looking ahead there is one thing of which I am 
sure. Change, and once again, excuse me if I appear to contradict myself -  is 
here to stay.
“I will go further than that. Change is going to come about ever faster, and 
more frequently” (Chaudhry-Lawton and Lawton 1992. My emphases).
A senior police manager, describing his experience in the police service over 
the last three decades could quite easily have spoken these words. Today, the pace of 
change in just as swift, just as frequent, and if anything more intense.
“This policy paper, as the forerunner to police reform legislation, inevitably 
concentrates on those aspects of reform which are primarily matters for the 
police. Nevertheless, we approach radical change not from the standpoint of 
those delivering the service, but from those reliant on it.”
This was the view of the Home Secretary in the White Paper on police reform 
published in 2001. He continued,
“Our task is clear...we will bring about change...But the challenge of 
modernisation is to bring about the kind of improvements which are welcomed
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by everyone -  except those more concerned about protecting their comfortable 
ways of working. The challenge to us is to provide the means which will 
enable police officers and support staff to work better, and to do their job free 
from complicated and time consuming procedures, unnecessary to achieve 
results or to protect basic rights.
In the end, it will not be the statistics on crime falling, or targets met for 
burglary or vehicle crime, but rather the difference felt in the neighbourhood 
and community itself which will be judge and jury of these reforms. It is time 
to focus on preventing crime and protecting the victims, and to place the 
weight of society behind this drive to reform the police” (Home Office 2001b. 
My emphasis).
These words of the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, in 2001 expressed 
sentiments that would have been all too familiar to the police service, because it has 
been facing a continuous call for change since the major corruption scandals of the 
late 1950s (Critchley: 19). If senior police managers thought that the pace of change 
to which the service had been subjected was about to subside, if for no other reason 
than to give them the time to take stock of what the service had achieved as a result of 
the relentless demand for change over the years, then the police reform White Paper 
would have left them very disappointed. As the Home Secretary mentioned at the 
Police Superintendents’ Conference in September 2001, “This is a time of great 
change in policing. From the challenges of leadership to new technologies, the police 
service is changing quickly” (Home Office 2001b). However, it has been doing so for 
a long time. As Savage explains, “From a position of relative stability through much 
of the post-war period, the police organisation has been confronted with a range of 
pressures for change and, like other areas of the public sector, has had to learn to live 
with change -  not as something temporary or transitory but as an endemic feature of 
the ‘post-modem’ world” (Savage and Charman 1996: 39).
Since Home Office Circular 114/83, which ushered in what was to become the 
government’s continuing programme of change, the various methods that have been 
adopted by different governments to bring about the desired change in police 
management style, operational practices, and working conditions have ranged from 
financial constraints, through variation of structure and function, to now greater
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accountability to the public. Regardless of the methods, it appears that none has 
produced exactly what any of the governments have wanted.
I think it is safe to speculate that one certainty for the police service in the 
coming months, perhaps years, is that the demand for change will continue unabated. 
Taking a positive consumerist view of this relendess demand for change, perhaps it is 
encouraging the police to adhere to the doctrine of ‘continuous improvement’. Put 
simply, it will be better for the police service in the end.
The continuous demand for change in the police service has been clear. What 
I will discuss in this chapter is how senior police managers have managed change. In 
doing so, I shall start by looking at some of the causes of change before moving on to 
how they have managed the changes.
UNDER THE MICROSCOPE - CAUSES/SOURCES OF CHANGE.
Over the last two and a half decades, the police service has come under relentless and 
continuous pressure, from both internal and external sources, to bring about change in 
its structure and function. Some of these demands have been specific to the police 
whilst others have been general to other public sector organisations.
The sources of change in public sector organisations in general and the police 
in particular can be categorised under the following headings of “economic/fiscal on 
the one hand, and political/ideological on the other.” While sources of change 
specific to the police service can be categorised under the headings of crime/criminal 
justice mid formative controversies” (Savage and Charman 1996: 39). As the authors 
go on to explain, “While these processes by no means exhaust the myriad of factors 
constituting sources of and pressure for change on the police, they do form the 
primary elements of that framework”, as they appeared also to have done for my 
respondents.
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Economic/Fiscal
Savage and Charman explain that, “something approaching a ‘crisis of public 
expenditure’ has confronted virtually all Western economies since the mid-70s” and 
that this was initiated by the oil crisis of 1973.
Before this time Western economies had gone through a period described by 
one commentator as the “The Golden Age”; the period between the end of the Second 
World War and the early 1970s. Using the oil crises as an example, Hobsbawm 
suggests that, “One of the reasons why the Golden Age was golden was that the price 
of a barrel of Saudi oil averaged less than 2 US Dollars throughout the entire period 
from 1950 to 1973, thus making energy ridiculously cheap, and getting cheaper all the 
time” (Hobsbawm 1994: 262).
Savage and Charman explain that, “a long worldwide recession, characterised 
by a slowing down of economic growth; rising unemployment; and, in some cases, 
soaring rate of inflation” consolidated the reduction in public expenditure. Further, 
that “Britain’s relatively poor economic performance throughout much of the post­
war period placed it in a more vulnerable position than most” of the other Western 
economies. “As a consequence, the Labour government of the mid- to late- 1970s, 
under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, found itself having to introduce 
the first major round of cut-backs in public expenditure since the Second World War” 
(ibid: 40).
With the election of the Conservative government in 1979, there was a further 
shift towards a reduction in public expenditure, and the need for such further cuts 
were justified by two deep recessions in the 1980s. The situation was exacerbated by 
the Conservative government’s “ideological hostility to public spending, particularly 
the high levels of public spending on ‘welfare’” (ibid).
The first application of this new financial restriction on the police was through 
Home Office Circular 114/83, which required adherence to the three Es of, 
Efficiency; Effectiveness; and Economy. These were the prevailing conditions under 
which my respondents had to manage change within and to the police service before 
my interviews of them.
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With the return to power of a Labour government in 1997, one might have 
expected some relaxation in the level of restriction on public expenditure. But as one 
reader of the Guardian newspaper asked in the Notes and queries section on Thursday 
20 January 2000, “At the last general election I voted Labour, only to discover thirty 
months later that I had actually voted Conservatives. Can anyone account for this 
phenomenon?” It should be pointed out that the Labour government of the 1970s was 
the one that started the ball rolling, with budget cuts and reduced spending on public 
expenditure. Therefore, it is arguable that this was just a continuation of their policy 
-  but in the 1970s it was forced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), now 
willingly espoused by ‘New Labour’.
For the police the question could read as follows. At the 1997 general 
election, Labour came into power with promises to move policing from a more 
performance/efficiency-driven style to a more community/effective one. However, 
six years later we find that performance indicators are more searching and demanding 
and the financial constraints are tighter. Have the ‘Conservatives’ just added more 
bite to their policies on reducing public expenditure? Having had the experience of 
working on secondment to the Home Office, I have little doubt that ministers make 
policies and officials devise what they see as the best methods to implement them. 
The police service is given significant opportunities to influence government policies 
through the mechanisms of consultation and sitting on advisory groups.
Political/ideological
Savage and Charman suggest that the election of the Conservative government in 
1979 and the ideological framework it introduced into the public policy arena sent out 
two conflicting messages to the public service, which they described as follows.
i. There was an explicit commitment to strengthen the forces of ‘law and 
order’ in the battle against crime.
ii. There was the pledge to ‘roll back the state’, encourage markets and 
the private sector, and spread the culture of the ‘business ethos’ 
throughout the public services.
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They labelled these two messages ‘neo-conservative’ and ‘neo-liberal’, 
respectively, and explained that the neo-conservative message could be taken by 
police managers as a comforting sign that the police service would be protected and 
that resources would be found. While the neo-liberal message indicated reduced 
expenditure for public services and more scope for an expansion of ‘private sector 
disciplines’ into the management and delivery of public services. They suggested, 
with the caveat that it might be an oversimplification, that the former message set the 
agenda for the police service in the early 1980s while the latter set the agenda for the 
late 1980s and 1990s. An oversimplification the interpretation may have been, but it 
seemed to have struck a familiar note with my respondents, as some of them 
expressed in their answers to a question on managing change.
Oh I  think there's been a significant change in that we tried and are still 
trying to adopt some o f the good practice o f businesses outside... We're 
actually devising better plans than what we did in the past, I  mean we have 
had a business plan for a number o f years now, but it's much more 
structured... So we actually look at what business is trying to do, where are 
we now? Where do we want to go to? How are we going to get there? What 
are our priorities going to be? And the big thing in the last year or so mind 
you, is the way we’ve tried to develop performance indicators that matter as 
opposed to counting numbers for the sake o f it. (R. 15).
The concept of adopting the management principles of private sector 
organisations in the management of public sector organisations has been labelled 
‘new public management’ (NPM). NPM can be characterised by the following five 
traits of, ‘private good, public bad’; competition; centralisation of policy formation; 
decentralisation of delivery; and fragmentation. They explain that “NPM reflects and 
ideological commitment asserting the superiority of the market over the state, often 
underpinned by no more than a simplistic ‘private good, public bad’ faith” (Leishman 
et al 1996b: 11). This generates four further features of NPM:
1. Competition; “NPM reflects the view that greater competition between the 
public and private sector and within the public sector promotes greater
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efficiency by making public sector agencies more consumer-responsive” 
(ibid).
2. Centralisation of policy; “NPM centralises the making of policy strategy 
(especially policy goals and budgets) increasingly in the hands of the core 
executive at the heart of government, embracing a closely-knit network of 
senior ministers and officials. It separates ‘steering from rowing’ leaving the 
centre to steer while other agencies row” (ibid).
3. Decentralisation of delivery; “NPM decentralises the delivery of public policy 
to a plethora of agencies, including local authorities, quangos and private 
contractors that exercise managerial and operational discretion within the 
limits of policy strategy set by the centre” (ibid).
4. Fragmentation; “NPM fragments government because of the steering/rowing 
split, encouraging further client/contractor and purchaser/provider splits within 
government” (ibid).
They conclude that although these five traits of NPM could be found in the 
way all public sector organisations were managed, they have had unequal impact 
across policy area. The police service was perhaps the last to face full exposure to 
NPM, but it has now hit it in force. Leishman et al (1996b) have little doubt that the 
ideology of new public management has formed the major source of change 
confronting the police service in recent years. Explaining that the ideological 
framework of new public management did not emerge fully-fledged from the core 
ideology of neo-liberalism, but developed in an incremental fashion. Further, that it 
had been shaped by a number of factors, one of which was the shifting political 
climate. They suggested that as new public management has evolved “two core 
overlapping ideological themes have remained pervasive. These have been on the one 
hand, the virtues of competition, while on the other, the benefits of private sector 
styles o f management.
These concepts would have been prominent in the thoughts of my respondents 
at the time of my fieldwork. Therefore, it is reasonable to surmise that they might 
have had the most influence on the professional thinking of my respondents at the 
time of my interviews. That this was partly the case was reflected in the responses 
that I got from them when I posed the following question. During the last two/three
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years, there have been a number o f Inquiries and Reports on the police service, 
calling for change in its structure and function. The White Paper on Police Reform 
(1993); The Sheehy Inquiry into the Roles and Responsibilities o f the Police; The 
Posen Enquiry into Core and Ancillary Tasks; various Audit Commission Reports; 
and the ACPO Quality of Service report *Getting Things Right'. Have these demands 
resulted in any changes in policing or management styles?
This question falls within the causes of change that I have categorised, 
following Savage and Charman usage, as, crime/criminal justice and formative 
controversies. As one of my respondents explained,
Oh phenomenal Vic really. I  mean we discussed earlier about all the work 
this Force has done over the last few years in terms o f its Charter, in terms of 
the performance that it undertakes to provide to the community. In the 
development o f Service Level Agreements internally in which we set out what 
each department will give one to another. In terms o f the fact that we're 
dividing now into service providers, which I  am one, and service deliverers, 
which are the Divisional Commanders who deliver the service to the 
community. And I ’m actively involved in developing Service Level 
Agreements with outside agencies. I  mean the start o f that was when we 
introduced the witness liaison computer. We had to develop Service Level 
Agreements with the Courts and the Crown Prosecution Service as to the 
availability o f this information and its freshness, and the like. So yes these are 
all major changes. We are no longer, we can no longer see ourselves as an 
island that can dictate to others. (R. 32)
I  mean really the whole thrust now is sort o f more business driven, I mean we 
look at the things like the performance indicators and the national objectives, 
and we're talking about targets. I  mean we’ve been given targets this year for 
the first time that we're going to be expected to achieve and we're working 
towards that, so we've become much more business driven, in everything we 
do. And I  think in a way it's probably not a bad thing because I  think we're 
being held much more accountable in terms o f what we're spending money on. 
I think the police service has got away for a long time without actually having
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to focus on that. I  think the Audit Commission is probably the most impactive 
organisation on policing, I  mean what the Audit Commission say generally is 
attended to. I  mean I  like the Audit Commission in many ways, I think that the 
Audit Commission does make a lot o f sense, because for too long the police 
service has done its own thing. Each o f the police forces have done their own 
thing, there’s never been any recognition of best practice, or actually looking 
at what we’re doing. It’s been more a case o f each chief constable has wanted 
to have his own unique initiative so they he can say, look what I ’ve done and 
what I ’m doing. So, yes they’ve been very impactive, for the good in a lot of 
respect I  think. (R. 49).
In contrast to the above expressions that these external demands and internal 
initiatives have produced changes in the management style of senior police officers, a 
sizeable number of my respondents questioned the breath arid depth of the changes. 
A typical response was,
We have a whole range o f policies now that we didn’t have before, but they’re 
fairly transparent, they really haven’t changed much. I  suppose on a scale of 
1 to 10 we’ve moved to about 2, if we’re looking at change, and to be 
anywhere near effective I would suggest we have to be about 7.5. So we’ve 
enacted all sorts o f things, and I reckon we’ve got away with it fairly well, 
because people think we’ve done quite well. We’ve got a lot o f good stuff 
going for us, but it’s not actually eating into the core o f management. I f  you 
really want to affect management within an organisation, and service delivery, 
you’ve got to affect the Sergeants and Inspectors. The people who are 
actually turning people out day in day out and have some immediate control. 
We haven’t done that. (R. 20).
This suggestion of senior managers not delegating tasks appropriately to the 
lower ranks and wanting to immerse themselves in the daily task of police activities is 
a real issue that perhaps has its roots in the culture of policing and the structured 
progression of officers through the ranks. For example, in terms of the culture, the 
following reply from one of my respondents to the question of the general problems 
that they faced in their current rank and position, illustrate the point.
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Well generally, I  would say the major problems now are associated with the 
organisational issues as against day-to-day management o f your own 
department or your Division. The things that are forced upon you, the need to 
deliver things on time, to set targets, to achieve targets, to budget for things, to 
play a part in developing policies, implementing policies, managing change. 
All concepts that were outside the sphere o f the manager at the same level a 
number o f years ago. Then it was very much about, is the police work getting 
done? What incidents occurred last night, have they been dealt with? Who's 
done what? Who's arrested who? Who's done a good job? What serious 
crime have we got? That used to be what the day was about. Now the day is 
about, why are we overspending in this area? Why are we not meeting our 
target on this? What about if I  get asked about this? What about when I go 
to the Community Meeting tonight and I have to explain so and so, what am I 
going to say? So I think the whole perspective o f management o f someone at 
superintendent level has changed dramatically and some have handled it and 
some haven't. Some really struggle and will continue to do so no doubt. So I 
think there is a massive swing from the attitude that you could retire a few  
years ago as a superintendent and everybody would talk about you as a 
policeman, he's a good copper, all the arrests he had. I  suspect now when you 
retire as a superintendent, rarely does anyone talk about you as a good 
copper. They talk about you in terms of he's a nice bloke, you know, and they 
can't actually think what you did! So, from a policeman's angle that all seems 
sad, because I'd like to be remembered as a policeman. I  suspect I won't be, 
I'd like to be but I  won't be and I think that just indicates the change and the 
swing that's occurred, from worrying about police work to worrying about the 
management o f police work. Someone's got to do it, all the worrying about 
that used to go to the Centre years ago, now it's done out there where the 
service is delivered. So I  think that's the major change. (R. 10).
The desire to remain hands-on and to judge one’s success as a senior manager 
by the ability to do policework rather than manage it is probably a product of some of 
the components of ‘cop culture’, such as ‘mission’ and ‘action’ (Reiner 2000: 89). 
Additionally, when junior officers use the same measure to judge success, then it can
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be a powerful determinant of a senior officer’s actions. For example, the remarks of a 
24-year old police constable in Roger Graef s book Talking Blues illustrate the 
significance of senior officers’ thinking, and hints at the influence of the structured 
progression through the ranks from the base of uniform constable.
Our superintendent Ops [Operations] is good. He's keen. He’s still got his 
feet on the ground. He hasn’t lost it -  he’s still a PC. He will come out walking with 
you, not to catch you out but because he is interested, because he wants to walk round 
and meet people. I  am sure if something happened he would leg after them and arrest 
them. I ’d have to do his paperwork, but he would get involved” (Graef 1989: 464).
One thing that both these quotes illustrate is that the ability of senior managers 
to retain the practical skills of coppering is in the eyes of junior officers an important 
measure, paradoxically, of managerial competence. It seems that it does not matter to 
many front line officers how good senior managers were at managing resources. The 
real test in the eyes of those under their command was their ability to do some 
effective operational policework on the ground.
Reiner describes two of the core characteristics of cop culture -mission and 
action -  as “the feeling that policing is not just a job but a way of life with a 
worthwhile purpose... The mission of policing is not regarded as irksome. It is fun, 
challenging, exciting...” (Reiner 2000: 89). The structured, linear progression of all 
officers through the ranks means that all my respondents would have been exposed to 
these core characteristics of cop culture, albeit to varying extent and length of time. 
This in my view could have created the perception that one measure of managerial 
effectiveness was operational competence. Perhaps not surprisingly, some of my 
respondents believed that the changes in management styles were temporary 
unthinking reactions to external demands. Typically,
Invariably, and most o f the responses are knee jerk, and I said earlier on that 
we’re now on maybe the third major change o f policing style. We had 
community policing when I first joined, then we went onto Pandas and Area 
beat, then we went on to team policing and now we’re coming back to local 
Area policing or BCU-type policing. So yeah I think when these papers are
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published, and there's no doubt that Sheehy was a tremendous shot across the 
bows, because I think there was a feeling that we were always going to be 
needed by the Government to keep their policies on track. But we were 
comparatively well looked after, but there was a failure to recognise it. But 
the thing that I  think is a lot o f the reaction are knee jerk reactions. (R. 40).
One thing that these examples illustrate is that the police service and senior 
police managers are capable and can adapt to assimilate changes in its structure and 
its working practices. However, for some senior managers it is not an easy process, 
particularly when they are aware that their subordinates measure their effectiveness as 
managers by their perceived coppering skills. These examples, however, do not 
address how senior police managers manage change. How can they move away from 
the type of response that the last quoted respondent described as ‘knee-jerk’, and carry 
out change in a structured, controlled and proactive way? Perhaps one way is to 
pursue the formulation and adoption of organisational values, for example. I now turn 
to this topic and its effect on the management of change.
MANAGING CHANGE.
One author has suggested that the history of change in the police service began as far 
back as 1974 when the last major police force restructuring created the present 43- 
force structure (Grange 1992: 300). The process of change and the demands for it 
have continued unabated throughout the last three decades. What I wish to consider 
here is the procedures and mechanism senior managers have used to manage the 
changes that have unquestionably happened to and within the police service.
Priorities, goals and values.
Policing by Objectives (PBO) was one popular mechanism that was adopted for 
managing change in the police service in the 1980s (Audit Commission 1990, 
Weatheritt 1989). As Grange explains it,
“PBO demands a clear analysis of demands and statements of priorities by the 
chief constables -  missions and goals -  followed by analysis at all levels down 
the organisational pyramid upon objectives, demands, plans and evaluations of
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plans in action. Its success was theorised to be founded upon the involvement 
of officers at all levels, from which commitment to the process would 
inevitably follow, and a comprehensive planning cycle. Locally, 
superintendents are the managers of the system and are responsible for its 
implementation and success” (Grange 1992: 310).
However, the initiative did not work as well as expected. Grange concluded 
that the reason was,
“PBO suffered from its rationality, it assumed that given rational analysis and 
clear specifications of targets, operational personnel would support it. The 
humanist perceptions appeared to be ignored and the internal cultures and 
values that bind operational officers together were apparently neither properly 
understood nor used to assist the introduction of the new order” (ibid).
This is important because if the ideas of PBO do not produce successful 
outcomes when used in operational and practical situations, then officers will not 
adopt or embrace the initiative. This means that it would not become part of officers’ 
working practices and values, and consequently, part of their culture. This I would 
propose is perhaps part of the reason for the resistance to PBO.
The external programmes for change concentrated on measuring the 
quantitative aspects of policing, and to get a balanced view of the full range of police 
activity, the service embarked on highlighting the importance of the qualitative 
aspects of policework in the early 1990s with the formation of the ACPO Quality of 
Service sub-committee. This concentration by chief officers on the proactive aspects 
of policing increased the level of discussion on such matters as ethics and values. I 
discussed with my respondents their thoughts on the reasons the police service had 
adopted the concept of values. I asked them why forces were publishing statements 
on values - which appeared to have followed on from the publication of priorities and 
goals -  and what effects such publications had had on the style of police management.
Their replies produced common themes that could be grouped into the broad 
categories of, professional integrity, professionalism; standardisation of individual
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behaviour in the delivery of policing services; reaching consensus on the purpose and 
function of the police; and those that were unsure why. There was one common 
feature throughout the majority of the views expressed by my respondents; this was 
cynicism. They questioned the longevity of this transformational style of 
management. (Leban and Zulauf: 2004). Examples of typical quotes are as follows.
Professional integrity, professionalism.
One reason ACPO gave why forces should set values was that “the Police Service 
firmly believes that the public is right to have the highest expectations of consistent 
and professional standards of service to be provided by the police in all 
circumstances, implemented courteously and not discriminatory in any way with 
respect to the colour, age, sex, religion, ethnic group or social status of the persons 
being dealt with.” Although my respondents supported the need for professionalism 
in the delivery of service, which was demanded by ACPO, some were nonetheless 
still sceptical about the efficacy of promulgating values to professionalize the service.
Generally because it’s seen as good organisational practice and we tend to 
environmentally scan and pick up people’s ideas several years late, and just 
as we are publishing our statement o f values, the outside world has decided 
that it’s a thing o f the past and they’ve got a new idea. One o f these days we 
might just about catch up but there comes a point where if it’s seen as 
accepted good practice in the outside world, we are very much expected to 
follow suit. I  mean I was quite a strong critic o f the proposed Statement of 
Ethics I think it was called, because my approach was the original oath o f 
attestation that you take when you become a constable, more than adequately 
covers the proposed new ethical code, because that talks about even 
handedness, non discrimination and fair treatment for all. And that was 
penned back in the 1850s or something and I don't see anything in that which 
causes me any concern and needed change. So in certain areas we’ve 
undoubtedly tried to generate things, which I don’t think had any real value. 
But we can’t sort o f maintain a total ostrich syndrome and if it is seen as good 
practice and if it allows us to be accepted as some sort o f professional 
organisation, then we might as well do it. (R. 25).
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I  suppose over a number o f years some people have questioned whether the 
Police are operating in a moral vacuum and in the same way as you ’ve got the 
Hippocratic oath in the medical profession and those sorts o f things. I  
suppose it’s felt that we needed that, both in real terms, because perhaps we 
have been in a moral vacuum but also in a perceived term because others 
believe us to be in a moral vacuum. So I would imagine there’s both a 
conscious element o f that, the Police’s own internal conscience o f things, it’s 
about time, but also a political pressure for them. A real cynic would say, and 
I  wouldn’t, but a real cynic might say that it’s an attempt to professionalise 
the profession, no not only professionals have statements and values, all the 
professions have statements and values. (R. 12)
The implication is that by adopting a set of values by and through which 
senior managers would manage change, then the changes were likely to endure. This 
thinking is embodied in the Statement of Common Purpose and Values advanced by 
ACPO in 1990 in its Strategic Policy Document,
“The purpose of the Police Service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly: to 
prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep 
the Queen’s Peace; to protect, help and reassure the community; and to be 
seen to do all this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement.
We must be compassionate, courteous and patient, acting without fear or 
favour or prejudice to the rights of other. We need to be professional, calm 
and restrained in the face of violence and apply only that force which is 
necessary to accomplish our lawful duty.
We must strive to reduce the fears of the public and, so far as we can, to 
reflect their priorities in the action we take. We must respond to well-founded 
criticism with a willingness to change” (Page 1).
Organisational acceptance and public display of these values -  compassion, 
courteousness, patience and using only proportionate force to uphold the law -  would 
not and have not always necessarily lead to individual adoption of them in the 
delivery of policing services. The document addressed this point by stressing
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“That whilst statistics and opinion polls are a guide to the quality of service 
and public satisfaction, experience in other organisations suggests that change 
in behaviour and the acceptance by the organisation of the service philosophy, 
will only be achieved as a result of commitment and example from all strata of 
the organisation beginning at the very top. In turn the culture of the 
organisation and management style will be reflected in service delivery at all 
levels” (Page 13).
The development and adoption of organisational values is one way of 
changing the behaviour of individuals and the credo of an organisation, but as 
Waddington noted, values in the form of attitudes do not translate direcdy to 
behaviour. Schein explains that if the espoused values of an organisation are not 
based on prior learning, they may predict well enough what people will say in a 
variety of situations but may be out of line with what they will actually do in 
situations where those values should be operating (Waddington 1999b: 107, Schein 
1992: 19). This point was covered in chapter 3.
Standardisation.
The Association of Chief Police Officers was clear and unequivocal on the need to 
standardise service delivery across all forces. In its view the police service should be 
“seen as a cohesive organisation with a common corporate philosophy and agreed 
standards of service delivery” (ACPO 1990: 6). In contrast to the vacillation over the 
efficacy of values in general, my respondents were more certain about using them to 
ensure standardisation in management style and consequently in service delivery.
I f  you go back to your question a little while ago when you spoke about the 
militaristic approach, unless we're careful we can go too far down that road 
and I  think it is absolutely right that we actually set certain standards. I f  you 
want to call them standards, values, ethics, whatever. I  think the principle is 
the same that we will come up and deliver a certain standard o f service that 
we should be big enough in this day and age to say that is the standard we 
hope to achieve. (R. 4).
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I  mean partly I  think there’s a sort o f benchmark as it were, something that, 
you know, we feel as an organisation that we could sign up to, and I  mean 
certainly, when the code o f ethics, which is a form of statement o f values came 
out, one o f the reaction o f a lot of people was, they’re there, we’re already 
practising them, why have we got to publish them? I mean the reality is that 
whilst we may all like to have thought they were there, if you had asked, if you 
got a group o f police officers together and you asked them what their values 
or ethics were, they would have all come up with a different set. And so I 
think that there was a need at National level for us to have some common 
values that we could all identify with. I  mean I can remember when I joined, 
as a young PC that there were some things that I  saw which I thought, that’s 
not right, but I didn’t have the guts to do anything about it as an individual 
because in some ways it was, I say it wasn’t unexceptional, it was, I  had 
nothing to which I could go to like a code o f ethics and say, look I can clearly 
see that’s wrong. That sounds a bit feeble in a way but I  think that something 
like that, which is supported by senior management would give greater 
confidence to young officers. (R. 16).
But the set of values must be agreed by a cross section of people in the 
organisation for there to be some level of ownership of them. Some of the process 
that my respondents have used to develop mission and value statements accord with 
some of the suggested methods advocated in management texts. Such things as, 
‘working visions’, consulting and negotiating with staff to create simple statement 
that encapsulates the vision that that group is trying to attain. (Katzenbach 1996: 63)
The purpose and function o f the police.
One theme that has been consistent throughout this thesis is that the police service 
has faced an array of tremendous changes. Some of the calls for change have 
questioned what the purpose and function of police in contemporary society should 
be. Should the police concentrate on law enforcement (Home Office 1993), or should 
it pursue a broader mandate that emphasises, as strongly as law enforcement, the 
service delivery aspect of policing? (Joint Consultative Committee 1990). There have 
been no shortage of suggestions of what it is or should be. (Martin 1993; ACPO 1990;
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Posen 1995; Police Foundation 1996). My respondents thought that one reason for 
adopting values was to produce a consensus on the purpose and function of 
contemporary police. A typical examples was,
I  think this is something that was identified again going back through the 
Operational Policing Review and the perception o f what the public thought we 
were about. And it was this concern about the level o f satisfaction having 
significantly reduced in some o f the core areas o f policing and resulting from 
that as you quite rightly say was the ACPO strategic document that came out 
of that. And I think within that it was quite clearly identified that we do need 
to have some value statement and o f course we've got the statement o f 
common purpose and values coming out o f that. Yes I think there is a need to 
say to the public what we're actually about because all we had prior to this 
was the old definition o f what a Constable is. So now that's, I  think the 
difficulty the police were in and certainly got no steer from the Centre is, what 
actually do you want from us as an organisation? After the Operational 
Policing Review, what you were crying out for was a steer from Government 
to say to us, at the Home Office to say, ‘Right this is what we think you're 
about as an organisation' and come to some sort o f an agreement on it. That 
didn't happen so the police have now had to work through for themselves and 
say to the public and say, this is what we believe we're about, this is what you 
can expect from us. (R. 22).
Cynicism.
A problem with trying to inculcate an organisation with one set of values is that those 
values are unlikely to be the same values that all members of the organisation hold 
independently. When this is the case and the rationale for adopting corporate values 
are not properly explained to staff they are unlikely to conform to or embrace them. 
Typical comments expressing doubt about the development of values include the 
following,
Because it's the in-thing that everybody's doing. I  think it's right that one 
should make a statement to what our values are and what one is trying to do, I  
think that’s absolutely correct. And I  have to say Pm slightly cynical about
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the reality o f what's being expressed and the difference that makes into how 
the organisation operates. (R. 23).
The cynical would say that it sort o f came out ofBramshill and ACPO, I  think 
that's why it's happened. It seemed like a good idea and it's been pushed out, 
I don't think it's come up from the bottom, the need for them, I  think, it's one 
o f the few things which ACPO's put through. (R. 31).
The perceived impact of change.
For the majority of my respondents, the numerous demands for change have made a 
difference to the style of police management. Interestingly and paradoxically, where 
some of my respondents have said that these demands have not produced any change 
in management styles, the main reason they gave was that they, individually and 
collectively, were already practising what was being advocated. Typical of the types 
of examples given were the following,
I think marginally, because most o f those service delivery standards, people 
will say to you, they're actually what we already do, and all we've done now 
is written it down. So that we can pick it up and say, when we go to a 
burglary that's what I'm supposed to do. When I go to a cot death, these are 
the parameters I can work in. But I  suppose every time one is produced you 
actually read it and think, now have we actually got it right in that particular 
area. So I think they do make a difference, at the margins. (R. 5)
From a personal perspective, no, and I  always think it's very difficult when it 
comes to values. I f  you start to try and impose a set of values on people, I 
think we will meet a degree o f resistance because people will quite rightly say, 
well, surely I'm doing that now, or these are my own personal values anyway. 
Apart from which I think the personal values o f individuals coming into the 
service should be along the lines o f those, which somebody is now publishing. 
(R.6)
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Discussion.
Contemporary police managers are no strangers to the process of change. They have 
been part of and leading a service that over the last two to three decades has been 
certain of one thing: change.
The call for change has come predominantly from external sources. The 
internal initiatives to bring about change, which were started in the early 1990s, have 
been the result of calls for some recognition of the ‘social’ aspects of policework, 
instead of concentrating entirely on the quantitative and easily measurable features.
My respondents were in no doubt that the variety of external demands for 
change had had some success. They felt that there had been some changes to the 
structure of the police service and the style of management, which was 
unquestionable when one listened to the list of structural and procedural changes. 
However, the changes had been made directly in response to specific demands. They 
had been carried out in a ‘mechanistic way’ (Audit Commission 1990). The change 
process was reactive, and there were few examples of management of the changes. 
There were few examples of senior police managers displaying the attributes of ‘real 
change leaders’. These are senior managers who are more than information 
transmitters, compilers, syndicators, and administrators. “They are the linchpins 
connecting three critical forces for organisational change and performance: top 
leadership aspirations (what are we trying to become?); workforce energy and 
productivity (how will we climb the mountain?); and the marketplace reality (what do 
our target customers truly seek, and what can and will our potential competitors really 
do?) (Katzenbach 1996: 8).
My respondents’ and the service’s attempt at a proactive approach to the 
management of change involved the adoption of explicitly espoused values. The 
efficacy of using defined organisational values to implement change worked at a 
number of levels. These included enhancing the professional integrity of individuals 
and the organisation for which they worked, standardising the behaviour of officers in 
order to ensure a consistency in the quality of service provision, and gaining some 
consensus on the purpose and function of the police.
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The promulgation of organisational values has brought about changes to 
management styles, but it would appear that these changes have occurred mainly 
where the organisational values were similar to those of individual practitioners. 
Even where this has been the case, many people were still disappointed because they 
felt that the service was telling them what they already knew. The significance of this 
from the point of cultural analysis, is that if these values do not arise from shared 
experiences and learning, and therefore given a common meaning, they are not likely 
to be adopted and embedded into the culture of the group, which is the view my 
respondents were expressing.
However, one alternative view that was not overtly expressed was a lack of 
change in the content of management activity. The style may have changed, in the 
sense that there was an established process for producing and displaying written 
values, but there was little evidence of how these values would be embedded in 
operational practice. How it would be monitored and evaluated to ensure they were 
producing the ‘right’ behaviours throughout the service.
My respondents hinted as some of the reasons why the values may not have 
changed behaviour. One example is possibly that the proposed organisational values 
were at odds with individual values. However, one reason that was not mentioned by 
any of my respondents but has been expressed by Waddington, is that values 
expressed in the form of attitudes do not invariably translate directly into actions. I do 
not believe the point is weakened by the fact that I am approaching it from the 
opposite direction to Waddington’s argument (Waddington 1999: Ch 4), as the 
principle is transferable. If senior managers believed that they were behaving 
properly, according to their values, when carrying out their duties and that their 
personal values were not aligned to the organisation’s values, it would be 
understandable why they would view the use of values to drive organisational change 
with cynicism. The cynicism may be stronger where the proposed values were not 
based on any prior learning or experience amongst the officers at that location. 
Therefore, as Schein explains, if these values were not based on prior learning they 
may just be formally or presentationally espoused values, “which predict well enough 
what people will say in a variety of situations but which may be out of line with what 
they will actually do.” He warns that in “analysing values one must discriminate
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carefully between those that are, in effect, either rationalisations or only aspirations 
for the future” (Schein 1992: 21).
From the data, the values that the service is promulgating appear more to be 
aspirational and have not yet been turned into a philosophy of operating. 
Consequently, the difference between the values that the service espouses and the 
ones under which it operates leads to cynicism amongst some senior managers. 
However, one positive note is that by using values as a method to bring about change 
the service is taking decisive steps to make implemented changes deeply embedded 
and long lasting.
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Chapter 7.
CONTEMPORARY POLICING ISSUES. 
INRODUCTION.
This chapter and the next two will discuss three of the core concerns about policing. 
These three areas are important and relevant ones for the purpose of this study 
because the emphasis that is placed on any one of them in relation to the others, and 
the significance that is attached to each at any particular time will depend on the 
prevailing social and political environment. The three areas can, individually or 
collectively, change the external environment in a way that creates problems that the 
police service, and senior managers, have to solve or adapt to in order to grow or 
survive. These areas are the police function, crime, and public disorder.
What is the function of the police? The specific and general functions of the 
modem day public police service have been the subject of much research, 
considerable debate and inquiry from a diverse number of official and unofficial 
‘investigators’. For example: The Government’s White Paper on Police Reform; the 
former Conservative Government’s Strategy on Crime - Protecting the Public; Joint 
Staff Association publication Operational Policing Review; ACPO Strategic Policy 
Document; ACPO Quality of Service Committee initiative, “Getting Things Right”*, 
Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards chaired by Sir Patrick Sheehy; The 
Role and Responsibilities o f the Police chaired by Ingrid Posen.
However, when a group of police officers and civilian staff from a small force 
were asked for their opinion on the topic their replies were varied, but predictable. 
Predictable in that the list of things the officers mentioned consisted of the functions 
one would find in most sociological texts on the police. Nevertheless, those that the 
civilian members mentioned consisted of things that the officers present were 
reluctant to admit that they either practised, or rarely had first hand experience of.
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The group listed activities such as, ‘prevent and detect crime’; maintain public 
order’; protect life and property’; ‘provide a service’; and ‘enforce the law’, while the 
civilian members, alone, added that police officers ‘abused their powers’.
The police service clearly has a mandate to do some of these things, such as 
prevent and detect crime, and, frequently, has used them as a measure of its 
effectiveness. Some of the activities listed are relatively easy to interpret and do not 
need too much elaboration, for example, ‘protect life’. However, although others may 
sound straightforward enough, they can be problematic to explain, for example, 
‘providing a service’. The reason is because everything that the police do could 
rightly be described as providing a service, at least to someone. However, because 
what is a service to one person might be servitude to another it becomes difficult for 
the police to state, without fear of contradiction, which of their functions should be 
categorised as important and therefore deemed core activities on which they should 
concentrate their resources. As an illustration, in the 1993 White Paper on Police 
Reform, the then Conservative government stated that two of the main functions of 
the police were to fight and prevent crime, adding, that the police should consider 
shedding some of the more service-type activities that they undertook in order to 
concentrate on these two activities. However, five years later, the current Labour 
administration has adopted a broader view with regard to dealing with crime and 
extended the responsibility for fighting and preventing it to other public sector 
services under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In essence, it has engaged a wider 
range of providers, but not a broader definition of crime or of police function.
The concept of service provision is very broad and because it can mean so 
many things to so many people, it becomes very difficult for the police and the public 
to agree on what service the police should provide and to whom, since different 
sections of the community want different things from the police, while all sections 
welcome policing but disapprove of being policed. Whatever the type of activity that 
either the police or the public class as a service, one negative aspect of service 
provision that is indisputable and well documented in the literature is that the police 
organisation can be partisan in the type and quality of service it provides to different 
groups of people in society, especially the policing of people from minority ethnic 
groups. I shall return to this point in the next chapter.
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There was one activity that the officers, from the small force, initially refused 
to accept occurred where they worked. But when pushed on the subject reluctantly 
conceded some ground and argued that although some officers from this force might 
have acted that way in the past, it would not happen in this force today and perhaps 
would only happen in some of the larger forces now. Not surprisingly, this practice 
was the one that the civilian employees described as ‘abusing their powers’.
That the civilian members used the phrase ‘abuse of their powers’ as a 
euphemism for corruption was not in doubt. Now, although one can make a case that 
an abuse of power may not necessarily amount to corruption, to do so would be to 
engage in semantics rather than substance. Abuse of power and corruption are similar 
in that they both involve some element of dishonesty and a lack of integrity on the 
part of the practitioner, and the distinction between them rest only on the scale of the 
dishonesty involved. (Waddington 1999b: Chs 5 & 6).
There is a wealth of information on police malpractice (Rose 1996; Mclagan 
2003; Gillard and Flynn 2004), and this is despite the fact that there has been very 
little empirical research on the subject. The available evidence shows nonetheless 
that police corruption has a long history, one that predates the ‘new police’. It was 
present in the systems and practices under which policing was delivered before the 
modem police force was formed after 1829. (Morton 1993). The last Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner, Sir Paul Condon, who in 1998 expressed publicly that there 
was a hard core of over 200 officers in his force who were corrupt, was the most 
recent chief officer to acknowledge the problem with the intention of solving it 
(Campbell 2002: 137). To this end he set up large-scale operations, using some of his 
most experienced detectives and some of the most sophisticated investigation 
techniques available to try to remove what he described as a small bunch of ‘bad 
apples’ from his collection of golden delicious.
Considering the length of time that police officers have deliberately engaged 
in malpractice in the execution of their duties, and the number of high-ranking 
officers that have tried to address the problem without success, it is questionable 
whether police abuse of their powers is a problem that can be eradicated. Certainly
151
some officers question the wisdom of spending so much time and effort on a problem 
that in their view is an inevitable consequence of policing. Some have offered an 
explanation why corruption could not be eradicated from the police organisation, 
which is that the emergence of corrupt practices is cyclical. In their view, corruption 
reaches serious proportions every fifteen years, at which point the organisation goes 
into overdrive and takes extensive measures to try to eradicate it. After some success, 
the organisation diverts its attention to other problems, in the mistaken belief that 
corruption has been eradicated; only for it to rise up the list of problems until it 
acquires the prime spot of concerns fifteen years later. However, it should be noted 
that these explanations have tended to mean personal corruption for gain, not abuse of 
power or violation of rule of law, which tends to be universal.
Whatever the length of time between campaigns to remove corruption from 
police forces, it should not come as a surprise to anyone that corruption exists in the 
police service. To imagine that an activity as knotty as policing, which is carried out 
by complex individuals, motivated by a variety of complicated reasons, could be done 
simply, without deviation from the norm is nothing short of wishful thinking. There 
is no doubt that there are police officers that abuse their powers in the course of their 
duty. The reasons why some do is not as important as knowing and acknowledging 
that they do, and those who insist on denying that it happens are engaging in a motif 
that I have described as ‘elegant denial’ (b).
Ideas of the police function can roughly be divided into two broad categories, 
a wider proactive view that the police are a public service agency with a broad social 
control role, perhaps even with a responsibility to remedy the social sources of crime, 
and a narrower reactive view that they should limit themselves to law enforcement 
and the control of public order. These two broad categories exemplify the tension that 
exists in delivering policing services that meets the needs of the different communities 
in general and in particular the demands of the contemporary role of a superintendent 
(which was discussed in the last chapter). In brief, the tension arises because of the 
dual role that superintendents have to perform, as both policy makers and operational 
commanders. On a broader point, this tension reflects the difference that exists 
between the philosophical ideals espoused by some senior managers on the best way 
to deliver policing services and the practical realities faced by the majority.
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In this chapter, I shall explore with my respondents the tension that exists 
within contemporary policework using the two broad concepts of the police function 
highlighted above, and in the requirements of their position as superintendents. As 
policy makers they have to take a long term proactive view in delivering policing 
services, while as divisional commanders they sometimes act instinctively in looking 
for an immediate solution to a problem, which often forces them to adopt a reactive 
approach.
POLICE FUNCTION.
Policing is a protean term; it means different things to different people, even to the 
professionals. This is illustrated by the views expressed by my respondents. A 
typical example is the following,
I think I'm going to have difficulty in answering this particular question. I  
think my view o f the police service is that it is in a big dilemma at the moment, 
that it is trying to meet an agenda, which is prescribed for it nationally. That 
national agenda I don 't think has been derived out o f sufficient consultation. I 
accept it represents the results o f national crime surveys etc., so that is why 
we're focusing on burglary, violence against the person etc. The key dilemma 
that I  see is that policing is very much about identifying with the needs and 
expectations o f local communities, and I think we're being pulled in that 
direction as well. Quite probably, if you 're a police officer in — , your 
affinity is very much to your local community who may see life in a totally 
different way to the national picture. So there's the dilemma. I  think the 
dichotomy that we've got is who should we please? At the end o f the day, 
there's a tendency to end up pleasing those who regulate you because they're 
the providers o f the resources, so you end up valuing what's being measured, 
rather than actually responding to the needs o f your local community. There's 
a mismatch there between the two extremes, which I think you can get over 
because a lot o f those, which are quite probably identified as national issues, 
are also local issues, but in the locality, people don't see it as such. I  think the 
way round it is incumbent on us to consult and negotiate far more with the 
public than we ever have done, and I think in doing so we've got to represent
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information and facts to the public. So just by way o f example, if you go along 
to the Community Consultative Group or to any other local forum and their 
problem is one o f prostitution, or they perceive it as prostitution, if we can go 
along and say to them, okay we’re telling you it’s burglary because you’ve 
had 100 burglaries at houses in your area in the last month, if you present 
those facts to the local community, I think the local community would turn 
around and say, well prostitution is still a worry but we agree that burglary is 
the problem. So I think the shortfall at the moment is we don’t represent the 
facts and information to the community as well as we should do. I f  also going 
along to them we turn round and say, there are not burglaries, you’re 
absolutely right, then we should be responding to prostitution. The big 
problem again is that when we’re measured externally, whether it’s through 
HMIC, the auditors or the Audit Commission, they will focus upon a key set of 
performance indicators and they won’t give us any credit for sorting out the 
problems o f prostitution. That’s where I see the dilemma. I  think the other 
problem that we’ve got, again it’s cultural, is that we still see ourselves as a 
service that is there to respond to everybody’s needs rather than actually 
rationalising the fact that there are other people there who can help us. And I  
think although it’s good jargon, strategic alliances are the way forward and 
we as an organisation have got to start to learn to let go and to actually 
prioritise and to negotiate with communities. To work out what the actual 
agenda is, to work out what business we’re in. So, it’s a long-winded answer 
but hopefully that helps. (R. 14).
Long-winded it may be, helpful it certainly is. What, amongst other things, 
this example illustrates is that the environment (social, political and economical) in 
which policing is carried out is a further complicating factor in reaching a consensus 
on the purpose of the police. The police function does not rely solely on the ideas of 
the police or the public, or the consensus between both. It relies on the aims and 
demands of other stakeholders such as resource providers, in this case central 
government, and assessors of the quality of the service provided by the police - the 
Audit Commission at a national level, Police Authorities at a local one. Some of the 
other activities on which the police concentrate their efforts that my respondents 
mentioned where;
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• Meet an agenda that is set nationally;
• Consult and negotiate more with the public, through Police Public 
Consultation Meetings;
• Crime Surveys, in the sense of using the results obtained from them to set 
national objectives;
• Local Communities, in terms of taking note of their needs and expectations
• Regulators, in the sense of carrying out their regulatory duties through the 
use of performance indicators;
• Providers of resources;
• Valuing what is being measured;
• Communication, in terms of the police representing facts and information 
to the public;
• Culture of the police organisation, in terms of the police accepting all calls 
for assistance because they are available 24 hours a day;
• Forming Strategic alliances with other public sector organisations;
• Prioritising the activities they are required to undertake;
• Work out what the actual role of the police is.
Proactive or Reactive.
The division of police function into the two broad categories of proactive or reactive 
styles of policing was not one that my respondents were entirely happy or agreed
with. Where an individual did express a clear preference for one style over the other,
the explanation for that preference included some qualification, as the following 
examples show.
I lean, I  suppose there is a continuum between the two but I would say that I 
lean towards the latter one [reactive]. Albeit we have to take some softening 
steps, public relations steps in order to make that appear more attractive. (R. 
1).
I favour the narrower concept [reactive]. When I joined the service the 
definition o f Constable was given to every police officer and I  thought that
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that definition defined what we were about at that stage. I ’m not restricted in 
my views, I feel, I ’m a fairly flexible character, and I  feel there are in addition 
social areas that we need to address and we need to sell ourselves as a 
service... (R. 21).
I primarily favour the first concept [proactive], because it’s the only way 
really to sort o f try and get ahead o f the game if you like, otherwise we’re 
continually pouring resources into reacting. Whereas, by the involvement o f 
others in what we do and taking people along with us, it is feasible that you 
can get ahead o f the game. (R. 28).
The first one, I ’ve seen law enforcement agencies at work before, and they 
stand slightly, they do stand apart from the public they serve. I ’m not 
necessarily in line with the fact that we can cure the root causes o f criminal 
activity, I ’m not necessarily sure I  could subscribe to that. But I ’m firmly of 
the belief that we are a liberal democratic society and the police within a 
liberal democratic society ought to be a social service, if you like, more than a 
law enforcer. (R. 39).
These brief examples illustrated the complexity and difficulty my respondents 
experienced in trying to reach a decision on what the police function should be, based 
within the parameters of the two broad categories of proactive or reactive styles to 
which they were confined. The issue became more complex when they were asked to 
consider through which activities the broad styles of policing could be achieved.
Nationally set police agenda.
Over the last two decades the social, political and economic environment in which 
policing has been delivered has been continuously changing, and the rate of change 
has been so swift that the police have had difficulty keeping pace with it. These 
changes gained impetus in 1983 with the now famous Home Office Circular 114 of 
that year. This circular was the introduction of the government’s Financial 
Management Initiative to the police service. The principles of which were based on a 
style of management that has been termed, new public management (Leishman et al 
1996). Following the substantial resources that were poured into the police service
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during the first few years of the then newly elected Conservative government in 1979, 
which at times appeared limitless, the call for restraint in the police demand for more 
resources coupled with the government’s demand for commensurate results from the 
police came as a surprise to some police managers. Throughout the intervening 
period, including the election of a New Labour government in 1997, the call has 
remained loud and clear and the tone has grown gradually more demanding and 
prescriptive, even though it has been sent in a variety ways. In the 1980s, the 
message of Circular 114 was reinforced by two other Circulars, 105 of 1988, which 
directed the police towards civilianisation of certain police posts, and 106 of 1988, 
which demanded evidence of effective deployment of current resources before 
requests were made for additional ones.
Compared to the 1980s, in which the message for reform was delivered by a 
solo voice, in the 1990s the message of reform came from an ensemble. The process, 
and the players, started in July 1992 with an Inquiry “to examine the rank structure, 
remuneration and conditions of service of the police in England and Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland.” Sir Patrick Sheehy chaired the Inquiry, which came to be 
commonly known as the Sheehy Inquiry. Its findings, which emphasised deficiencies 
in internal management, received a mixed response from the police service. The 
Association of Chief Police Officers accepted some but not all of its 
recommendations. The Superintendents’ Association was ambivalent to the whole 
Report, while the Police Federation was simply hostile to it, its recommendations and 
its authors. In the considered opinion of the chairman of the Police Federation, he 
suggested that the Report would, “at a stroke...change the police service from being a 
vocation reserved for dedicated and committed officers to just another job.” Adding 
that, “the report is a business analysis of ‘Policing UK -  pic’”, further, that “the 
balance sheet has become the bottom line of policing” (Cited in Leishman et al 1996: 
13). Leishman suggested that the “Police resistance to Sheehy was swift, well- 
orchestrated and effective”, so much so that “In October 1993 the Home Secretary, 
Michael Howard, announced that he no longer accepted significant sections of the 
Sheehy Report”. The concession made by the Home Secretary with the intention to 
appease predominantly the Federated ranks in the service, also satisfied some anxious 
Conservative backbench MPs, one of whom believed that, “If we had not moved 
directly against some of the worst aspects of the Sheehy report, we would not have
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been able to call on the police to defend us from anarchy in future -  it is as serious as 
that - and we would have moved away from the close bond that politicians have 
always had with the police” (Leishman et al 1996: 14).
In June 1993, the government published its white paper on Police Reform, 
titled A Police Service for the Twenty-First Century. Although the main theme of the 
Paper was to clarify the roles of chief officers, police authorities and Home Secretary 
in order to improve accountability and performance, it provided some guidance to 
senior police managers on how to change their thinking and explanations for the lack 
of success in police efforts to reduce crime. For example, in highlighting the 
substantial resources (i.e. an increase of 88% in expenditure between 1979 and 1994) 
that had been poured into the police service by the government, but which had not 
produced the expected reduction in the level of crime or the fear of crime, the 
government provided some comfort for the police by explaining that, “the police 
alone cannot tackle the problem of crime. They need the active support and 
involvement of the communities whom they serve” (page 1). In the 1980s the mantra 
of the Federation, in particular, of, give us more officers and we will reduce crime, 
was to take on the more restrained tone of, the police alone cannot reduce crime, 
following the publication of the White Paper.
The White Paper provided strong support for the concept of partnership 
between the police and the community by offering that, “The proposals of this White 
Paper will help to build a partnership between the police and the public to deliver 
what people want most... The aim is to ensure that the police respond better to the 
needs and wishes of citizens; and that people are supportive of the police in their 
efforts to defend the values of society” (page 1). Additionally, it was certain on what 
the aim of the police should be, which was to ‘fight and prevent crime’. To 
emphasise the seriousness of the government’s intentions they added that chief 
officers would be held accountable for the performance of their force against this aim. 
However, chief officers would be given greater freedom to manage the resources at 
their disposal. While police authorities, which would be reduced in size, but through 
proposed changes to their composition would be given greater local representation in 
order to strengthen them and make them more effective, would be held accountable
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for the results the police achieved in meeting local objectives and the Government’s 
key objectives.
The Police and Magistrates * Court Act that followed a year later (enacted in 
July1994) contained many of the recommendations of the White Paper. The broad 
effect of the Act was to “further centralise the steering, while decentralising the 
rowing of the police”, through for example, the Home Secretary’s power to set 
national objectives for the police service, which every police authority in discharging 
its function were to have regard (Leishman et al 1996:16).
Finally, included on this list of contemporary initiatives designed to influence 
the thoughts and actions of police managers, was the Home Office team set up to 
‘examine the services provided by the police, to make recommendations about the 
most cost-effective way of delivering core police services and to assess the scope for 
relinquishing ancillary tasks’, in short the Posen Inquiry (1995) as it became 
popularly known. This Inquiry sought to establish what tasks the police could shed 
without affecting their capacity to concentrate on the government’s “belief that 
fighting crime and the protection of the public should be the top priority in police 
work” (White Paper 1993: 2).
These were some of the contemporary initiatives that would have set the 
agenda nationally on what the police should be concentrating just before and around 
the time I interviewed my respondents. However, as expressed in the White Paper 
there was a strong emphasis on the local aspect of policing and police work, which 
was in tune with the view expressed by one of my respondent (R. 14), quoted above.
Consultation with the public.
Consultation with the public was one of the main themes of the Conservative 
government’s White Paper, (and a strong component of the current Labour 
government’s Police Reform agenda -  Home Office 2004), in particular, when it is 
carried out to obtain their views on policing priorities. It advocated a “new 
partnership between the public and the police”, on the basis that in a “democratic 
country the police need the active support of every citizen if they are to maintain a 
peaceful society in which people are not plagued by crime.” Adding that society
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could not expect the police to cope successfully if they were left to deal with it alone. 
Further, “the concept of such a partnership is not new. It can be traced back to the 
roots of British policing”, and more recently to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 in which one of the recommendations in the Report into the riots in Brixton in 
1981 by Lord Scarman was given legislative backing. In his report Lord Scarman 
expresses his satisfaction “that police forces generally recognise the importance of 
good relations with the community they police”, and was certain that, consultation 
and accountability were the mechanisms on which society relied to ensure that the 
police in their policies and operations kept in touch with, and were responsible to, the 
community they policed (Scarman 1986: 146). Consequently, section 106 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (now section 96 of the Police Act 1996) made 
police/public consultation a legal requirement. Police authorities, in consultation with 
their chief constables, were required to make arrangements in their area for “obtaining 
the views of people in that area about matters concerning the policing of the area and 
for obtaining their co-operation with the police in preventing crime in the area” 
(Zander 1995: 288).
So, the topic of public consultation had received considerable coverage in the 
discussion on policing for a number of years before my interview with my 
respondents. However, after twelve years of legislative requirement it was still being 
discussed in terms of something the police should be doing, as opposed to something 
that was being done and done well. The police recognise that communication with the 
public is one-sided, with the police telling the public what they want them to hear, and 
in return taking little notice of the public’s response. Most senior managers will 
readily acknowledge that without the public’s support their officers would not be able 
to do their work effectively and efficiently. As one of my respondents explained,
Actually somewhere between the two, which may be a diplomatic answer, but 
firstly I believe very strongly that the police service cannot, on its own, hope to 
solve the ills o f society and the old idea o f the police force just being 
reactionary in dealing with crime and that sort o f thing, has been proved in 
recent years to be a faulty premise. We’ve got to adopt an holistic approach 
and with other local authorities and local agencies, tackle problems at root 
cause. Having said that, we are an organisation, which polices by consent,
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and unless we take the public with us and actually consult with them to do 
what they want, then to a great extent we can't succeed either. Where I think 
we need to spend a lot more time is actually ensuring that the public 
themselves are better appraised o f our problems, so that they can make 
judgements as to what they want from a more informed viewpoint, rather than 
pure emotion. (R. 46).
In areas where the mechanism for consultation was good, often the reason for 
this appeared to come down to the interpersonal skills and determination of the 
individual police manager as opposed to a corporate arrangement of the force. This is 
illustrated by the following typical quote,
The first one, public service agency, there's no doubt about that. I'm not 
suggesting for goodness sake that I see myself as the guardian o f everybody 
who lives in — [a Welsh Town] but I do have responsibility. I  think that 
police managers in the past were very, very small minded, very narrow 
minded about the police function, and I  can remember coming back from an 
Inspectors' Development Course and being interviewed by the deputy chief 
constable and I can remember sitting in his office, looking out over —  and it 
was a lovely summer’s day and saying, Sir at some stage we've got to listen to 
those people out there, we can't sit in these castles with the drawbridge up 
and just keep being prescriptive about what we do, and he nearly chucked me 
out o f his office. He told me I was too liberal, I  didn't know what I  was 
talking about. I  was naive. I  was inexperienced. I  can remember leaving his 
office then in an absolute bloody torment and bewilderment, and I've always 
had that view, that we've got to be involved in the community and I  suppose 
that's one o f the reasons that they sent me to — [Town and police division]. 
The previous divisional commander was o f the second type, a reactive type, no 
pro-activity, very, very little communication with the outside community. Oh, 
just as much as he could barely get away with and I'm the absolute opposite. 
And apart from the community, I  mean to give you an example, I  came to this 
Division when the previous divisional commander was here, the chap I took 
over from, and I'll never forget, the first thing I  did within the first month, I  
invited every single councillor in, rural councillor, county councillor, borough
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councillor, brought them in and said, look, this is who I am, this is how I tick, 
these are what my views are, I need to listen to you, you’re the voice of the 
people, you’ve got to tell me what the problems are, we’ve got to work 
together. I  can remember, I  never asked the divisional commander if I  could 
do that and he was taken aback, he couldn ’t believe what I ’d done. (R. 30)
Local Communities.
The comments made above under the heading of consultation with the public, 
particularly those by the government in the White Paper, which called for active 
support from the public, are also applicable under this heading. The point to be made 
here is that my respondents thought that the service should listen to and incorporate 
the needs and expectations of the local community when they set their priorities, and 
not leave the public to find out, by accident, what those needs and expectations were. 
Consultation ought to involve a process of negotiation between the police and the 
public whereby the needs and expectations of the public, the more pressing problems 
for the police as assessed through operational demands, and the resources available to 
the police are all taken into consideration in agreeing what the priorities should be for 
the police. This aim is more difficult to achieve than the mere passing on of 
information, which is what appears to happen when the police engage in what they 
describe as consultation. Further, where the public’s wishes were incorporated into 
regular police activities they could appear incongruous.
I favour the first one. When we were looking at the Sheehy Report and the 
things that were coming from that in recent years, the last thing that I want to 
be is a police officer and I think the vast majority o f police officers are in the 
same line. I  don’t think there’s a place for us to be a small enforcement 
agency, because all that does is posing conflict with the public. I f  they only 
see us as the Force that comes along when you do something wrong, then I 
think that’s to our detriment. I  think the police service and it’s been described 
many, many, times as the 24-hour Social Services, and when people are 
castigating us for our performance in say crime detection, dealing with crime 
is but one small part o f our remit that we deal with. (R. 19).
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Resource providers.
Central government is the main provider of resources for the police and although the 
public can significantly influence what the police do through calls for assistance, it is 
central government that dictates how the police do what they do and on what they us 
those resources. This point was not lost on my respondents.
Well I  think that from a personal point o f view I favour the social control 
model, because I think that through that we can actually become involved in 
negating some o f the causes o f problems for the police. I f  we're purely a 
reactive police force I feel that we then are very much more politically driven. 
I  feel that we're being pushed down that road with the various financial 
restrictions and the way that the police service has allowed certain functions 
to drift away from it. I  think we have to be focused on what we're doing, but 
certainly I  think the social control model o f the police service is the one that I 
would favour because I think we've got much flexibility in actually dealing 
with the causes o f crime. Dealing with the social disorder, and we have an 
opportunity to remove a lot o f the conflict that we're likely to face. (R. 49).
Valuing what is measured.
One of the recognised and often discussed drawbacks of using performance indicators 
to judge the effectiveness of the police is that they tend to concentrate police efforts 
and resources on those things that are being measured and against which they are 
being judged, rather than on those things that are the right things to do, but which are 
not being measured. This skewed emphasis on measured activities could lead to 
increased police efficiency if what was being measured was actually what worked in 
increasing efficiency and effectiveness, whilst increasing public satisfaction in 
policing services. However, it was not evident that this was indeed what was 
happening. For example,
The former, Vm not sure that we can fit the role o f social engineers. We are 
certainly social facilitators in that we can actually bring people together in 
things like the Police Community Liaison Groups; the Neighbourhood Watch 
schemes. We can bring them into life but what then happens is very much up 
to the community, and I don't think we can do very much more than that. But
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my philosophy has always been we are a 24-hour a day emergency social 
service. It brings into play a very great deal o f difficulty because how do you 
quantify it? That is the main problem and it does concern me as you go 
through time with Sheehy and various others, who would tend to push you in 
the general direction of a very reactive performance indicator driven service. 
(R. 32).
24/7: The culture of the police service.
In the opinions of some of my respondents, the police service is the only 24-hour 
service, and one that should remain available to every member of the community 365 
days of the year. This is a difficult concept to maintain in theory let alone trying to 
achieve in practice, but nonetheless some officers believe in the efficacy of a 24-hour 
service, even a social service one.
I  probably favour the first one, not necessarily follow the ideologies as you've 
outlined it. But I  probably follow the first one because I  think if we look at. 
The traditional view of the police and how people perceive the police, I  think 
we're about much more than enforcement. We do a lot o f social work, we are 
the Social Services, 24-hours a day. When the social services close, if people 
get stranded with no money, or whatever problems they've got, domestic 
problems, they come to the police, whether it be 1 o'clock, 2 o'clock, 3 o'clock 
in the morning. In a lot o f cases, actually we're acting on behalf o f other 
agencies when they're not available, and my view is I  like this idea that we 
give a service to the public and I think that that should continue. (R. 22).
The first. The first, I think our role is wider than law enforcement and public 
order. We are a helping service, we are the only emergency service that is 
there 24 hours a day, 365 days o f the year and which never says no. I f  you 
ring, you can ring the Ambulance Service or the Fire Service and they can say, 
I'm sorry, you've rung the wrong number you need to ring some place else. 
We never do that. We take it and we either generate responses from other 
agencies but we never say no, and if at the end o f the day we have to do 
something, we do it. Which means delivering babies, it means putting fires
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out, it means doing all the things that everybody else does, but when the chips 
are down the police service delivers. (R. 41).
Forming strategic alliances with other public sector organisations.
The importance of partnership was emphasised in the 1993 White Paper on the police, 
which stressed that the police could not solve the problem of crime by themselves. 
The police took heed of this message and started talking about the benefits of 
collaborating with other public sector organisations, and even putting it into practice. 
The current Labour government has given legislative backing in the 1998 Crime and 
Disorder Act for police forces to work in partnership with other public sector 
organisations, notably in forming Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships.
I  like the partnership approach that’s been pulled around, I ’m involved and a 
signed up member on two different partnerships locally where we can 
influence what our partners do, but we don ’t go out and do it. If, for example, 
one o f the partnerships is with education, we’re trying to concentrate on a 
pastoral influence on the socially disadvantaged local youths and prevent 
them becoming involved in crime in the future by identifying those who are at 
risk, putting more resources from the education system in to them with our 
influence as to what they need to do. We don’t go in there and become 
teachers or become social workers, we try and influence the application o f the 
resources and indeed we’ve been given an £800,000 grant from the single 
regeneration budget from the Government over eight years to apply resources 
to that, not our resources, all I  have to put into that is my time as a 
management committee. The other things that we do, we influence the Council 
into CCTV on certain hot spots. We don’t go out and put the CCTV up, we 
don’t work out what’s the best approach, we just influence into that arena. 
(R. 8).
Perhaps if you turn the clock back and you’d asked me that some years ago, I  
would have favoured the very reactive sets, mainly because you’re not aware 
o f the politics behind the issue. You tend to see the police service as the be all 
and end all, that it can actually survive quite adequately operating in its own
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little sphere. I  think then as you migrate up through the rank structure, 
because o f your own involvement with other agencies, other perceptions, you 
find that there’s a lot within the organisation that is beyond your control. So, 
therefore, if you want to have any influence as to the direction that you’re 
going, you have to work with other agencies otherwise you ’re going to be left 
behind. (R. 27).
Service priorities.
With the number of incidents reported to the police increasing all the time, they do not 
have the resources to deal with everything. They certainly do not have the luxury to 
consider themselves a 24-hour social service, even if they thought it was the best way 
to gain public support. The reality is that the police service has to prioritise and deal 
with those things that it considers more important, and this was clearly recognised by 
my respondents.
I  favour the narrower concept. When I  joined the service the definition o f 
Constable was given to every police officer and I thought that that definition 
defined what we were about at that stage. I ’m not restricted in my views, I ’m 
a fairly flexible character, and I feel there are in addition social areas that we 
need to address and we need to sell ourselves as a service. We need to get 
into areas o f public service that can assist us, we need to project our image, 
we need to do all these things. But in doing that we can’t get away from our 
primary role or primary function, which is the enforcement o f the law, the 
maintenance o f the peace and that’s what people want us to do. (R. 21).
I probably favour the latter, only because and I ’m not sitting on the fence 
here. I  don’t think we can cure the social ills on our own; it’s got to be a 
multi-agency approach. So, I  actually would go for the latter. We are here for 
law enforcement purposes and that in itself with diminishing budgets and 
limitations on manpower is hard enough. I  accept there is an area where we 
have to get involved and the social aspects but I think we have to consider 
what is the core role o f policing today. (R. 35).
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Determining the role o f the police.
We return to the point on which we started this chapter, the function of the police. 
When push came to shove, there were no simple answers to the question and my 
respondents’ views of the police function were as varied as the individuals 
themselves.
I suppose there is a continuum between the two but I would say that I lean 
towards the latter one. All be it we have to take some softening steps, public 
relations step in order to make that appear more attractive. But I  have very 
serious ethical concerns about the police intervening in social change, and I  
remember, and this isn't an original idea, I  do remember one o f my chief 
officers, some years ago, he was still a chief officer here doing a lecture on a 
course I  was on, one o f the external things, self developmental courses I  was 
on, talking about the role o f the police in society and I remember him likening 
it to a boxing ring, I  don't know if you have heard this analogy.
[No.]
He, and it was at a time just after that chap Alderson, [John Alderson, former 
chief constable of Devon and Cornwall] in Devon and Cornwall, really got 
deeply into community policing, and he actually argued that that kind o f style 
of policing which really was quite interventionist and it pulled a load o f public 
services together, swapping information, he reckoned that was a slippery 
slope towards a police state. And he said, now really what are the police 
about, are the police there about bringing about change or are they about 
holding the ring, the boxing ring whilst everyone else sorts out change, and he 
got the boxing ring and he said society continually evolves and within that 
evolution, you know, and we have conflicts and people fighting with each 
other, you know, all different competing interest. And really the debate is, are 
we in there as one o f the competing interests fighting with the others, and 
intervening and helping one side to win, or are we almost like the ring itself, 
where we merely hold that conflict within reasonable constraints. The actual 
outcomes o f the conflicts are not our problem, that's society's problem, our job 
is to provide civilisation and a set o f rules that conflict can take place within. 
And I tend to lean towards that idea. So, in that sense we are about
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enforcement and control, but in an acceptable and accountable consensual 
way. (R. 1)
I  favour the first concept because I think the narrower concept would put us 
into the situation where we are not sufficiently involved in developing society 
and responding to the needs o f the problem o f society. One o f the big 
problems in recent years in the whole o f the time that I've been in it, is it has 
been wholly reactive. It has been too arrogant, too detached, not playing its 
part in areas where it should be influential, much o f that has been to do with 
the fact that we did not have people who could be influential in their own 
right. We've had academics, we've had all sorts o f arrogant bastards, we've 
had people posturing and prettying, but haven't gone out there and actually 
played their part effectively amongst the organs o f control and influence. That 
has actually not just meant that we haven't played our part in society. It also 
means that we haven't advanced our own image, advanced and developed our 
own sense o f purpose and done justice to our own role and to the people who 
work with us, for us and of which we are a part within the Police Service. It's 
been an overall failure to communicate within the Service and outside, I  think 
we've lost our role, we haven't had an anchor and we've drifted and we've 
been buffeted and pushed around, picking up all sorts o f agendas that 
basically could have been shovelled off to other people. (R. 20).
The two quotes provide support for the aims of ACPO stated in the Strategic 
Policy Document (1990). The message was that the police service should be more 
engaging with the public, work collaboratively and not in a controlling way. It should 
reinforce its strengths while at the same time acknowledge and tackle its weaknesses. 
The notion that the service had failed to do either with any certainty has created 
confusion in its role and position with the public. As ACPO explained, “The 
improvement made in our Service and the excellence we have maintained are 
frequently overwhelmed by new demands and a decline of self-regulation in society 
that exposes the vulnerability and ineffectiveness inherent in our form of policing. 
Unfortunately, there are also good grounds to believe that far too many of the 
complaints, especially those about attitude and behaviour, are well founded; many 
remain unreported but simmer in the minds of reasonable people who when
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confronted with news about major allegations, proven or not, are conditioned to think 
the worst. The paradox and what lies behind it imposes an imperative on the Service 
itself to question the policing style and service to the public that has resulted. That is 
why no matter how unpalatable and uncomfortable in the short term, we have to 
engage in self-analysis and respond with urgency to the result” (ACPO 1990: 
Foreword).
COMMUNITY POLICING.
As has been shown above ideas of the police function can vary so much that a 
discussion of the topic is invariably not a straightforward and consensus-based 
activity. Nonetheless, one would logically expect a discussion of one activity that can 
rightly be deemed part of the police function to be an easier endeavour. However, 
sometimes using the term logic in the context of police activity is an oxymoron. That 
one activity, community policing, can also mean different things to different people. 
For example, it could mean the following,
i) improved communication between police and the community
ii) an emphasis on problem-oriented policing (Goldstein 2005)
iii) collaborating with the community in setting police priorities
iv) helping neighbourhoods solve crime through crime prevention 
measures
v) structural changes in police organisation that dedicate officers to patrol 
on foot and bicycles in specific locations
vi) using the ‘extended police family’ to deliver policing at a 
neighbourhood level. However, “unlike previous community policing 
initiatives, the new style of policing being advanced by the 
Government in partnership with the police service will not just be 
about delivering public reassurance, as important as that is. Excellent 
police forces today can and should be about reassuring the public and 
preventing and detecting crime.” (Home Office 2004: 48)
vii) people in ‘authority’ showing neighbourhoods that they care (Wilson 
and Kelling: 460).
Or, as Weatheritt combines the various aspects of community policing 
initiatives to explain that it “attempts to reorganise patrols in ways which are thought
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to be more acceptable to the public and to encourage behaviour more in line with 
public expectations; and approaches to crime prevention which involve the police 
working with other people and institutions to reduce opportunities for crime, or the 
motivation to commit crime” (Weatheritt 1989: 36).
Reinforcing the point of the multifarious meanings of community policing, 
other commentators have suggested that “In a definitional sense, community policing 
is not something one can easily characterize” (Skogan and Hartnett 2005: 428). They 
explain that “It involves reforming decision-making processes and creating new 
cultures within police departments...Community policing relies upon organisational 
decentralisation and a reorientation of patrol in order to facilitate two-way 
communication between police and the public. It assumes commitment to broadly 
focused, problem-oriented policing and requires that police be responsive to citizens’ 
demands when they decide what local problems are and set priorities” (ibid).
The fundamental concept on which community policing is based in that of 
partnership, and in the previous section a number of my respondents mentioned 
partnership and expressed the necessity for the police and public to form partnerships 
to tackle a variety of social problems. They also offered a number of interpretations 
of partnerships that were given a variety of names, one of which was, ‘strategic 
alliance’. Whatever the terminology, interpretation or arrangement of partnerships, 
the reason for forming them reflected one of two main philosophical aspects of 
community policing: Consultation and collaboration, between the police and the 
community.
As one commentator explained, the organisational aspect of community police 
is decentralisation, in the sense of devolving operational command and authority to 
small self-sufficient units. The practical aspects of community policing include the 
operational activities of engaging in consultative groups; foot patrols; neighbourhood 
watches; and targeted patrols. Bennett suggest that, “on the basis of the descriptions 
of the relationship between the police and the public found in the literature, the main 
elements of a community policing philosophy might be summarised in a single 
sentence as, a belief or intention held by the police that they should consult with and 
take account of the wishes of the public in determining and evaluating operational
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policing and that they should collaborate with the public in identifying and solving 
local problems” (Bennett 1994: 229).
The police do believe in the philosophy of community policing, however, the 
problems are that different emphasis have been placed on different aspects of it and its 
translation into practice has not come easily or instantly. For example, for some it has 
meant putting more officers on foot patrol (Gordon 1987) whilst for others it has 
meant restructuring large sections of a force to provide community-style policing 
(Leigh et al 1996:12). Further, translating philosophy into practice has been patchy 
and inconsistent (Leigh et al). The drivers for consultation and collaboration has been 
external encouragement, and where this has not produced the desired effect it has 
been forced, through legislative requirement, on the police. For example, in the case 
of consultation, which was expressed widely by my respondents and discussed 
specifically under the heading of consult and negotiate more with the public above, 
although my respondents saw it as a necessary activity in which the police should 
engage if they are to deliver an effective and efficient service, it took legislation to 
force the police to do so regularly (Crime and Disorder Act). However, it is readily 
acknowledged that regular consultation has not led to better consultation (Morgan and 
Maggs 1984 and 1985).
With regard to collaboration, referred to by my respondents specifically under 
the heading of, Local Communities, taking note o f their needs and expectations, from 
my professional experience the associations that have been formed under such 
initiatives as crime prevention panels, have not proved particularly successful in 
producing the desired aims that the initiatives were trying to achieve, such as reducing 
crime.
Police research studies have shown that the philosophy of community policing 
is based on the principles of consultation and consent, supported by the goals of 
accountability, problem identification and problem solving. (Wilson and Kelling 
2005). Nevertheless, is this academic and theoretical explanation borne out by the 
practical experiences of my respondents? Here are some of their views of what the 
phrase community policing meant to them.
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The first thing it means to me is that it is one of those Sacred cow words that if 
you put it into a sentence you get ten points. It's a bit like partnership and all 
these other sacred words. I'm quite cynical. It doesn't mean to me certain 
stereotypes like, policemen on the beat, neighbourhood beat officers or 
whatever they're called in different forces, it doesn't mean that and it doesn't 
mean a soft option. What it means to me is really the consent issue, I  suppose, 
and it's really what the contract between the public and the police is about; 
that we are their police and we take account, take account and do not, take 
account o f what they say. It really grates on me when I see people having 
community policing departments. They seem to separate out a particular type 
o f police activity from another type o f police activity. I  think the whole system 
o f British policing is community policing because of its consent approach. 
Because it is by consent, because there're not many o f us. That's how I  see it 
really and I  really am quite cynical about the words. (R. 1).
I'm not sure it actually means anything, I  think it's like a lot o f modem terms, 
it is a label given to what hopefully we've always been trying to do. What else 
do we police if we don't police communities? And what are we if we are not 
community policemen, and women? So, I  suppose I think Alderson, the guy, 
ex-Commandant o f the Police College from way back who wound up as the 
chief constable o f Devon and Cornwall, he was the guy who used to paint 
*community police' on the side o f his police vehicles. And he was the first 
person to raise the flag o f community policing, but I  think it's a fairly hollow 
term. (R. 2).
The notion that community policing is something that most managers were 
practising anyway echoes the indignant announcement of one chief constable, who at 
the time was President of ACPO, in the early 1980s who said, “I’ve been employing 
community policing for years. The difference between me and John Alderson is that I 
don’t go around shouting it from the rooftops” (Gordon 1987:133).
I think community policing to me is getting closer to the community, getting to 
know the needs and expectations o f them, trying to respond in a prioritised 
way, explaining why we can't actually deliver on something and being honest
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with the community. Making it clear to our own police officers what it is 
we*re trying to achieve as well so there’s no doubt in people’s minds. And at 
the end o f it all, making sure that the communities are actually working with 
us towards achieving the ends o f making a safer community. So I  don’t see 
community policing as purely the prerogative group, the Police service, it is a 
partnership towards making the community safer. (R. 14).
Community Policing in a broad sense means that you are actually in 
consultation and co-operation with your local community. And that’s really 
what, we like a lot o f other Forces I  believe have always been a community 
Police Force. We’re a small Force, we’ve always been very close to the 
community, we’ve always taken the community’s views into account. We can’t 
always act as the community wishes us to act because we can’t be a panacea 
for all ills and we can’t cover all the issues that the community wishes to 
cover. It’s certainly more important now because we’re into strategic plans, 
we’re into costing policing plans and we’re certainly into Divisional plans 
and all these things are inter-linked, and the Divisional policing plan should 
be based upon consultation with the local community and what they see to be 
local policing issues. The same applies because we now certainly canvas the 
public much more, we have a whole programme o f surveys that we do to ask 
them about the service they receive from the Police and what they see to be the 
important policing issues that we should take into account, and these are built 
into the local policing plans. (R. 22).
These last two quotes from professional practitioners reflected somewhat the 
ideal aspects of community policing (Skogan and Hartnett). However, one 
commentator has pointed out that regardless of the large amount of research that has 
done on community policing, we are not certain which one of these factors make 
community policing successful. Fielding explain that over the past decade, a 
multitude of studies have examined a variety of factors that could have affected the 
success of community policing initiatives. He points out that “everything in the social 
world (senior police, frontline officers, ‘the community’)” has been examined and 
consequently the findings are that, “everything in the social world has something to 
do with the success or otherwise of community policing.” (Fielding 2002: 154). Also,
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he adds, “the relevant ‘factors’, the things whose adjustments brings about predicted 
effects, have been identified. For community policing, they are: organisational, 
operational and individual...There are lots of ‘factors’; indeed they are ‘myriad’. 
Since our research has told us that everything in the social world is relevant to 
community policing it is not surprising that if we want to make changes with 
predictable (or testable) results then we can choose from as many factors as the police 
institution has facets” (ibid). This has no doubt been reflected in the ubiquitousness 
of community policing in contemporary policing strategies. For example, one 
commentator has suggested that the philosophy of community policing could be 
converted into practice through compatible organisational structures and operational 
strategies, where the organisational structures that best supported community policing 
were those involving decentralisation, while the operational strategies were such 
things as community meetings and contact, and community crime prevention and 
proactive policing. These general operational strategies should be supported by 
specific operational strategies such as consultative groups; foot patrols; community 
constables; police surgeries; Neighbourhood watch; property markings; problem- 
oriented policing; and targeted patrols. However, as Bennett points out “these 
organisational structures and operational strategies do not in themselves represent 
community policing as they could exist equally well within the context of a different 
policing philosophy...” But it is “when they are implemented within a community 
policing paradigm they become community policing structures and strategies” 
(Bennett 1994). Perhaps those respondents quoted above did not specifically 
categorise what they did as community policing because they did not do it under a 
strategy of community policing. When senior officers implemented some of these 
general and specific operational strategies within an organisational structure that fitted 
into a community policing paradigm the result was a graphic illustration of what 
public consultation, collaboration and service ought to be, as the following example 
shows,
Well, I  think it's about policing with consent, primarily. Again, if you go back 
to the Alderson model, you could take his particular line, but maybe for many 
people he went too far in one direction in compromising our autonomy. For 
me, in the big 1990s I  think the sort o f model that we are in the process of 
building here is for community policing to be spread out, it's actually about
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community safety. It's a broad concept it's not just crime prevention. It's not 
just the bobby on the beat, it's actually about, if you like, the feel-good factor, 
the quality o f life issues. So, it may well be as well as dealing with the drug 
dealers, hitting the big criminals and reducing burglary and so on. It's 
actually about improving people's well being, and that may well be dealing 
with street nuisance, noise, aggravation from neighbours, and things like that. 
So, I  am in the process o f setting up in this Division the biggest combination o f 
territory and numbers that we've got, we've got three Districts: — ; —  and — 
—. Three very different towns, three very strong communities, so each will 
actually have a Community Safety Strategy Panel working on crime 
prevention initiatives with 'Action Groups', very much along the way say the 
City might create it, even more probably. We're actually developing a much 
broader concept o f what is the community, o f what is safety, rather than just 
focusing on the crime issue. So, I  guess for me that's where we're going now 
in terms o f community policing. Beat Teams, we run here, we will have a 
Divisional Tactical Team pursing, based on intelligence, criminals and so on. 
But a very high level o f input on prevention, dealing with those issues that 
affect people at a very low level and these are things that tended in the '70s to 
be regarded as rubbish, nothing to do with the police. I  actually think they are 
the things that we should be worrying about and we have to produce, we have 
to find ways o f producing volume detections designed to hit targets and 
demonstrate within the new form of management that we are efficient and 
actually get down to the real issues o f the things that affect Joe Bloggs. .(R. 3).
However, in the type of community policing that was practised by my 
respondents the twin principles of consultation and collaboration were evident, it 
would appear, only as operational aspirations.
Well I  think it means just what I've said actually, the opportunity to interact 
with the community. We are heavily into it these days, seeking the views o f the 
community as to how we police. Do we meet their expectations? Do we 
provide them with what they want, and all those sorts o f things? As you'll 
recognise that doesn't make our job any easier, because, o f course, if you ask 
questions o f the community, you actually find out that their priority are not
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always what you think the priorities ought to be, and then you are left with this 
professional dilemma: Do you abandon what you think to be right, in favour 
of what the community wants? But, I  think we are here to police on behalf of 
the community, police the community on behalf o f the community, and I  think 
that is what it is about. I  think most o f us these days, and you'll probably 
recognise this from the City, most o f us actually travel into work from 
elsewhere. So my ties with — , yes they do extend outside my working hours, 
but bearing in mind I actually live twenty five miles away, I  know far more 
about what happens socially in —  than what I  perhaps know what happens in 
— . And unless I actually make an effort to interact with the community and 
the people that run — , there’s a great sort o f chasm between us really, so I 
think we do have to work quite hard at it. (R. 5).
Although the underlying principle of community policing combines 
consultation and collaboration, sometimes there could be a hard edge to the 
interpretation and implementation of community policing.
When I came to this Division, we had 27 community policing police officers. 
They were divided both within and outside the service as being people who 
went out and played the guitar in old folks’ homes and things like that, bear in 
mind 27 is like 15% of the staff on this Division at constable level. We could 
not afford that sort o f approach, they didn’t arrest people, they didn’t deal 
with policing issues, they went out and made the police look good. That I 
think is what most people think o f when they think of community policing, 
people who go out and make the police look good.
I actually think community policing should have both words in the phrase. 
What I ’ve now done is, I  don’t have community police officers and label them 
beat officers under the traditional approach, they are people who have an 
area and the whole Division is divided into the 27 beats, each one o f them has 
an area and he’s responsible for the policing o f that area, not the community 
of that area. Now as an individual they’re allowed to work where they want 
and they must have an eye to what the community is doing. They get involved, 
they go into the school, but their function is to identify crime problems, public 
order problems, even the traffic problems on their beat and set up
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programmes to deal with it. Some o f those programmes might be to call in 
reserves, if they have an off licence that's continually selling to underage and 
that's causing drinking, they will get the licensing unit involved upon 
negotiation with that supervisor. I f  they have a number o f street comers that 
are getting rowdy behaviour late at night, they will adjust their patrol times to 
visit those street corners. They will also have access to Special Constables 
who can for a week at a time spend two hours at eleven o'clock at night on 
that street corner and keep an eye on the problem. They are also expected to 
turn in an arrest rate, not just go out and arrest people for the sake o f it but 
deal with crime in that way and gain the respect o f the communities because 
that's what the people out there really want. They ail talk about community 
policing but when you speak to them as individuals, they want the bad guy 
who's causing them hassle to be nicked and when we take 15% of our people 
away to put them onto doing non-policing duties and we have a stretched limit 
o f officers anyway, we're not doing what we're paid for. So, I  may have given 
you an idea I'm against community policing, I'm against what it is seen as. I  
still think we should have the approach that gives people access to their 
officer who they know, but the reason they have that access is to give him 
information about what's happening so he can go and deal with it. (R. 8).
To me it means policing the community. It does not mean being social 
workers, teachers, it means policing, the emphasis is on policing. Don't 
assume that means heavy handed, riot shield tactics, it means walking around 
the beat but focusing on crime, prevention, detection and social control, not 
guitars in schools and that sort o f stuff. So, I  would say policing the 
community, but in a way that works with the consent o f the community in the 
areas we should be focusing on. (R. 12).
Regardless of the ideal arrangements that some of my respondents wanted to 
implement within their sphere of authority, in general the reality was that what they 
wanted or would have liked was different from what they eventually had to do. 
Further, when they were able to implement the type of community policing model that 
they wanted, often the reason why they were able to do so was not down to choice.
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/  know what it means to me. It actually means that police officers are 
recognised within the community and for their skills, for the virtues and values 
that they actually have and it means that they will find a way of being 
embraced by most communities. It won't happen all the time, there will 
always be resistance and difficulty. It also means that there is a degree o f 
tolerance, credibility and non-partisanship shown by those who are actually 
involved with the role. Officially what it means is that we, certainly now in 
this Force, they talk about community policing and it’s just a handle to try and 
convince themselves and the communities outside that we’re making an effort 
to reach out towards them and police them, to some sort o f consensus. That 
doesn’t happen, it’s just a handle, it’s a superficial nonsense that really isn’t 
taking place. Community Officers are the first to get pulled in to fill up the 
roles and functions. I f  you want to look at this Force any time round the 
clock, and you look at the community officer and see how many are actually in 
place, not many. The percentage o f absentees from those sorts o f roles is far 
higher than any other position. So, community policing is something which 
the police service hangs its hat on but actually doesn’t come up to proof on, 
and that’s certainly something that happens here. It should be, if we’ve got to 
have a sense o f consensus, if we’re going to have joint developments and 
believe in the first concept that we spoke about, instead of the reactive Fire 
Brigade approach to policing, it has got to be, well policing a community. 
You can’t separate the two if you’re going to operate in some sensible and 
effective way and actually be influential, because you need to be more 
influential at times on the streets than you do in the board rooms, with the 
people who are now saying, well let’s get in there, let’s have a few hundred 
thousand, let’s have the partnerships and all the rest o f it. One o f my fears 
now is we might put far more effort into doing that for purposes o f revenue 
than ever we have done by actually investing time and effort and 
understanding the concerns of some streets and communities. (R. 20).
The literature (Leigh et al) tends to support the views expressed in this last 
quote, which is perhaps closer to the reality than the previous quote. This raises the 
question of whether the majority of my respondents were engaging, consciously or
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otherwise, in the motif I have termed ‘elegant denial’? In this case, expressing a 
corporate ideal whilst shutting out the local reality of the situation.
TRADITIONAL POLICING.
In trying to elicit from my respondents their views on different policing styles, I 
inferred in my questions that there was a clear distinction between the two styles of 
community and traditional policing, without offering a definition for traditional 
policing. The reason was that I wanted my respondents’ view on whether they 
accepted my inferred distinction, and if they did, what they conceived represented 
traditional policing. On speaking with them it became apparent that perhaps the 
distinction is not so clear, as one of my respondents highlighted,
Well we use that a lot in this Force area. We either use the phrase community 
policing or traditional policing, and as I  see it in its purist form, it’s the 
embodiment o f the single police officer, who’s able to discharge his or her 
duty through consent and primarily through resolving issues and persuasion, 
as opposed to pure law enforcement and the hard side o f policing, like 
arresting, or whatever, and taking formal action. Nevertheless, we do have to 
do that as well obviously, but that’s the way that I  envisage it; that the police 
officer is known more or less within this community and knows the community 
as well and is involved with those levers within that community, which makes 
that community a society that makes it the way that it is. That’s how I  see it in 
its purist form. Mitigated against that there are o f course changes; postings, 
turnover o f personnel, staff, other demands on the system, which means you 
never reach the pure form, or very rarely do, but you strive to do that. (R. 29).
Concentrating on traditional policing, the same respondent offered the 
following interpretation,
I  tend to regard them [community and traditional policing] as being the same 
thing. I mean again was there ever a time when there was traditional 
policing? I  mean you can always ask that question, /  mean we tend to refer 
back and the Service tends to refer back and say, oh in those days we used to 
do this. When you actually think about it, even 30 years ago when I first
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joined, we didn't actually do all the things we thought we did. It was more o f 
an ideal and perhaps we practice more o f it now than we did then to some 
degree. But I  mean these are the concepts that the officer goes out unarmed 
into a society and can and should by and large operate on their own and get 
results if you want. Be a symbol o f the law, be a symbol o f common sense and 
good judgement, and influence the society in which he or she operates. That’s 
the idea in my view. (R. 29).
This interpretation of traditional policing is very similar to the one articulated 
at the highest policy level in the service. The ACPO Strategic Policy Document 
described traditional policing as follow;
“British traditional policing is relatively low on number, low on power and 
high on accountability; it is undertaken with public consent which does not 
mean acquiescence but a broad tolerance indicating a satisfaction with both 
the helping and enforcement roles of policing. Its structure allows the public 
to express their policing wants and needs though changes in social attitudes 
and methods of social control may occur, the culture of policing remains 
intact” (ACPO 1990: 2).
This is perhaps an idealistic view of traditional policing; one which goes some 
way to making tangible the notion of policing during a golden age. Some 
commentators have questioned this notion of a golden age of policing (Reiner 1992, 
Benyon and Bourn 1986: Ch.l); the age of George Dixon, when officers could clip 
young mischievous malcontents across the back of the head before taking them home 
where their fathers, after showing gratitude to the officer, administered the real 
punishment on his offspring for his erroneous ways.
Traditional policing is perhaps this view o f the Dixon o f Dock Green, that’s 
perhaps the best way o f putting it that people perceive this guy who is there, 
high visibility policing, is walking up and down the street, speaking to 
members of the public. I can’t put myself into the mind o f members o f the 
public, but I  think generally that’s the kind o f view they have, o f this
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traditional uniformed officer who's on patrol, who adopts this friendly attitude 
towards them, who will listen to their problems and be therefor them. (R. 22).
I'm not really sure o f that, I  mean in the eyes o f the public traditional policing 
is very much the visible side o f police work, you know, the patrol in the streets. 
I  mean it probably means to a lot o f members o f the public, you know, clipping 
kids around the ear as we were talking about earlier. I'm not actually sure 
whether that isn't just a myth, you know, it's the thing about a policeman 
being on every corner, you know. In the good old days and where policemen 
used to sort o f deal with young lads for raiding the orchards and things like, 
you know. David Phillips, the Chief Constable o f Kent, once wrote an article 
on it in Police magazine and he said it was a total myth, it just never existed 
other than in people's minds and I'm not so sure if traditional policing isn't 
just a more posh way o f describing that myth really. (R. 16).
The view of traditional policing by ACPO highlighted above is not one that 
some of my respondents readily registered with. For example,
I  don't know what traditional policing is. It's almost this rosy view of 
something that happened in the past that we probably never had. Sometimes I  
get quite passionate about this and when people talk to me about traditional 
policing I say what you mean when we were all bent, for taking bribes, didn't 
take on the middle classes and so on and so forth. You know, things weren't 
rosy or fair in the past from what I've read and so it appears, so I  have a 
problem with traditional policing. (R. 1).
Traditional policing is what everybody tells me they want every time I  go to a 
public meeting. Traditional policing are expectations, which we can’t meet. 
They want to see a policeman walking down every street who will stop and 
talk to everybody and spend lots o f time and at the same time they expect a 
policeman to arrive in a marked car with horns blaring and lights going the 
minute they push the panic button. (R. 7).
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The majority of my respondents viewed traditional policing as the public’s 
desire for uniform foot patrol, an activity that has been euphemistically referred to as 
Bobbies on the beat. Although they saw the need to try and give the public what they 
desired, most of them saw the idea of unfocused policing as an unmitigated waste of 
valuable and scarce resources.
Traditional policing as far as the public is concerned, there are different 
perceptions as to what traditional policing is all about. I  think from my 
experience as an Area Commander, traditional policing is, they want to see 
police officers in uniform with helmets on walking round the street at all hours 
o f the day and night. Now if that's what they want, then to an extent we've got 
to meet that. It would be foolish o f us to ignore that and say, ‘well we know 
better, we know from research that the prospects o f a police officer walking 
the beat, o f him actually coming across a crime or preventing crime taking 
place are quite minimal, but the fact is you're talking about a feel good factor 
and I think we have to recognise that. (R. 17).
The concept of traditional policing had many similar characteristics for many 
of my respondents. They found it very difficult to explain what this policing style 
called traditional policing was, but they were at ease to offer what they saw as the 
public’s explanation of what traditional policing was. This was that traditional 
policing meant the uniformed constable who patrolled his beat upholding the law, 
giving advice and reassuring the community. In modem day parlance, he is the much 
requested and highly desirable ‘bobby on the beat.’ In essence he was a paternal 
authority figure to whom everyone could turn in times of uncertainty and need, and in 
today’s terms he is the embodiment of reassurance and order, whose presence is 
certain to alleviate the anxiety and fear of the community. Nonetheless, in my 
respondents’ view he is neither effective nor efficient and has no place in a modem 
police service that is saddled with an unquestionable remit to solve crime.
To the majority of my respondents the concept of traditional policing, 
epitomised by the fictitious image of George Dixon, was nothing more than a myth, 
and in any event it was a luxury that could not be afforded in the police service of 
today that is tightly tied to a performance regime. In their view, traditional policing
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was about aimless patrolling, which was at odds with focused, targeted and 
intelligence-led policing.
Traditional policing to me is your Dixon o f Dock Green. Do you remember 
Dixon o f Dock Green? Well that's what I  would say traditional policing is 
where an officer is, walking round a predetermined area and he or she is seen 
to be out there. It's what members, some members o f the public want, 
traditional policing. To me it's an illusion and I'm sure that all the research 
that's been done proves it to be an illusion really and truly, but people still 
like it. We as a Police service should be saying something via the media to 
combat that because it's far to target where you should put your resources 
and whether you should have them covert, overt or what other resources we 
should be using to tackle the problems. We have got to be putting officers 
where they can be best making inroads into whatever problems the public 
want us to look at, and not only what the public want us to look at, what we 
also think we should be looking at. (R. 48).
I  don't know what it means. Again I think there's a lot o f folklore about 
policing, I think there's a lot o f myths that we had the Dixon o f Dock Green, I 
don't know if we ever did, you've heard those debates. I  think people want to 
feel safe and in a mythical time gone by there's a perception o f feeling safe. I  
don't think there is any more, and I think if they want to hang onto traditional 
policing in terms o f the beat bobby and those reassurance type patrolling, then 
fine, but I'm not so sure it was ever there. I  think it's linked to social change, 
social upheaval, social problems, that are perhaps more prevalent now than 
they were then. Plus the fact you can't have a war in there somewhere, a war 
tends to bring people together every now and again and in a perverse way it 
tends to give them social cohesion. So, we haven't had one o f those to speak 
of, not that I would advocate one! (R. 42).
My respondents see traditional policing, and according to them so does the 
public, as typifying the uniformed officer on the beat administering the law fairly, 
without fear or favour, at a time when the public respected the police, who performed 
their duties with integrity. As some of my respondents’ have expressed about the
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public’s perception of how much better policing used to be, the reality was quite 
different from the memory. Perhaps it will not come as a surprise that some of my 
respondents’ idea of officers in the past going out and talking to people and 
establishing community contact is nothing more than a case of ‘elegant denial’ by 
many. For example,
Traditional policing was, it's funny isn't it when we look back to the Dixon of 
Dock Green, did he ever exist? What was traditional policing? Traditional 
policing was about going out with a uniform on and not talking. I now am the 
Divisional Commander here, I  was Head o f Complaints and Discipline and I  
look back through the old discipline books and the number o f officers that 
were booked, put in the discipline book for idle gossiping. I can remember 
being given the bollocking o f my life by a sergeant who'd left the Station at 
6am in the morning and he gave me a new probationer, he had just started 
that morning and he gave me the probationer, told me to walk along my beat, 
the probationer was on the next beat to me and to give him an insight into 
what was expected of him. And I  can remember I walked the length o f my 
beat, and I  was trying to pass on as much experience as I could to him. It was 
his first day out and I can remember being right on the end of my beat and it 
was 7 o'clock, and the sergeant then had come out o f the Station to do his 
visits and when he drew up to us and saw that the probationer was still with 
me after an hour, he got out o f that car and gave me the biggest bollocking of 
my life for idle gossiping and he was going to put me bn the book. Now that's 
what I  talk about, when we talk about this thing about old policing styles, oh it 
was dreadful. It was restrictive, you weren't allowed to go off the main beat, 
the supervisors had brains as big as peas. As long as they could see you and 
book you a visit they didn't care what you did, and I  wonder why? I've never 
looked at it, I  wonder through research whether anybody's looked at, what did 
they do in those days? What were the results? I  mean I can't remember 
anybody ever discussing results with me, and when I  look at what we're doing 
now, when I  look at an officer who is proactively involved in, in the 
Community, in what he does, in the way he does it and the way right from 
senior management down we're involved with the men, I  just wonder what was 
going on in those days. (R. 30).
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Discussion.
What is policing? Actually, as Waddington’s anecdotal evidence suggests, the 
answer to this question is quite straightforward. Policing is “the same the whole 
world over.” Describing his experiences in patrolling with officers from Chicago 
Police Department and Reading, part of Thames Valley Police in the England, he 
explained that the situations that officers were asked to deal with were remarkably 
similar. However, as he pointed out, “True, complainants in Reading do not usually 
have guns and neither do the police, but police officers share the experience of finding 
themselves enmeshed in complex quarrels as well as ejecting unruly drunks from 
bars” (Waddington 1999: 3).
As he goes on to claim, “Social scientists have become so familiar with 
amalgamating research from such a broad diversity of social, economic, political, 
cultural and historical conditions there is the danger that we lose sight of the 
genuinely remarkable consistency midst diversity that research reveals. When Banton 
compared the police in Edinburgh in Scotland with a police department in North 
Carolina, it was the similarities between them that allowed him to discuss generally 
what policing entailed. We need to keep this consistency across apparently diverse 
conditions firmly in mind lest we slide into parochial and particular explanations for 
why policing takes the form it does” (ibid). From this explanation of consistency in 
policing, it is easy to use it to support an argument for a singular basic culture in the 
police service, certainly nationally, which allows for the similarity in the delivery of 
policing services.
Although what is similar is consistent among the providers of the service, 
however, what the police ought to be doing, as interpreted by the receivers of the 
service, is not so consistent. It is the different demands on and from the police service 
by the different stakeholders, which has made policing sometimes problematic for 
senior police managers. The situation is made more challenging when it is realised 
that some of the stakeholders are making their demands not from information gained 
first-hand, but often second and third-hand, and occasionally from fictitious sources. 
However, some of the stakeholders are very well informed and influential and they 
used their knowledge to support their demands on the police, in particular on what
185
they think that senior managers ought to be concentrating. This often leaves senior 
managers in a dilemma over their use of resources, since there is not enough with 
which to address all the calls that are made on them. All these factors make managing 
and leading a complex social institution that is required to tackle a variety, and 
sometimes complex, social problems a difficult and arduous orle.
My respondents in this chapter highlighted the difficulty and challenges of 
dealing with general contemporary policing issues. Their replies on how they dealt 
with the problems were, as Waddington found from his experience of policing across 
international boundaries, remarkably consistent. This leads me to assert that the 
common experience of similar policing problems that senior managers faced in their 
different geographical area and functional or specialist post gave them the opportunity 
to develop similar occupational outlooks, and since this is one dimension of culture it 
adds strength to the proposition of the formation of a culture amongst this group of 
officers.
186
Chapter 8
CRIME AND ITS CONTROL.
THE EXTENT AND CAUSES OF CRIME.
The difficulty with discussing the subject of crime is that it is so broad an area that 
most discussions tend to concentrate on parts of the whole. For example, on the 
extent of crime, should it be decided, or more appropriately estimated, from officially 
recorded police figures? Or would national surveys that include unreported crimes by 
victims and unrecorded ones by the police (such as those captured annually in the 
British Crime Survey (BCS) be a more accurate guide?
However, crime surveys conducted within certain localities, such as the 
Islington Crime Survey, have given different and inflated figures for particular crimes 
in comparison to the BCS. So, do these types of surveys measure the extent of crime 
more accurately? In essence, could results from local surveys be extrapolated to 
explain national situations and trends, or are local surveys only able to reflect the 
situations that exist at local levels?
Regardless of which measure one decides to use to express the extent of crime, 
there is another factor that affects people’s perception of its effect and prevalence, and 
that is the fear of crime: described by one author as, “the anxieties and worries about 
crime as expressed by the population” (Pantazis 2000). Nonetheless, despite this 
working definition of the concept, there is much confusion in the literature on the 
precise meaning of ‘fear of crime’. Part of the confusion surrounds equating fear with 
anxiety, where fear of crime is used to refer to levels of worry and anxiety about both 
becoming a victim of crime and the individual’s perceptions of the risk of crime 
(ibid).
Recent BCS have shown that despite a fall in the number of reported and 
recorded crimes such as burglary, vehicle related thefts and violent crime over the 
four years up to the year 2000 (as measured by two BCS), the 2000 BCS did not find 
a comparable reduction in the fear of crime. The fear of crime, like crime itself,
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affects certain groups within society disproportionately, for example, women, and 
people living in old age or poverty are generally more fearful than others, but the 
groups suffering disproportionately from victimisation and from fear are different and 
almost opposite. Some of the reasons that have been suggested for the 
disproportionate fear of crime by certain groups have included either the inability of 
those in fear to defend themselves, due to their physical size or health, or their social 
and economic position (ibid).
On the topic of crime itself, from the literature a list of suggested causes 
would include such things as, unemployment; recession; poverty; homelessness; 
affluence; low IQ; lone parenting; illegitimacy; drugs; insufficient formal and 
informal deterrents. Along with these suggested causes of crime there is an equally 
full array of proposed remedies: full employment; improved social amenities; 
economic equality; access to and better education; better parenting; rehabilitative 
treatments; community service; more policing; imprisonment; and corporal 
punishment. All these suggested causes and remedies have some effect on crime, for 
sure, but none of them can be claimed to be solely responsible, or a remedy. 
Although they are inextricably linked, they can contribute in a cumulative way to the 
causes of crime, while others can ameliorate, either individually or collectively, the 
problem of crime.
In this chapter, I start the discussion of crime with my respondents from a 
broad base, exploring their perceptions of the extent and seriousness of crime. I then 
focus the discussion, firstly, on their views of the social features that might affect 
crime problems, before concentrating on the effect of police activities on crime. Next, 
we examined the question of additional legal powers to deal with the problem of 
crime. Finally, we considered the efficacy of concentrating policing efforts on a 
particular social group, one that is perceived in the literature to be disproportionately 
involved in the commission of crime, and whether some crime problems could be 
resolved by such tactics.
Before discussing my respondents’ views on crime and its problems, I first consider 
the difficulty of agreeing on the concept of crime. This helps to contextualise the 
different angles from which my respondents approached the subject.
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CRIME TRENDS 
The problem o f crime.
I start my discussion of crime from the premise that the concept of crime is one on 
which there is general agreement by all those interested in the subject. However, 
from the literature it is clear that this is not necessarily the case. The behaviours or 
activities that are acceptable to one generation or one group might not be so readily 
acceptable to different ones. This point was alluded to by one of my respondents, 
whose view on the question of whether crime was a greater problem today than in the 
past was as follows:
I  suspect not. What I  think has happened o f course is that...we’ve become 
more o f a political football. Crime’s become a big issue, and so it’s closely 
analysed, the media and media definitions o f crime tend to blow things out o f 
all proportions. My gut feeling is that the problem is probably aren *t as great 
today as they were then, trends are different. There are particular things that 
are problems now that weren’t then, but other things have dropped out o f the 
framework. (R. 3).
Though the media can be and often are influential in defining the behaviours 
that ought to be classified as criminal, they are not the only social institution, nor the 
most influential one, that has the ability or capacity to do so. Muncie and 
McLaughlin offer the following interpretations of the different definitions of crime 
over the years.(a) (Muncie & McLauglin 1996: 6).
Crime as criminal law violation. In this context, certain activities and 
behaviour are linked to substantive criminal law, for example, ‘an act is only a crime 
when it violates the prevailing legal code of the jurisdiction in which it occurs.’
Crime as norm infraction. In this context, it is only those behaviours that are 
socially abnormal, whether or not they are specifically defined as illegal by statutes 
that can be defined as crimes.
Crime as social construct. Here, the emphasis is placed on the labelling of an 
individual’s behaviour as criminal.
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Crime as ideological censure. Here the definition of what is criminal is not 
simply a question of any number of interest groups acting in competition with each 
other, it is based on the systematic and consistent empowerment of some groups to the 
detriment of others.
Crime as historical invention. Although crime is a fairly recent method of 
social disapproval, troublesome behaviours have been defined as ‘crimes’ for so long 
that the concept is routinely applied in condemnation of the ‘unwanted’ and the 
‘undesirable’. For example, civil law and religion dealt with behaviours that are now 
deemed criminal. In other words, there was less ‘crime’ and more ‘sin’.
As this brief illustration of the various definitions of what constitutes a crime 
highlights, defining what is a crime is not a straightforward exercise. The 
interpretation that one uses to define what is a crime will affect how one reacts to the 
problem. The importance of this for my purpose is that the definition that my 
respondents, consciously or otherwise, use to determine what is a crime may influence 
how they respond both strategically and operationally to the problem. As one of my 
respondents asked in reply to the question of whether crime is a greater problem now 
than in the past:
“For whom, is it for the community or for the police? A greater problem for
whom? (R. 12).
The police and the community are not the only two parties for which crime is 
a problem. It is a problem for central government, local authorities, the courts; and 
the news media, to list a few. For central government, it is a good barometer of the 
social welfare of society; for local government it is a good measure of its ability to 
devise and implement policies and initiatives that lead to integration and cohesion, 
rather than disintegration and exclusion of certain sections of the community. For the 
courts, it is a measure of their ability to stay in touch with the ‘real world’, since 
lenient sentences are synonymous, in the public’s mind, with being out of touch with 
reality. Crime reporting forms a substantial part of media reports, so much so that the 
level of media reports of crime coupled with the type of crimes that are reported -  the 
more serious bodily injury types -  can give a false impression of the prevalence and 
seriousness of crime (Reiner 2001, Sparks 2001, Chadee 2001, Roberts 2001). What
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were my respondent’s views on the nature, extent and causes of crime based on then- 
professional experience?
The extent o f crime.
Data on the number of crimes as recorded by the police has been collected since 1857 
(Kershaw et al 2000: 2). But using post World War II figures and concentrating on 
those collected after 1981, when data for the British Crime Survey (BCS) started to be 
compiled, the trend in the number of recorded crime has generally been upwards. 
“Broadly speaking, the amount of crime recorded by the police in England and Wales 
increased tenfold between 1950 and 1993”, and “For comparable offences the British 
Crime Surveys confirmed a rise in crime between 1981 and 1993” (Smith 1996; 
Reiner 2000).
Between 1993 and 1995 police recorded crime fell, while BCS figures started 
to level off. Between 1995 and 1997 both sets of data showed comparable falls, while 
between 1997 and 1999, although for both sets of data the trend was still downwards, 
there was a greater fall in BCS crime (Kershaw et al 2000: iii). Since then both have 
tended to fall. For example, in 2004 crime had fallen by 30 per cent since 1997. 
(Home Office 2004: Foreword)
So, although the trend has been downwards in the number of crimes recorded 
by the police and BCS since 1995, up to 1996, the period when I conducted my 
fieldwork, the trend was upwards. With the greatest increase occurring in the 1980s, 
when between 1979 and 1992 the number of notifiable offences recorded by the 
police more than doubled from 2.4 to 5.4 million. From the data the obvious 
conclusion that would have been reached by all those interested in the topic, including 
my respondents, would have been that more crimes were being committed generally.
Not surprisingly the majority of my respondents held this perception and 
expressed the view that crime had become a greater problem, with most of them 
equating greater problem with greater quantity. However, there were variations in the 
views expressed. Those of my respondents that were definite that crime was a greater 
problem were more ready to offer a reason why this was so, and I will discuss some of 
these reasons in the next section.
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Those that expressed some ambivalence or uncertainty as to whether crime 
was a greater problem suggested that the perception and/or the fear o f crime were 
greater problems, for example:
The perception o f crime is a greater problem than it was; yes, there's a 
greater fear o f crime. Do you know how many robberies we had in —  [a 
county] last year? 365. I  think we’ve got 6 million people in —  [a county], 
Jesus Christ, I ’m terrified o f going out because I ’m gonna get robbed! What a 
load o f crap! So, it’s the fear o f crime, the problem there has increased. 
There has also been an increase in crime, but I think some o f that is as a result 
of bureaucratic systems rather than a real increase in crime. For instance, 
more people getting insurance, more people getting cars and, therefore, more 
actual crime is reported and that makes it all look like crime’s going up. (R. 
12).
Although most of my respondents were certain that recorded crime had 
increased, many saw this as a reflection of greater reporting and better recording 
by the police. There were two aspects of crime on which there was overwhelming 
consensus, and these were violence and illegal drugs.
The problem of violence was seen both in term of its use in the commission of 
other crimes, and the commission of violent crimes per se. While the drugs 
problem comprised both greater misuse, and the commission of other crimes in 
order to purchase illegal drugs. Thus, typical responses from my respondents 
included the following:
Well there’s more of it, but then you’d expect that, there’s more property, 
there’s more possessions, there’s more people, there’s less jobs. I would say 
that, I  have a particular concern about the link between, I  suppose I ’d have to 
answer that by plucking out one thing and say the thing that really concerns 
me is violence. I  mean when you look, I  mean in this Force, things like armed 
robberies are going down. There’s all sorts o f sophisticated means of 
stopping it, but violence as a crime itself, I  think would be my biggest concern
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and I would see that as the biggest change that’s occurred. So you asked 
whether it a sort of a greater concern about it?
Yes.
I suspect there is, because nothing creates more fear than the fear o f violence. 
(R. 10).
I  think violent crimes have become more difficult to detect and there’s more 
violent crime obviously than there used to be. Again, when I joined there 
wasn’t a drugs problem in the country; there is a drugs problem now. (R. 14).
Pure statistics, there’s a lot more of it, without doubt there’s a lot more o f it, 
but there are a lot more different types o f crime. Bearing in mind I joined the 
county force, but I was initially working in quite a big town in —  which is a 
typical Northern town with plenty o f violence, plenty o f fights, plenty o f 
drinking-type offences and burglaries. But certainly not on the same scale 
and not driven by drugs as most crimes seem to be at the moment. That’s the 
biggest change, the actual weight of crime and the underlying drugs thing at 
the moment. (R. 36)
It depends how you define crime. I  think crime is worse now than what it was. 
Although again in my day, we cuffed that much o f it, we didn ’t know what 
there was but yes we had burglaries, but we didn’t have the volume, then. And 
we didn’t have the spectacular crimes that we have now like the job in 
Scotland the other day, [the shooting of a number of school children at a 
primary school in Dunblane, Scotland] I  mean that just wasn’t, or Neilsen or 
the Ripper or anything, all those sorts o f things thirty years ago, we didn’t 
have. (R. 41).
Not only are some of the offences that have been highlighted exceptional, my 
respondents as a group saw them as exceptional, and ‘spectacular’, and the high 
profile media reporting of them would certainly have made them spectacular. In 
all honesty, they were spectacular by any standard, and it was perhaps this feature 
that attracted the media to them, from whence they ensured that they remained 
spectacular in the way they were reported. Whichever version is closer to the
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truth, the fact is some of my respondents felt that not only did the media distort 
reality; they created a problem with regard to crime where perhaps there either 
was none, or if there was it was not as serious as it was portrayed. Further, where 
there might have been some real problem the media exaggerated it. Indirectly, the 
greater ease by which people could communicate and receive information 
contributed to making crime a greater problem (Rose 2001). Many respondents 
were cautious about whether crime had actually risen. This quote summarises the 
reasons for suspicion.
I  don't think so, no, I  really don't. People are saturated now with a whole 
range o f problems that they think that every time they turn the radio on or 
television or pick up newspapers, communications are that much more focused 
and sharp, and hysterical, unfortunately. I think the problem's always been 
there, the recording systems is better, the public awareness is greater, the 
demand, the policy's greater, people's aspirations are that much greater, it's 
always been there, we can talk about these enormous increases... There were 
too many misconceptions and too many pay cheques hanging on the end, not 
just police pay cheques, but media pay cheques, all sorts o f pay cheques, 
hanging on the end o f producing results, inspiring or frightening people to do, 
and it's the wonderful media communications. The art of, let's say 32 years 
ago, if there was an enormous catastrophe the other side o f the world, even 
then it might have taken a long time to find out about it, now we can get it in 
25 minutes can't we? (R. 20).
CRIME CAUSATION.
Explanations o f the recorded crime increase.
In addition to the media, my respondents suggested that the following factors might 
have contributed to the perception that crime is a greater problem now than in the 
past. Firstly, the ease with which victims and witnesses could contact the police to 
report crime, i.e. telephone ownership both at home and on the move, which has made 
it easier to report offences to and summon help from the police. Secondly, the police 
are more accessible and ‘user friendly’, possibly as a result of them pursuing and 
adopting more consumerist approach to service delivery in the 1990s, with the then
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concentration on the provision of ‘quality of service’. In addition, there are greater 
demands for Forces to become more accessible (HMIC 2001). Thirdly, there are 
more consumer goods being purchased by a more affluent society, which leads to the 
availability of more stealable goods. Finally, demographic changes and an increase in 
the number of young people in the population could lead to an increase in the number 
of crimes. In addition to these factors, my respondents suggested other social features 
that could contribute to making crime a greater problem, and these are discussed next.
Social sources of crime.
As illustrated at the beginning of this chapter a number of factors have been offered 
by commentators as possible causes of crime, such as unemployment; poverty; 
affluence; and drugs. My respondents appeared to be in tune with various academic 
thinking and research finding in this area. (Fitzgerald et al; Borrell and Cashinella; 
Muncie and McLaughlin). This should not come as a surprise as one would expect 
officers at this level to have some knowledge of the sociological research findings in 
this area, if not directly through training or personal studies, then through the 
multitude of professional journals on policing that are now available. The relevance 
for this study is the extent to which these theoretical findings translate into 
respondents’ analysis of the causes of crime. The complexity of the subject precludes 
simplistic discussion, as one of my respondents explained.
I  think there are features in all societies that aggravate crime problems, and 
that will include everything from the personality and culture o f people. There 
are clearly race issues that will come into play in different areas, there could 
be economic factors that could aggravate crime problems, and maybe we've 
just seen some o f them. In fact, if you look at some o f the old police research 
that plots rises in crime with economic troughs both in Europe and around the 
World, there's an uncanny correspondence. Well there could be many factors 
that influence it. It could just be the pure numbers o f the population; 
unemployment; all those things can aggravate crime at any given time. And
it's an area that, having worked w ith  , our chief for two years, on the
national scene, dealing with Sheehy, the Royal Commission, Kenneth Clarke's 
reform package taken over by Michael Howard, and seeing all that close up, 
seeing the inside o f the Home Office and some o f the ideas, just seeing all
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those issues rattling around all the time, and at any given moment some will 
grab one aspect and say this is the cause o f crime of this is actually making 
things worse and I think there are many factors and it's a very, very complex 
area. (R. 3).
In addition, one needs to ask the question of the direction of any causal links:
I  mean is crime a symptom of the individual and his genetic propensities, or is 
it a feature o f society's affect upon the individual, or is it interaction between 
the two? I think most o f us would say that probably it is the latter o f those 
three. (R. 43).
However, regardless of the fact that some of my respondents thought that this 
might be a difficult subject that required a thoughtful and perhaps complex approach, 
there were some social features that most of them thought were aggravating factors. 
These in a way simplified the discussion and helped to contain and focus it. The two 
social features most frequently mentioned as ones that could affect crime problems 
were, broadly, illegal drugs and unemployment. I state broadly, because other 
features were mentioned which are closely associated with unemployment, such as, 
social exclusion and the division between the haves and the have-nots, i.e. inequality 
and the wealth gap.
Illegal Drugs.
May 2001, the feeling of deja vu was overwhelming as one witnessed on the front 
page of a national free tabloid newspaper the horrific picture of 19-year old Loma 
Spinks, who had died from the effects of two ecstasy tablets {Metro, 9 May 2001). 
Loma, who was described by her grandmother as a ‘golden girl’ was very similar in 
many respects to another young girl whose death, also from taking ecstasy, was well 
publicised in 1996; that of Leah Betts.
The horror of drugs were conveyed graphically by both examples, and the 
reason why both parents had authorised the publication of these disturbing pictures of 
their dead daughters in national newspapers -  to prevent other young people suffering
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the fate of their cherished daughters -  had, it would appear at least in the case of the 
Betts family, gone unheeded.
What could have been the reasons for this disinterest by young people to the 
warning? Was it that the older generation was out of touch with the contemporary 
desires and understanding of today’s young people concerning the use of illegal 
drugs? On the other hand, do young people actually take note of these messages and 
warnings, but simply decided in this case, as perhaps they would with other potential 
hazards in life, that it would not happen to them? Conversely, was it an over-reaction 
by two families to a social activity (especially for a drug that is closely associated 
with pleasure and enjoyment by young people, particularly in terms of the club scene) 
that young people considered commonplace and uneventful by contemporary 
standards?
Whatever the reasons why some young people did not heed the warnings of 
those who had suffered the consequences of illegal drugs, both directly and indirectly, 
the fact is that drug use and its availability has increased substantially over the second 
half of the 20th century (South 1997).
At the time of the fieldwork, the death of Leah Betts was prominently reported 
and widely discussed in the media. The subject of illegal drugs was at the top of the 
agenda of social problems that society, and in particular the government, needed to 
tackle and resolve, for a number of reasons, some of which included, as indicated 
above, the personal loss suffered by individual families.
My respondents were attuned to society’s fears and concerns about the wide 
availability of illegal drugs, and in particular drugs such as ecstasy that were popular 
amongst the young. Perhaps the fear was accentuated by the fact that ecstasy was not 
associated with some of.the social stigma attached to other illegal drugs were. For 
example, cannabis is associated with a ‘foreign’ culture; heroin with the filth and 
depravation that comes with users sharing ‘unclean’ needles used to inject the drug; 
cocaine with the violence surrounding the distribution of crack; and LSD with the 
irresponsible and anti-establishment behaviour of the radical ‘children’ of the 1960s. 
Ecstasy is still free from any such malign associations, which perhaps has encouraged
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some people to call for legal acceptance of its production and use. For example, the 
mother of Leah was quoted as suggesting a more liberal approach by the authorities, 
saying that, “In Switzerland [where both parents were residing at the time of the 
tragedy] in venues like this [nightclubs], there is a chemist who tests the pills. If Leah 
had her tablets tested she would still, perhaps, be here” {Metro, 9 May 2001). My 
respondents, collectively, echoed some of these views:
I  think the greater availability o f drugs and more of an attitude that they don’t 
matter. That is perhaps the difference.
[Drugs don’t matter?]
Drugs don’t matter, yes, I  mean, I ’ve got teenage daughters and I  talk to their 
friends. My daughters tend to have what I  regard as the right attitude, but I  talk 
to their friends who say, well Ecstasy would be all right if it was legal because it 
would be quality controlled. But there’s no suggestion that the drug that Leah 
Betts took was false or fake in any way, it was believed to be a proper Ecstasy 
tablet, to which she suffered an adverse reaction and that happens far too often 
for me to say well it would be all right if it was quality controlled. (R. 8).
Drugs, there’s no doubt about that. We’re seeing it so much more and more and 
more, and the priority for 96/97 within this Force, it’s not just national, that has 
got to be drugs. It’s like a canker in society. (R. 30).
Unemployment
Unemployment for a number of reasons has a link, if not directly then indirectly, to 
offending. The social controls of work/employment create bonds for the individual 
and social groups that alleviate the temptation to offend. For the individual, Fox has 
suggested that there are ‘two great alternative meanings’ to work. The first is that it is 
an end in itself, in that it is an activity that is of ‘central importance’ to the 
development of the individual’s personality and life fulfilment. The second is that it 
is little more than the means to acquire the necessary resources for survival or leisure 
and pleasure. However, from studies of the unemployed it is clear that work means 
more than this narrow instrumental view. Fox describes eight ways in which work 
can be important to the individual, in addition to its importance as a source of income. 
“It provides opportunities to relate to society, and opportunities for interaction with
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others; it sustains status and self-respect, and offers a sense of personal identity; it 
structures the passage of time and distracts from private worries, fears and 
disappointment; and it provides scope for the satisfaction of ‘achievement’, and offers 
the possibility of identifying with a transcendent cause” (Fox 1984: 133).
One commentator has suggested that “lengthy periods of high unemployment, 
by breaking an important social bond, may create a group of young people who are 
more likely to commit offences” (Smith 1996: 1). Over the preceding seventeen years 
to the date of my field study, the period of time the Conservative government had 
been in power, their policies had expanded the division in personal wealth to such a 
degree, partly through a rise in the number of the unemployed, that Bottoms and 
Wiles explained that; “As the highest income earners earn more and the lowest 
earners proportionately less, a disadvantaged ‘underclass’ may emerge which might 
either result in an increase in crime...or develop into a culture of hopelessness” 
(Bottom and Wiles 1996: 15).
However, it would be too simplistic to suggest that being unemployed 
generally leads directly to offending. There are other contributory factors in addition 
to ‘economic growth, unemployment, and deprivation’, that lead to offending. These 
include ‘informal controls, relationships, and self-discipline*; ‘urban ways of life’; 
‘families’; ‘opportunity’; and ‘law enforcement’ (Smith 1996: 10).
My respondents were aware of the subtle link between unemployment and 
offending and did not point up unemployment as a direct cause of offending:
Yeah, I  firmly believe unemployment does. I think it does create desperation 
and a need to survive and a need for money, a need to break away somehow I  
think. So I think well unemployment inasmuch that it tends to link to a lack of 
resources; no job no money. (R. 10).
In my view yes there are. I  mean there are different schools o f thought as to 
what impacts upon crime and I can only say from my professional experience 
as an Area Commander what I  believe to have an impact on crime, and from 
my own studies, doing my own degree into causes arid affects o f crime, I've 
got some idea. I mean there's always been this thought that politicians have,
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thought, steered clear of it, that you link unemployment and so on with crime. 
Or social depravation with crime and they say ‘well it didn’t happen in the 
war and it didn’t happen in the 18th century, whatever’. But it would be my 
personal opinion that there is a clear link between high unemployment, 
especially youth unemployment, and levels o f crime. (R. 17).
Well I  mean the debate about unemployment and things like this, prejudice, all 
these sort o f things, yes, I mean they must have some influence. I mean idle 
hands, you know; the devil makes work for idle hands. You’ve got to believe 
that if people haven’t got a job, I  mean the things that tie people into society 
and into the norms o f society, family and employment, because they take the 
bulk o f people’s energy and time. Now if the family ties are loose and if the, 
or employment is not there then those ties break down and, you know, they will 
give more opportunity for crime. I  mean I ’ve always believed that and I still 
do. Dealing with people who are arrested for crime and being processed for 
crime, it’s a common factor, the custody record nearly always shows 
unemployed in the case of an adult. (R. 29).
The general view was that unemployment was one of a number of factors that 
lead to offending, but it would be an unsophisticated exaggeration to claim that it is 
the cause of crime. However, the relevance for commonality of culture in the 
expressed views of my respondents is that despite differences in their professional 
experience their interpretation and outlook are remarkably similar.
POLICING CRIME
The influence of the Audit Commission.
Since its establishment in 1983 with a remit to appoint and regulate the external 
auditors of local authorities, the Audit Commission has increasingly influenced the 
thinking and activities on which the police service concentrates its resources. Over 
the years senior police managers have come to place great value on the advice and 
recommendations contained in the Commission’s reports on the police, and the 
Commission is very much aware of this fact. For example, on their research on the
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Audit Commission, Savage et al (2000) quotes two officials from the Commission 
who stated:
“The take-up o f our recommendations is much higher in the police world than
it is in the rest o f the local authority sector or in the health service ..."
Additionally,
“...The work we've done on the police has been some of our smartest work.
We think it's been some o f our most influential work."
In effect, the relationship between the police and the Audit Commission has 
developed into a symbiotic one. Part of the reason for this is that, “The Audit 
Commission is highly dependent upon the police service (and particularly ACPO) for 
information, expertise, support, and implementation; and consequently it tends to 
work with (as opposed to against) the police service in its investigations”, and the 
police benefit from a relatively supportive independent examination of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of their activities. (Savage et al 2000: 36). One outcome of this 
symbiotic relationship is that the police service is usually aware of the 
recommendations the Commission is likely to make in its reports before it is made 
public, and therefore they do not come as a surprise. This appeared to be borne out by 
the discussions with my respondents, the overwhelming majority of whom agreed 
with the recommendations in the particular Audit Commission report to which I 
referred: Streetwise. Effective Police Patrol. Where there were some reservations 
with the findings and recommendations of the report this appeared to be because of 
some misunderstanding of its content, in particular because some of those who had 
reservations had not read the report. Coincidentally, some of the responses by those 
who agreed with the findings and recommendations of the report echoed the views of 
those expressing some reservations. This perhaps highlights a difficulty of trying to 
spread good practice; what might seem an obvious solution to a national problem may 
not be so obvious when it comes to implementing it under local conditions. For 
example, one of my respondents suggested:
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To an extent yes, you'll never get a straight yes or a no! The qualifications 
that I'd  put in there are that first o f all, let's just return to the community 
policing issue. I  think what the communities actually need, sorry not what 
they need, what they're actually asking for, is somebody who is highly visible, 
high profile policing. That's something that they want and I  think that's 
something we can provide in a reasonably simple way. They are reassured 
even by the sight o f a, not even, but they're reassured by the sight o f a traffic 
warden or a Special Constable, who don't undergo the degree o f training to 
every police officer. So I think we could make ourselves more effective by 
spending less on our officers and putting them out on the streets in a more 
limited fashion than the omnicompetent constable who we're putting out there, 
so I  think there's scope for that. I  think you've got to actually meet public 
expectations as much as possible, and getting to know your community and I  
think that type o f police officer that I've just described could actually achieve 
that. Then over and above that you do need your specialist officers, but you 
need to utilise your specialist officers in the most effective and efficient way 
possible and that I  think is really a case o f identifying what the problems are 
and how you're going to divert your resources to deal with those. So almost 
there is a two-tier approach, one trying to keep the generality o f community 
life going and the other in a mode that deals specifically with the issues in an 
order o f priority. So in that way, I  think you probably could meet the two 
extremes that are started there at the beginning, what is nationally required 
and what is locally desirable as well, so I see that as the way forward. I  think 
at the moment following up the Audit Commission's recommendations, again I  
keep returning to this lovely word, culture. We're scoring own goals because 
we're trying to cling on to too much rather than sharing it with other 
agencies. For years and years and years we've seen ourselves as the only 
people who are going to tackle the drug problem, which is a nonsense because 
the only reason we're going to tackle the drug problem is because there's 
plenty o f it out there and we’re congratulating ourselves because we keep 
arresting more and more people for it, but it's not reducing the problem at all. 
I f  we work with the other agencies, the other agencies have probably got the 
lead role as the Government's drug strategy now is identifying other agencies
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have got a far greater role to play than us, what we need to do is to work 
closer with those agencies and bring that about. (R. 14).
Typical of the comments from some of the other respondents who had some 
reservations with the report is the following one, although they agreed with its 
findings,
Up to a point, but I  disagree with the Audit Commission’s approach in that, 
and this is where I ’m a bit o f a traditionalist, I  think policing is like justice, it 
has to be seen to be done, as well as being done. And I don’t think we have a 
very clear view o f what our job is. For example, let’s take domestic burglary, 
in — [a county] at the moment something like only 12% o f domestic 
burglaries are cleared up by primary means, the rest that are cleared up are 
cleared up on prison visit. And that whole system as you know is questionable 
in some people’s eyes. So the reality is that when someone gets burgled, 
which for most people is a pretty traumatic experience having their home 
entered and people using and stealing their property. The chances o f the 
police who come to investigate it actually clearing up the crime are very 
small, that doesn ’t mean that it is wrong to try, because I  think you must try. 
And you could only, for example, say 12% of people with a particular disease 
you could rescue, you’d still want to put some effort in and save the 12%. So I  
don’t think our small rate o f success means that you shouldn’t try in any way 
...S o  when people like the Audit Commission come along and they do their 
sums and they say, the policeman on the beat don’t naturally do very much, in 
measurable terms, therefore he’s not cost-effective. Ask the public if they 
don’t want no policemen to be on the street, and see what they think? They’re 
the people, they’re the customers. (R. 2).
Some others (26 of the 41 of the respondents that answered the question: 63 
per cent) agreed with the report’s recommendations unreservedly. Typical examples 
included the following views:
Absolutely, without question. It goes back to what I  was saying earlier on.
We could put every police officer that we’ve got in -—[a county] out on the
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streets, walking round, and having been briefed and being up to the mark, 
knowing what they're doing, but you have to question how effective they would 
be. We need to be targeting known criminals, using intelligence; we need to 
be going to specific locations at certain times to do certain things. We've got 
to get into surveillance, we've got to get into all the high tech ways o f dealing 
with crime and not just putting on a uniform and walking around saying to the 
public, ‘well look I'm here, I'm looking after your interests', it may make them 
feel good, but I doubt it will have an affect upon levels o f crime. (R. 17)
These expressions, whether they were qualified or unreserved agreements with 
the recommendations of the report, reflected the content of the report. For example, 
the report points out that, “The police, like other parts of the public sector, face 
competing demands for their services. They are expected to tackle crime effectively 
and provide a fast response to emergencies, while at the same time meeting an almost 
insatiable pubic appetite for visible patrol -  ‘bobbies on the beat’.” Further, that, 
“Surveys consistently show that the public attaches great value to police patrol,” and 
explains that this is because, “It provides a sense of security and symbolises lawful 
authority at a time when there are increasing concerns about an erosion of authority.” 
Paradoxically, “despite the high degree of satisfaction with most aspects of policing, 
the Commission’s own survey of the public’s view reinforces the message of 
dissatisfaction with current levels of foot patrol.” They asked, “Why, despite their 
best intentions, are the police not meeting public expectations in this key area?” The 
answer was contained in the three points that the study highlighted:
• “public expectations are not wholly realistic;
• in many forces there are opportunities to manage existing demand better; 
officers spend much of their available time awaiting deployment to 
incidents or dealing with incidents which do not merit police attendance; 
and
• what time there is between incidents is not always used effectively, and 
could be better targeted and more productive.”
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As shown by the comments by my respondents they were already aware of 
these points, and it did not require the Audit Commission to conduct a study to bring 
them to the forefront of their thinking. Perhaps the main benefits of the study were, 
firstly, that it was able to provide objective evidence collected through a systematic 
and methodologically sound process to support what police managers already knew 
through operational experience. Secondly, as one of my respondents explained, the 
Commission produces its findings, on policy areas of police activity, in practical and 
useable ways:
/  didn't find that there was anything in there that was terribly surprising, and I 
suspect you wouldn't either. There are telling sections in there that we've not 
heard before and there are plenty o f research around that I've read and I'm 
sure that you've read, we can sit here talking about them for hours, that 
indicate that a policeman can walk around the plot for eight years and not 
come across a burglar. But I think the Audit Commission have pulled it off in 
terms o f practice, because that's the way they operate and I think it's very 
strong. I  mean things like ‘Cheques and Balances'; ‘Tackling Crime 
Effectivelyand so on, I  mean very helpful documents. (R. 3).
Legal powers and crime control.
Changing the structure of the organisation and working ‘smarter’ as opposed to harder 
could help the police provide a more effective and efficient service. However, the 
police can only operate within the law, and the lack of certain laws could contribute to 
police inefficiency and ineffectiveness. I discussed this possibility with my 
respondents by asking them if there were any legal powers that the police required to 
control crime effectively but did not have at present.
If legal powers are to the police what weapons are to the soldier then the 
police have had a substantial addition to their arsenal over the last two decades. 
These have ranged from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to the most 
recent Police Reform Act 2002.
In the recent past the Police Federation has expressed an unquestionable desire 
for more powers, offering the reason that without adequate powers officers would not
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be able to deliver the level and quality of policing that the public deserve and demand. 
The message has been that more powers will lead to better results, which crudely 
equates to more crimes detected and cleared up.
However, my respondents were equivocal as to whether the police would 
benefit from having more legal powers. The consensus was that the police had 
sufficient powers to enable them to deal with the demands society made on them and 
what was needed was simplification of the vast array of legal powers currently 
available. Some went further and suggested that the large number of legal powers 
might confuse some officers and make them less efficient:
What I would say is, we’ve got such a myriad o f powers in different 
documents, it would make good sense to me if they were simplified because 
beat officers now have got so many powers with so many caveats and 
conditions, they’re confused, or they don’t understand them, or they’re 
frightened o f getting them wrong and I  believe that the powers are not always 
used. So I would like to see what we’ve got simplified so stop and search was 
in one place only and the power o f arrest was simplified; it’s a real nightmare 
to learn. So, I ’d go for simplification rather than additions. (R. 7).
POLCING, CRIME, AND MINORITIES 
Pathological social groups and crime problems.
The police could change its structure to produce the most effective and efficient units 
possible to deal with crime. They could be given all the legal powers they need to 
deter people from committing crimes, and catching and prosecuting offenders who do 
commit crimes. However, it is possible that these measures would not stop every one, 
or groups from offending, because there are some people and groups that have a 
pathological desire to commit crime.
There is abundant anecdotal discussions within the police service claiming that 
such groups exist, and that they specialise in the commission of particular crimes. For 
example, ‘Gypsies’ (not the Romanies) are regarded as thieves; West Africans are 
fraudsters (this group is officially recognised as such through the existence of a West
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African Crime Squad at New Scotland Yard); young black African-Caribbean men 
are muggers. The importance of these stereotypical portrayals of certain social groups 
is the influence (though some people would question the existence of any influence) 
they have on the way these groups are policed. One commentator has described this 
phenomenon of ‘targeted’ policing of certain social groups as ‘racial profiling’ 
(Cashmore 2000).
This section of the interview was an uncomfortable one for some of my 
respondents, for a number of reasons. Although the question was asked about a 
‘social group’, because of the comment at the time by the then Commissioner for the 
Metropolitan Police that most muggings in London were committed by young black 
men (or at least that was the way his message was interpreted and reported by the 
media), the phrase ‘social group’ could have been taken by my respondents as a 
euphemism for ‘racial group’. This in itself would have caused some discomfort for 
some senior officers, especially taking into account the context in which it was being 
asked; a serving police officer carrying out a research study from a well-known and 
respected University, and whose chief officer had written personally to the chief 
officer of the Force of the respondent. The Police Staff College had backed the 
research. The interviewer held a middle management rank in the service and, through 
conversations before the interview had struck up a good rapport with the respondent, 
but was a black West African by birth. They could have been forgiven for suspecting 
that this was some elaborate integrity test!
This discomfort was illustrated by the reply of one of my respondents to the 
question of whether it would help clear up more crimes if people from a particular 
social group with a disproportionately high criminal record were stopped and 
searched more often. He expressed the view that he did not have a large population of 
black or Asian people within his area, but that if he had they would not have been 
treated any differently to the majority population. No sooner had he mentioned this 
than we were interrupted by one of his officers who wanted to let him know that a 
group of ‘Gypsies’ was travelling towards his divisional area. His reply was to keep 
them moving; he did not want them to settle on his Division. The reason? These 
people were responsible for a large amount of thefts wherever they settle. However,
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he was not the only one to express these sentiments. Other typical examples included 
the following.
Probably, yeah. In this county, you may even remember, one part o f the 
county, two parts, but one part over this side has got a very high proportion of 
Gypsies. Quite frequently Gypsies are responsible for 'bogus official' jobs, 
'distraction burglaries', call them what you will. (R. 37).
The same explanation was also valid for socially deprived groups, such as 
those living on council estates:
I'd question that; I  mean it could be counter-productive to be honest. Yeah, it 
might well be the case that if we looked at a particular social group and 
targeted it that we could have some success. I am aware o f the reports coming 
from the Met. Are they not? Where they are saying, 'in my area, X-percent of 
the crime is committed by that particular racial group, for instance, and if 
that’s where the crime is being committed, yes we should be stopping and 
checking within reason. I  don’t hold with stopping and checking for no 
reason, but I ’m at, operations on my borders with the neighbouring area 
because most o f the thieves that thieve on my area come from a council estate 
just the other side o f the road. And we regularly put on high visibility policing 
patrols purely to stop and check people that we know damn well are up to no 
good in my patch and when we do that, that has a marked effect on the amount 
of crime that’s committed. We don’t always lock up, don’t always succeed in 
detecting crime but we certainly prevent it. I ’ve got to point out in my area we 
don’t have any racial minorities whatsoever. We have a very small Sikh 
community, very small, who are no problem whatsoever, but that’s about it. 
(R. 36).
I would suggest that the discomfort does not arise simply because of the 
concentration on a particular social group. It perhaps arises from a perception that the 
practice is motivated by racial stereotyping and not on evidence based on objective 
information and intelligence. An additional reason for any discomfort might be that 
although most of my respondents confirmed that acts of, and on many occasions
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agreed with, targeting of people from a particular social group did occur and 
explained why this was so on the grounds of law enforcement, the underlying reason 
why it is done might really be due to order maintenance by the officers. The notion of 
keeping certain people in their rightful place within the social hierarchy, those groups 
that occupy a level on the social hierarchy from which the police can comfortably 
draw their ‘property’.
It would all depend what the decision for doing that was. I f  the decision or the 
strategy was that your task in life was to keep the lid on the dustbin, and that 
was your strategy, then yes. I f  you are wanting naturally to get to the root o f 
the problem, then nothing could be worse. I f  you need to search somebody, if 
you need to do something like that, it should be on an individual basis, not 
because the study or type is, that, you know all black men, you know Robert, 
or people who have short hair and wear a baseball hat back to front are 
TWOCers, you know. And there is, but it’s a great deal easier for an 
organisation to attribute certain things to certain groups because it makes 
things clear and it comes back to what we were talking about, briefing. Part 
o f the briefing to my mind should include what your attitude is towards certain 
things, and our attitude towards, I mean a good example is prostitution to me, 
you know, why does the police services lock up the women and does nothing 
with the men? It’s because actually as a group the prostitutes are easier to 
have a go at, and they*re easier to pick up, they*re identifiable, they*re 
standing there night after night, they*re causing bother, the local community’s 
up in arms about it and so you can be seen to be doing something. Where in 
actual fact if you pick up some of the men, it may cause you a bit o f 
embarrassment, whoever you pick up. So, they’re an easy target, but if you 
really want to influence the thing, you’d pick on the punier. (R. 40)
No. I ’m not a great believer in stop checking as a way o f law enforcement 
anyway. I t’s random, it’s counter productive, it’s not a good use o f resources 
in general terms.
Just upsets people. The Police Service relies on information and co­
operation, going back to community policing. I f  everybody below the age o f 
21 who can drive was turned over at monotonous intervals for no good
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reason, that’s hardly a way o f creating a climate in which those people as they 
get older will actually talk to us, and give us the information which we need to 
function properly. (R. 31).
Nonetheless, people from certain social groups are ‘turned over’ at 
monotonous intervals and most of them would claim this was for no good reason. 
The available data show considerable disproportionality in the level of stops and 
searches recorded by the police. Using the quantitative data from the Statistics on 
Race and the Criminal Justice System published under Section 95 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 to illustrate the disproportionate use of the powers of stops and 
search it is clear that recorded stops and searches show significant bias in the use of 
the power. I have chosen to set the figures out in tabular form to show differences 
between different ethnic groups, because it highlights the disparity more starkly than 
would have been the case by describing it. I chose the police recorded figures that 
showed the use of the powers around the time I would have been conducting the 
fieldwork.
Table 15. S op and searches of persons in 1997/98 relative to population
1997/98 -  Stop and Search
Ethnic Group All % MPS % City
White 818,939 81.00 199,304 59.10 2,372 67.30
Black 110,890 11.00 89,068 26.40 570 16.20
Asian
Other
Not Known
54,646 5.40 31,765 9.40 370
9,528 0.90 5,905 1.80 122
17,530 1.70 11,279 3.30 91
10.50
3.50
2.50
Total 1,011,533 100.00 337,339 100.00 3,525 100.00
Estimated population aged 0 and over
Ethnic Group All White Black Asian Other Total
Numbers-All 45,453,800 42,918,200 779,200 1,221,400 534,900
-All 94.40* 1.70* 2.70* 1.20* 100.00
Numbers-MPS 6,573,400 5,319,000 494,600 484,100 275,700
% - MPS 80.90* 7.50* 7.40* 4.20* 100.00
Numbers-City 
% - City
4,700 4,400
92.70* 0.90*
100
2.40*
200
4.00* 100.00
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Table 16. Stop and searches of persons in 1998/99 and estimated 
population figures. _____________________
1998/99 -  Stop and Search
Ethnic Group All % MPS % City %
White 865,484 83.40 182,032 61.50 1,604 61.00
Black 94,774 9.10 73,880 25.00 489 18.60
Asian 51,305 5.00 27,627 9.30 304 11.60
Other 10,042 1.00 5,040 1.70 117 4.50
Not Known 15,666 1.50 7,493 2.50 113 4.30
Total 1,037,271 100.00 296,072 100.00 2,627 100.00
Estimated population aged 1( 1 and over
Ethnic Group All White Black Asian Other
Numbers- All 45,722,900 43,215,900 797,800 1,223,400 485,700
% - All 94.50* 1.70* 2.70* 1.10* 100.00
Numbers-MPS 6,635,800 5,465,700 498,200 431,000 240,900
% - MPS 82.40* 7.50* 6.50* 3.60* 100.00
Numbers-City 4,700 4,300 # 100 200
% - City 92.60* 0.90* 2.40* 4.00* 100.00
Table 17. Stop and searches of persons in 1999/2000 and estimated 
population figures. _____________________
1999/20 -  Stop and Search
Ethnic Group All % MPS % City %
White 697,067 85.20 107,142 60.10 1,066 58.40
Black 66,787 8.20 47,968 26.90 302 16.50
Asian 36,199 4.40 16,102 9.00 209 11.50
Other 7,538 0.90 3,042 1.70 105 5.80
Not Known 10,612 1.30 4,026 2.30 143 7.80
Total 818,203 100.00 178,280 100.00 1,825 100.00
Estimated population aged 1( »and over
Ethnic Group All White Black Asian Other
Numbers- All 46,028,500 43,496,300 807,500 1,233,700 491,100
% - All 94.50* 1.70* 2.70* 1.10* 100.00
Numbers-MPS 6,743,400 5,554,300 506,300 437,900 244,800
% - MPS 82.40* 7.50* 6.50* 3.60* 100.00
Numbers-City 5,400 5,000 # 100 200
% - City 92.60* 0.90* 2.40* 4.00* 100.00
(Details taken from Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System. A Home Office publication 
under section 95 o f  the Criminal Justice Act 1991.) [*-I have rounded these figures to the first decimal 
place. #-Fewer than 50]
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What is the likelihood of being stopped if you are a black or Asian person? 
Using these figures supplied by Forces to the Home Office, we get the following:
Table 18. Likelihood of being stopped within and outside London.
Y e ar-1997/98 Black & Asian Asian Black
All 4 2 6.5
Within MPS 2 1 3.5
Within City 8 4 18
1998/99
All 3 2 5
MPS 2 3 3
City 9 5 20
1999/00
All 3 1.5 5
MPS 2.5 1.5 3.5
City 8.5 4 18
These figures represent the number of people within the particular ethnic group that are stopped 
compared to the number of people from the ethnic group in the population in that area.
These figures illustrate the level of disparity in the recorded use of section 1 
PACE powers by the police since 1996. Officers must have reasonable suspicion 
before they can use the section 1 PACE power, whereas none is need before an officer 
can stop and search someone under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, for 
example. Officers must reasonably suspect that someone had committed an offence 
on had something on them that they could use to commit and offence, or were 
carrying an offensive weapon (PACE Codes of Practice Code A). The Codes 
stipulate that reasonable suspicion could not be formed based on a person’s ethnicity, 
age or from the fact that he had previous convictions. Therefore, officers should have 
some objective grounds before stopping and searching a person under the section 1 
PACE power. If officers were using this power appropriately then it would be 
reasonable to infer that one reason why significantly more black were stopped and 
searched is because they are more crime prone.
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Graphic as these figures are, they do not give any indication of the reasons 
why black and Asian people are stopped and searched so much more that white 
people by the police, or at least why their stops and searches are recorded more. As 
mentioned above one commentator has offered ‘racial profiling’ as a reason, which is 
exacerbated by the external pressures on the police to attain performance targets. He 
argues that police officers are not inherently racist or bigoted in their application of 
the powers available to them; the disproportionality comes through the instrumental 
requirements of modem day police work (Cashmore 2000).
Another explanation why the disproportional stops of black and Asian people 
might not be due to individual prejudice practised by officers is based on the 
population ‘available’ to be stopped and searched, at the times officers have the 
opportunities to carry out proactive work (MVA 2000, FitzGerald 1999). This view 
of the ‘attendant circumstances’ was expressed by some of my respondents, for 
example:
That's something I've done some research on myself on in this Force, the year 
before last. It is the case in this Force, where the ethnic minority groups are 
clearly, take — [a town] for example, I  think the proportion o f the ethnic 
minority groups is about 5 or 6% of the population, but they're concentrated 
in certain areas of the town. Now if you look at the stop search statistics, 
what you're finding is in certain parts o f the town at certain times o f the day, 
the searches will reflect a higher level o f searches o f ethnic minorities than 
they would whites. Now that was sort o f a concern for us in this Force and we 
wanted to find out, well why was that the case, and I think what you find is you 
can't just look at statistics and say, ‘well the police have differentiated 
between white and black' whatever, you've got to look at the attendant 
circumstances, and if you look at the location and you say, well okay there are 
some stop searches, but they're in this area where crime is going on and the 
majority o f the people in that area are from an ethnic background, then 
equally you could say, over on this other estate where there are many 
members o f the ethnic minorities, they're predominantly white. So, you know, 
I think you've got to look at the location and you've got to look at the times 
when it's being done, you've got to take into account all sorts o f other factors.
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For example, in — [a town], they've got night-clubs, seven night-clubs and 
there are members o f the ethnic minority groups coming from all round the 
Midlands to the night-clubs, from Coventry and Birmingham and so on. So, 
you get a highly artificial situation in a very localised part o f the town, where 
for a few hours into the night the numbers are far greater because you've got 
people moving in. They go back when the nightclubs shut, but people are 
being stopped and searched. So I think you 've got to look at all the factors. Is 
it the resident population? Where is the location? To what extent are the 
figures affected by a transient population? There's are all sorts o f reasons 
why that is. Coming back to your question whether or not it's a, as I  
understood it it's a tactic that the police should adopt. I  would say that 
providing it could be justified and it has to be justified, then I would say, and 
it's explained to the public why we're doing what we're doing, then it's a 
legitimate tactic. (R. 17).
The practice of telling people the reason why they have been stopped and 
conducting the stops in a sensitive and dignified way helps alleviate any mistrust that 
the person stopped might have about the encounter. Stone and Pettigrew (2000) 
found in their research that for those respondents that had positive experiences of 
being stopped, the stops were characterised by:
• “being given an acceptable reason for the stop;
• where the officers were polite;
• where the stop did not last a long time; and
• where people did not feel unfairly targeted.”
These are not difficult issues to grasp, for the police, senior or junior officers. 
In reality, police officers recognise and articulate the ‘proper’ way to police particular 
criminogenic groups and the responsibilities on the junior and senior ranking officers 
to ensure propriety:
I  suppose there's a possibility, but it's the delicate balance isn't it? It's 
obviously in relation to ethnic minorities, and some instances there's a 
possibility that one particular area o f committing offences, it was Sir Paul
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Condon*s attack on street muggings where he was saying that they were 
predominantly carried out by young black males. So on that basis they would 
concentrate their work in that area. It*s a very dodgy way, I  can understand 
why he’s doing it and I  would support what he’s saying, but it’s got to be done 
in a very, very sensitive way because the vast majority o f that community, 
young Afro-Caribbean males, are law abiding and you’ve got to be very 
careful that you’re not sending the wrong message to officers that everybody 
from this particular group has got to be a young black mugger. I f  the 
intelligence dictates that the offenders are from this group, then obviously 
we’ve got to look at that, but it’s got to be done in a very, very careful way 
because what you might find you’re doing is antagonising an element o f our 
society that are essentially law abiding people. Just by sort o f sectioning them 
as being, because they’re black, because they’re young, because they’re Afro- 
Caribbean, they must be a street mugger, which is something, and it’s 
important for senior management to ensure that our officers that go out on the 
street go out with that clearly in their mind. It is difficult, but there are always 
elements in this country that will jump on the bandwagon and accuse the 
police o f being racist and we’re by no means perfect, they’re obviously 
elements in the police service who do behave in a racist manner. It is for us as 
managers to make sure that we rip them out, we don’t tolerate it, but we’d be 
naive to say that it doesn’t happen. Any senior officer who says it doesn’t 
happen is kidding himself or herself. So it’s just making sure that if we 
targeting a particular crime, it matters not whether they’re black, white or 
yellow. I f  the intelligence dictates that the offences in the main are being 
committed by this section, then we would be wrong not to direct it towards it, 
but we need to direct it with a very clear mind that you can’t just say because 
they’re from this label you’re offenders. (R. 19).
The responsibility should not end with recognising, and perhaps agonising 
over, the problem, if that is how it is seen. It should extend to doing something about 
it to reduce or, preferably, eliminating it:
It’s difficult because we have, in the one section here, we have 20%, no it’s not 
only that, in actual fact it’s approaching 30%, o f the population that are
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ethnic. And we did a stop search study about 18 months ago and we found 
that disproportionately the numbers o f blacks being stopped searched were 
greater on a percentage basis o f a population than the whites. When we 
looked at it we discovered out o f the ones we stopped from the ethnic 
community, the number arrested were way up in comparison to the number of 
whites we arrested, not arrested stopping, stopping. Now balanced against 
this, and again we have to be so careful, apart from this section which is the 
South o f the Division, we’ve got the town centre. — [A town] particularly, 
has got a public order problem in relation to the clubs and the proximity and 
number o f clubs. We have something like eight, nine clubs all chucking out at 
lam in the morning, and there’s thousands upon thousands. Now the point 
I ’m making is this, linking it back to what we were talking about, that people 
who attend these clubs come from all over, and we get a lot o f the people who 
are stopped and searched who are visiting the club, they’re not from — [a 
town], they’re from Bristol, they’re from Slough, they’re from Cardiff. And a 
number o f the people who are stopped searched up in the town centre are from 
the ethnic community, known people from outside o f the area. And it bumps 
the number; it bumps disproportionately the numbers. We can weigh up and 
say, well hang on that shouldn’t matter, they’re from the ethnic community 
whatever. But we see it as a different problem up in the town centre than we 
do down there. Now, I have a concern about us dealing with the ethnic 
community in a different way to those that we treat the whites. So when I 
came here, when I came back to the Division and took over, I  got hold of the 
full time project leader from GREC and asked him to come in and do some 
work with us, and Manny came in and did a number o f briefing presentations. 
Talking through the problems o f prejudice what have you and dealing with 
people. What we have done as a Division, I ’ve got two sergeants who have 
been to Turvey. I  got them to do a full time full week’s course with the officers 
in this section, based on Turvey, on the problems of dealing with the ethnic 
community. And we’ve linked in with that the project worker from the present 
GREC. At the same time as doing that we’ve set up, and this is only in two 
months, three months, we’ve set up within the Division a multi-agency forum 
for dealing with racial harassment. Not that we see it as a problem, but to get 
an objective view o f the way we are dealing with harassment. So yes I  think
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the argument could be levelled, going back to the original question, the 
argument could be levelled at us that we do stop disproportionately the ethnic 
community in relation to whatever, but we try to address that as an 
organisation and as a Division, by taking them through the problems of 
prejudice and how they should, and we're going to see what happens after 
that. (R. 30).
The importance of disproportional policing, with the police occupying the 
‘gate keeping’ end of the criminal justice system, is that the unfavourable bias created 
by the police is exacerbated by the activities of other agents in the system as members 
of the particular social group are processed by them. One of the outcomes is that the 
criminal justice process creates a feedback loop with people from a particular social 
group: The greater number of convictions of people from the social group provides 
evidence and justification for increased stops, searches and arrests of members of that 
group:
I  was actually present when the Lord Chief Justice spoke to a group of the 
Race Issues Advisory Committee at — [a town], some time ago, when he made a very 
valid point that if discrimination occurs at the point o f service delivery, that's where 
the constable interacts with the individual, what tends to happen is that distortion is 
amplified as you go through the Criminal Justice system. Therefore, is there is a 
discriminatory tendency, then it will result in a larger proportion of a particular 
group within the relation gaining criminal records and things o f that sort. And, 
therefore, police officers say, well hold on, that's a criminal group, and they would 
then focus their attention more on that particular group and o f course you get a 
spiral, which results in an increasing tendency for that particular group to become 
criminalized, as against other groups. Now heaven forbid that process should start to 
occur in — [a county], but that is the way I could see it happening. And so the 
essence o f it all and we are actually tackling this within the Quality Service 
Management Group, which came out o f the ACPO and CRE joint document, that was 
published a couple o f years ago. We're tackling the whole issues through that group 
and trying to look at the statistics and the trends to avoid that particular chain o f 
events developing.. (R. 32).
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Discussion.
Crime is a problem for the police service not only because they are one of the 
recognised social institutions with a mandate to deal with it, but because the police 
have linked their efficiency, effectiveness and professional integrity in a direct way to 
the solution of crime. They have done this by making crime a core function of their 
activities and claiming a direct cause and effect on the level of crime with the number 
of officers on the beat. This claim has so often been expressed that other agents in the 
criminal justice system have repeated the same claims in their official capacity. For 
example, in sentencing a young man who had been caught and attacked by the owner 
of a car he was trying to steal, Judge Hubert Dunn is quoted as describing the case as 
“the perfect example of what happens when there are not enough police on the street” 
(The Times, 24 May 2001).
A general problem with crime is that it is a protean term. Not only does it 
mean different things to different people but also it can mean different things to the 
same people at different times. The types of crime and level of opprobrium 
associated with their commission can change with changes in the moral tolerance of 
society. A contemporary example is the offence of drink drive. A decade or two ago 
the drunken driver was more likely to be viewed generally as the victim and the police 
officer who stopped them as the villain. Today, drivers who drink and drive are 
judged far more severely by society.
My respondents appeared very much in tune with the contemporary moral and 
social problems facing society at the time of my fieldwork. In fact, some of these 
problems, such as the misuse of illegal drugs, have been brought into sharper focus 
and more time, effort and resources have been directed by central government in the 
intervening years into resolving them.
However, as with society in general, and the police service in particular, my 
respondents exhibited some discomfort around the issue of disproportionality in the 
targeted policing of some social groups. This again is another subject that has been 
brought into sharper focus since I conducted my fieldwork, with the publication of the 
Report by Sir William McPherson into the murder of the black teenager Stephen 
Lawrence. The police are doing a lot of work around the subject of race specifically,
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and diversity generally. However, the often expressed views by senior officers that 
the service has carried out a great deal of positive work which is claimed to have 
brought about real changes in police practices can often appear to be no more than 
platitudes. The reality is that when scrutinised the changes appear superficial: Police 
culture, be it that of the managers or the rank and file, remains stable and powerful.
It is unfortunate that it took the tragic death of a young man to return the 
police to a journey they were forced to start nineteen years previously with the 
publication of the Report by Lord Scarman into the riots in Brixton and other inner 
city areas in the summer of 1981. Though his suggestions to the police on ways of 
improving relations with certain groups in society were not revolutionary, sadly, 
nineteen years later Sir William has had to repeat very similar suggestions.
The circumstances that led to the inquiry by Lord Scarman centred round 
order maintenance, while those that led to the inquiry by Sir William centred round 
crime investigation. However, the police functions of crime control and order 
maintenance are not exclusive; one affects the other and in practice it is not always 
easy to distinguish which one the practitioner is pursuing.
Crime and its control are challenging problems for society in general and the 
police in particular, and this point was expressed by my respondents in our discussion 
of the different causes and solutions to crime. The views expressed by my 
respondents were highly sophisticated compared to those of senior officers from 
previous generations. They showed a good deal of theoretical and sociological 
awareness of the difficulties of finding solutions to the causes and effects of crime in 
this particular case, and other contemporary social problems in general. The style and 
content of the language used in the explanation and discussion of the topics reflected 
that used in academic social science discourse. The importance of this observation is 
that the contemporary language of my respondents is in marked contrast to those used 
by senior officers interviewed for other studies, where although they displayed some 
awareness of the sociology of policing the language used was more strident and the 
explanations comparatively simpler (Reiner 1991).
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However, this greater theoretical and sociological awareness of my 
respondents on matters of police efficiency and effectiveness, in this case 
concentrating on crime, does not appear to have been translated into operational 
practices when judged by police figures of stops and searches.
Here is the rub; my respondents’ outlook and the language they used are 
relatively more sophisticated in comparison to previous studies of senior police 
managers. They point to some collective group development and advanced 
professional maturity and thinking. This could reasonably be interpreted as a 
modification to a changing contemporary social environment, rather than a rigid 
adherence to old habits, ways of thinking and responding to challenges. In short, it is 
tempting to assert that contemporary senior managers were more flexible and 
adaptable to the demands placed on them. However, if the effectiveness of the 
perceived new flexibility and adaptability were judged in terms of change of 
operational practice on the ground, for example, using the data on stop and search, 
then the flexibility and adaptability appears presentational rather than changes in basic 
underlying assumptions. In essence what seems like a chameleon-like change in 
reality looks more like a dinosaur-like adherence to old ways of operating cloaked in a 
superficial chameleon-like exterior.
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Chapter 9
PUBLIC ORDER. 
INRODU CTION.
In contemporary police discourse 1981 was to public disorder what 1983 was to 
managerial accountability in the police service. There were seminal enquiries into the 
events that sparked the disorders in 1981, and reports in 1983 highlighting concerns 
about the adequacy of police managerialism. In both areas, these proved pivotal in 
bringing about changes in the style and form of service delivery.
In 1983, the police service received Home Office Circular 114, which is 
generally accepted as the introduction of the principles of New Public Management 
into the police. This Circular ‘offered’ a new option to senior police managers on 
how to manage their resources, primarily in a more business-like way. The principles 
contained in Circular 114/83 have been developed over the years and are today 
reflected in the current public sector management initiative that is also being applied 
to the police: The Best Value regime.
The incidents of public disorder in 1981 were a watershed in contemporary 
discussion of the policing of public disorders. The report by Lord Scarman (1986) 
into the most publicly known of the many incidents of public disorder that occurred in 
various parts of the country in 1981, the Brixton Disorders, was an influential one, on 
many levels. The collective disorders in Brixton in 1981 are used as the standard to 
which all other major public disorders are compared in contemporary police 
discourse.
The disorders occupy one end on a continuum of different levels and 
seriousness of public disorders. At the other end is the relatively low-level, low- 
intensity types of disorder involving small groups, euphemistically referred to as 
middle Englanders, that publicly express their disapproval of certain public policy 
decisions on environmental or animal welfare matters, such as the export of live veal.
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Also occupying this lower end of the continuum are the local Saturday night, 
Sunday morning skirmishes that occurred regularly in most major city centres in the 
‘80s when nightclubs turned out. However, these types of incidents seemed to cause 
more angst for the government and the police. As Fielding observes, “Public disorder 
need not be riotous to provoke official hand-wringing”. For example, “When police 
clashed with drunken youths in large numbers in 1987, and an early conflict was in 
the Home Secretary’s constituency, Ministers perceived an increasing problem of 
drink-related violence in semi-rural towns, and ordered research. They had in mind 
the incident at Crowborough where 200 youths ‘ran amok’ after being asked to leave 
a wine bar, the riot of 170 youths in Lincoln in 1987, and the battle of two gangs in 
High Wycombe over New Year 1988. ACPO reported that there were 251 incidents 
of public disorder involving 36,300 people in 1987, and that alcohol featured in 90 per 
cent.”
Predictably, “The commissioned Home Office research revealed that rather 
than affluent ‘yuppie yobboes’ the mayhem was caused by the usual suspects: young, 
poorly educated workers in low-status jobs” (Fielding 1991: 111). Today the issues 
remain essentially unchanged, although the causes are attributed to binge drinking. 
These low level, low intensity types of disorders are in contrast to the major large- 
scale disorders that used to occur regularly at events such as Notting Hill Carnival.
The stereotypical police view of particular demonstrators is sometimes 
reflected in the ease or discomfort with which they deal with different types of 
demonstrations. In essence, it is arguable that the tactics the police adopt to contain 
and control major disorders are tailored to reflect the social make-up of the 
demonstrators. However, this is not as straightforward as it appears, because when 
groups of demonstrators do not conform to the police’s stereotypical image of them, 
this can lead to public censure and disapproval of the police where they have 
mistakenly adopted ‘routine’ tactics to deal with the disorder. In this sense alone, the 
policing of public disorder can be a complex and thorny problem for senior managers.
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CONTROLLING DISORDER.
The police control and management of public disorder have changed significantly 
over the years. (Reiner 1997). The managerial control of incidents of disorder is a 
relatively more complex exercise today, partly because senior managers are now 
better trained and they are often specialists in public order management and control. 
Additionally, the management of disorders is more challenging because senior 
managers need more than operational and tactical skills and knowledge to deal with 
such incidents. They need constantly to be aware of the ease and speed at which their 
performance could be transmitted nationally and internationally which could 
influence the occurrence of similar incidents elsewhere. My respondents recognised 
some of the pit falls. For example, take this typical response from one of them to the 
question of whether policing public disorder was much more difficult for the police 
now than in the past.
Yes, I  would say that it is, and again I think that it's partly because there isn't, 
undoubtedly, there isn't the sort o f same respect for the police as there was 
many years ago. And also I think we are far more under the microscope than 
we were some years ago, and rightly so. You know, I'm not arguing against it, 
but I  think that some o f the ways that maybe we controlled or we maintained 
public order a few years ago wouldn't be tolerated now. Certainly if you look 
back to the Trafalgar Square riots and you saw the behaviour o f some o f the 
police officers there, you can see that, you know, we are a more disciplined 
organisation than we were then; our tactics are certainly far improved. (R. 
16).
As indicated above, although senior managers and officers under their charge 
are better trained to deal with major disorders, nonetheless the control of public 
disorder is not a simple process, for a number of reasons. One of these is that policing 
incidents of public disorder is a morally ambiguous activity. For example, contrasting 
the difference between policing crime with public order, Waddington explains that, 
“the criminal occupies a position outside the moral community, whereas protestors, 
pickets and possibly even rioters may be considered the moral equals of other 
citizens,” which can lead to the situation “when police battle with protestors and
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rioters, not only are they likely to be physically injured, the police organisation is also 
likely to suffer harm” (Waddington 2000: 156).
Another reason, alluded to above, is that different groups of people who are 
demonstrating against different causes, uses different means to do so, which can result 
in the display of different levels of violence against the police. An example would be 
the ‘environmental’ demonstrations that took place in Newbury, Berkshire and at 
Manchester Airport during ‘80s and early 90s. Nonetheless, regardless of the type of 
disorder the police are called to control, tactically their response might be very 
similar. This could be due to their adoption of standardised methods that have been 
formulated over time as they gained more knowledge and experience through dealing 
with more incidents. That said, despite the adoption of standardised procedures, such 
as the conflict resolution model to deal with both low and high level incidents of 
disorder, the police still experience difficulties in policing disorders. Recent incidents 
have included the disorders in Oldham and Bradford in the summer of 2001, and the 
anti-globalisation protest in central London in May 2001, where the police tactic was 
to corral everyone in the vicinity of the main protestors for several hours. Although 
this tactic proved very effective in preventing serious damage to property and a 
repetition of the scenes that were witnessed in the City of London in June 1999 during 
another anti-globalisation demonstration, the Metropolitan Police Service was 
criticised by some civil liberties groups (Daily Telegraph, 3 March 2001).
This difficulty with trying to use a single standardised method to police 
different types of demonstrations and demonstrators was highlighted by one of my 
respondents in his reply to the question of whether public disorder was more difficult 
to deal with now than in the past:
It depends on what sort o f scale you're at. The majority o f public disorder in 
this country emanates from drink related offences, late at night on town 
centres where officers, by the demands upon them are probably not there in 
the numbers that they've been in the past. I've always felt, there can be two 
reactions really, it's the delicate balance. The hefty police presence can 
sometimes provoke a response from the public, in the fact that they find it 
provocative and they take you on. Resources on the ground where they're
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under strength, can also provoke a response and they think, we can do this 
and get away with it. It's the delicate balance where you’re strong on the 
ground, sending the message that, look we don’t want to stop you from 
enjoying yourself, but if you do do anything wrong, there’s enough o f us here 
to deal with you. When you move to the higher echelons o f public disorder, 
this is very, very difficult, because there are many people looking at you, how 
you behave, you’ll be videod, because they’ll be video cameras from the press. 
The size that are demonstrating in large-scale public disorder come equipped 
with their video cameras. So they’re watching everything that we do, then it’s 
the delicate balance of dealing with it professionally, using the force that’s 
reasonable in the circumstances and not being seen to do anything that’s 
inappropriate. (R. 19).
Both the City of London and the Metropolitan Police were accused by some 
sections of the public and the media for using inappropriate methods to deal with the 
large-scale anti-globalisation demonstrations that took place on their respective 
policing areas. The City force allowed the demonstrators too much freedom, which 
enabled them to cause serious damage to property in the City, while the Metropolitan 
Police treated everyone within the vicinity of the demonstration as a homogenous 
mass. Although they prevented the level of damage and chaos that occurred in the 
City, they were nevertheless still judged to have got it wrong (Financial Times, 3 
March 2001).
Operational control.
The two incidents highlighted above occurred some years after I interviewed my 
respondents. Nonetheless, the topic of public disorder would have been prominent in 
their minds at the time of the interviews. In more recent times there had been rioting 
on the streets of London in 1990 (the anti-poll tax riots), and in Brixton in 1995. With 
these events still fresh in the memories of my respondents, combined with the 
experience and learning from the industrial disputes in the 1970s and major public 
disorders in the 1980s, and the increased regularity of training, it was not surprising 
for them to suggest that the policing of public disorder was more sophisticated and 
measured now than simply being either more or less difficult to deal with.
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Developments in policing contemporary local, large-group disorders.
My respondents consistently expressed the view that the policing of public disorder 
was not more difficult now than in the past, rather that it was different. For fear of 
getting lost in the semantics of describing the contemporary problems with policing 
public disorder, I ought to stress that my respondents held the view that there was 
some difficulty with policing public disorder, but the difficulty did not arise directly 
from what the police did but from how they did it. For example, it would not have 
mattered that officers in riot gear physically removed demonstrators blocking a 
carriageway, but when those demonstrators were middle aged, middle class members 
of society whose physical appearance one would not normally associate with 
violence, then the police’s actions were often censured by the media. This could be 
explained by the moral ambiguity the police face when policing public order, which 
was highlighted by Waddington (2000). He contrasts the different moral positions of 
the criminal and protester, explaining that “the criminal occupies a position outside 
the moral community, whereas protesters, pickets and possibly even rioters may be 
considered the moral equals of other citizens.” (Waddington: 156). The policing of 
pubic order is further complicated where protesters are doing so for a moral purpose. 
For example, “The series of confrontations that took place during early 1995 between 
police and protesters aiming to halt the export of live animals to Continental Europe 
illustrates the general point” (ibid). The sight of officers using heavy-handed tactics 
to remove protesters from blocking the free passage of the lorries used to export 
livestock led to the police being accused of partiality in controlling the protesters. 
Typically my respondents explained the difficulties inherent in policing public 
situations today as follows,
In practical terms no, we've never been better equipped or trained to deal with 
disorder and we are very effective at it, or we can be if we choose to be, if we 
deploy properly and so on. But as to whether it is more acceptable now than in 
the past, I  guess in some ways it has always been a dilemma for us, you know, 
again thinking historically, our interventions have always been welcomed. But 
experience in this county has been, this is where we're dealing with what we might 
call the middle classes or middle England, and with the Animal Rights protest at 
[a port town].
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We really were under the cosh really because again middle class values were 
applied and middle class assumptions were made about things like if it's middle 
England down here protesting therefore we must be right. I f  it was them down the 
road, that would be different. But we're middle England and we pay your wages, 
why is it you're moving us on, even though what they was doing was clearly 
unlawful, clearly undemocratic and so on. We really, that is a problem, so when 
we are in conflict with the middle class on what we might call middle class issues, 
you know Animal Rights and so on.
It does present us with, I  don't know whether they are new difficulties. (R. 1).
It is a truism that over the years the police service has developed more effective 
and sophisticated equipment with which to police public disorders. Some of these 
more aggressive looking equipment may have exacerbated certain situations and led 
to accusations of over-reaction (Northam 1988). At the individual level officers are 
much better instructed to follow a systematic and incrementally forceful sequence of 
actions to deal with low level local public disorders. Officers have new, different and 
more effective equipment, some of which, inadvertently, have turned out to be 
extremely effective deterrents to those who may have physically confronted them in 
the past. In this respect the sight and sound of officers rachetting an ‘ASP’ (the 
extendable metal batons made by Armament Systems and Procedure Inc., which have 
replaced the wooden truncheon in some Forces) to ready it for use has had a salutary 
effect on would be demonstrators.
The individual officer with his array of new equipment, such as the long-handled 
baton (an alternative to the ASP); pepper spray; and Quik-kuffs, is much better 
equipped now to deal with disorderly behaviours. Collectively, the militaristic style 
of training given to groups of officers working in teams, gives them the appearance of 
a well-drilled, well-organised units that are better managed and controlled under 
‘superior’ command to deal with most situations. (Waddington 2000). My 
respondents consistently expressed the view that the much better equipment and 
training that officers now received had made the operational aspect of public order 
policing easier. For example,
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No I don't think so, it's different. We've just gone through the introduction of 
the Asp, and introducing a conflict management continuum which starts from 
talking to them, and working up and down the continuum depending on how 
people behave; distancing yourself from some. Now we are better equipped to 
handle today's problems than we have been for a long time in my view. So I 
don't think it’s any more difficult, I think it's changed. Quite clearly if you 
looked at the bigger public disorder scenarios, we are far better equipped now 
to deal with those than we were before, what I'm saying is that we're better 
equipped than we've ever been. We're certainly, speaking for I, I  am certainly 
more aware than I  was twenty years ago about the dynamics o f being with 
people, non-verbal communications, about distance, about the sorts o f 
problems that officers can get into, about the different options, tactical options 
and strategic options we now have right the way from talking to people, right 
the way up to actually calling out an ARV [Armed Response Vehicle] and 
Tactical Firearms Team to deal with a situation. (R. 3).
Not all my respondents shared the view that policing public disorders had 
become easier operationally. Those that thought that it was more difficult now 
offered a number of reasons why this was so. However, a common reason expressed 
by most of them concerned the media. They held the view that the media reported 
public disorders more often now, and coupled with their perception that some 
demonstrators were skilled at using the media to their advantage, this made policing 
these events more challenging and demanding. For example,
It's probably more difficult. It's more difficult because more and more people 
I  think are prepared to protest to try and get what they see isn’t right. So 
some people protest for the right reason, some to try and gain what they can't 
legally get, and the other factor which makes it more difficult is media 
attention. A lot o f protest groups are very skilled with media use and so now if 
a bobby goes up even to a local dispute, where there is for example one man 
protesting outside a supermarket because he was sold a bad joint o f beef or if 
we go to afield where two or three gypsy caravans have arrived and 
apparently broken down a gate to get access, when the bobby arrives to deal 
with it, if I'd  have arrived as a bobby years ago, I ’d have arrived, been
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confronted with the situation, had time to think about it, talk to those involved, 
make up my mind or seek advice. These days when a bobby gets there, he’s 
just as likely to be there at the same time or after a television reporter or a 
local radio station or a cameraman and that actually makes his job tougher 
because he can’t have private conversations. I f  he takes any actions it’s going 
to get recorded or broadcast or photographed and that can be shown out of 
context, or again it may just intimidate him, so in some ways it’s easier, some 
ways it’s tougher. (R. 7).
National large-scale disorder.
The problems that beset officers at the local level are the same that affects a Force, or 
Forces working together through mutual aid, at a national level. The media interest 
remains problematic. However, according to my respondents there are additional 
factors at this level, such as the fact that demonstrators are more aware of the law and 
their rights, and, like the general public, are less deferential to authority and authority 
figures.
I  think it probably is and I  would say that’s largely down to a better-informed, 
more intellectual type o f protester if you want to put it like that. People now 
are far more aware o f their rights, they know what they can do, what they 
can’t do and the media are more inclined to follow demonstrations now. Look 
what’s happening in Newbury and elsewhere, which the police didn’t really 
have to contend with too much in the past I  suspect, the Miners’ strike was 
again, and the Wapping dispute, which really brought public demonstration 
and public disorder into National focus, and I think it has made it more 
difficult but it’s also meant that the police have had to respond more 
professionally than we’ve done in the past. So I  think the answer to the 
question is, yes, it is more difficult now, but I  think we’re better trained and 
we’re better equipped to deal with it. (R. 17).
I  think it’s made more difficult by the nature o f protest now, the sort o f middle 
classisation o f protests; Newbury, Animal Lib., that sort o f thing makes, has 
turned it away from the Miners’ strike sort o f policing issues, into other type 
of people. We do 70-odd year old people who have never ever been in trouble
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with the police before suddenly find themselves assaulting police officers and 
being locked up. And I  think in that sense it is more difficult for the police 
because there's more variety in it now. (R. 41).
Media response.
Several respondents suggested that the media interest in public disorder was a major 
influencing factor on the nature and outcome of disorder.
I  think we certainly seem to have a more co-ordinated approach now to major 
public disorder than we ever did, but I  don't see that it's any easier or more 
difficult now than it was certainly in my younger day. Or indeed if you go back to 
the early part o f the twentieth century when there were major riots in London. I  
don't think things have changed that much, there will always be public disorder, 
public disquiet, the big issue now I think is that they're far more publicised so 
people are far more aware o f them than they ever were before. (R. 6).
Social consequences.
My respondents’ awareness, gained through professional experience, of some of the 
causes of public disorder, even where some of these had only occurred at a local level, 
was matched by their desire to find solutions to prevent them happening in the future.
No, I  don't think so. I think the nature o f disorder has changed. I f  I  could 
reflect back, 30 years, in that yes there was disorder, there was violence but it 
was perhaps more sporadic and perhaps more based on entertainment for 
want o f a better way o f putting it. Alcohol will also have an issue; it will 
always be there. And there are certain licensed houses and outlets that would 
cause you more problems than another. And even the area where those 
licensed outlets were would always be there. There would always be the 
pressure groups and perhaps policing styles contributing a lot towards the 
public disorder. I think we're far more mindful now o f our actions and how it 
can escalate problems and actually have knock on effect and cause more 
problems for the future. It's not a question o f taking the soft option or treat 
people with kid gloves, we've actually got to think, well if we take a certain 
option and actually police an event or an incident in a certain way, are we
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looking at all the wrangles o f what could be the issues that come out o f it? So 
I  think the two things have moved together. Perhaps the absence o f real 
serious public disorder over the last five years is testimonies to where both 
sides have backed off a little, how much is reality, I  mean, I  look at a 
neighbour o f ours in a particular housing estate, which I've known that estate 
for many, many years, and we still can't police it. Yes, it's always been a 
council estate, parts of it with criminal propensity. Gradually employment, 
social depravation has come about and it flared up, at one stage, which I think 
is a sense o f anxiety, frustration against the whole series o f issues, but really 
when you look at it, the actual disorder was confined to two streets. And 
actually had more to do with the people in those streets than actually the 
issues they were complaining about. So I think the media had a lot to play in 
this as well. You know, things being blown out o f proportion on both sides of 
the equation and I think we are perhaps as a profession, far better to play 
down certain aspects and get our own voice across, like more open with the 
media. (R. 27).
This example raises some parallels with the changes in the way the Notting 
Hill Carnival in London has been policed in recent years. Waddington (1994) 
described how the police managed to exert extensive control over the way Carnival 
was policed by engaging in negotiations with the organisers of the events, local 
authority, local communities and those that they saw as organisers of the protests. 
(Waddington 1994: Ch 4). He suggested that the first imperative of the police was to 
bring the organisers of the demonstration into negotiations, preferably on police 
premises. As soon as the organisers consented to visit police premises the police 
acquired the “home ground advantage.” (ibid: 75). Explaining that being a visitor to a 
police station had many compliance-inducing features. The police were seeking 
maximum control over the event and attempted to persuade the organisers to see the 
wisdom of their viewpoint. The structural setting made the organisers a guest of the 
police in the unfamiliar environment in which movement was controlled. By regular 
meetings with key stakeholders in the process of staging Carnival the police were able 
to gain their ‘consent’ and thereby attained their goal of achieving far more control 
over the event than the law allowed, and did so without risk of review by the courts 
because it was obtained by consent. (Waddington: Ch. 4)
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FREQUENCY AND VIOLENT NATURE OF DISORDERS.
There is a strong temptation to suggest that one reason why police managers found 
public disorders easier to police now than in the past was because incidents of 
disorder occurred more frequentiy, which meant that they had more opportunities to 
practise their tactics and thereby refine and improve them. When I discussed with my 
respondent whether or not incidents of public disorder were occurring more 
frequently now than in the past, again their response was more sophisticated and 
detailed than a simple choice of yes or no.
I don’t believe it is something, which is on a linear scale. I believe it’s 
cyclical and I  think if you go through history we have periods o f time where 
disorder is very common, and then you’ll go into a relatively quiet period o f 
time. So, and I  don’t know where we are in the cycle at the moment but it’s 
something which comes and goes and I don’t think it’s particularly worse now 
than it has been through history. (R. 31).
The last quote was a typical view of my respondents, and pointed up the fact 
that for most of my respondents their perception of the extent of public disorder were 
informed by the general media, because their direct experience of incidents of 
disorder was minimal. They often expressed the view, sometimes apologetically, that 
their Force area was not prone to incidents of serious public disorder. For those that 
did have recent experience or were at the time involved in policing public disorders, 
the types of incidents that they were dealing with were long running ones.
I would say probably not, probably not, I  mean again, you know, I ’m speaking 
from my experience in [a Northern town], and we don’t have much experience 
quite honestly in major public disorder. So I ’m just talking from what I  sort o f 
see in the press and read, but I  don’t think there are, there are one or two sort 
of fringe subversive groups that are extremely violent. I  sort o f think o f the 
SWP and Combat 18 these people, but the British National Party and all those 
real extreme group, but apart from that I think the vast majority o f people are 
fairly reasonable and aren’t prone to violence. The major demonstrations 
we’ve had, you know, the animal rights and all that, apart from the
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involvement o f one or two o f these fringe individuals, most people are passive, 
it's not a violent protest, it's sort o f peaceful passive protest. (R. 25).
Perceptions of violence.
Although they expressed the view that it was difficult to quantify whether or not 
incidents of disorder were occurring more frequently, their perception was that 
although they were sure that incidents of disorder were not occurring more frequently 
people were more likely to use violence now than in the past. For example,
I  think society is more violent, whether that is by virtue o f media influence and 
television, cinema, sort o f also what's available through videos and what have 
you, right from an early age it is the accepted norm, whether that's in fact, 
again I'm not a sociologist, but I  wouldn't discount it. (R. 27).
Yeah, I  mean we get the one to one every Friday and Saturday night as you 
can imagine, that's part o f the culture. But in terms o f large scale, no I don't 
think it has, I  mean we had those peaks didn't we when those inner city, so 
called inner city riots in the early ‘80s, '81 I  think was the peak year. No, I  
mean we've not experienced a lot o f that, in fact we haven't had a lot o f public 
disorder in this area, we've gone on mutual aid to other areas by and large, 
that's our history in my service. I  mean I remember the Springboks tour of 
1969, when South African tourists came over to play in the British Isles and 
there was incredible demonstrations against that, and we went from this Force 
to many Regional Centres, Bristol, Gloucester, I  went myself personally to all 
those places. Swansea, Cardiff, locally in Newport, Ebwvale, you know, in 
response to that, so historically this Force has been one which has supplied 
mutual aid for public disorder rather than have to deploy it locally. I  don't 
think that there is, I  mean it's like the animal business, you know, the live 
exports, we haven't had local problems on that. I  mean the South East and the 
Ports, that's a more difficult one to police in my view, because there you have 
the general public sympathy to the cause of the demonstrators and it's difficult 
for the public to perceive that the police appear to take sides, and say, well 
that the exporters are also acting lawfully so they have a right to be protected,
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so that’s a very difficult one for the Police to market their actions in that. (R. 
29)
The frequency of incidents of disorder may not have increased, but the 
situation with the level and extent of violence used during incidents of disorder was a 
different proposition all together for my respondents. The vast majority of them were 
sure that the level of violence was higher now than in the past.
Their responses were intuitive and the information on which they based their 
answers came from personal knowledge. Even where contemporary incidents were 
compared with past occurrences, the recent incidents came from personal and 
operational experience rather than statistical or academic sources.
The similarity of the examples given and the parameters within which the 
discussion was contained were uncanny. Most of the examples concerned violence 
directed at police officers during small-scale local incidents of disorder, and the most 
frequently mentioned weapon of offence was a knife.
Typical examples included.
Yeah definitely, I  mean we had a situation, we trialled long batons in this town 
purely because o f the level o f assaults on officers. We had some really nasty 
assaults, it was baiting time, every time they got in a large group, they felt safe. 
They felt immune and the officers were approached, two officers were baited 
into the middle and the whole group would close round them and the boots 
and fists would come flying and then all run away, all heroes. They’d given 
the officers a good kicking and they’d be away on their. (R. 9).
Yeah, yeah, we had a lad here I  don’t know how many years ago, but on the 
bridge, just in town Saturday night, sadly we had a young lad stabbed and 
killed and that was just two groups, it wasn’t racial, it wasn’t gang, it wasn’t 
drugs, it was just a couple o f kids, there were 17, 18,16 year olds, two groups 
exchanged derogatory remarks to each other, it just grew, got to the railway 
bridge and the stabbing occurred. I think the degree o f violence is a lot higher 
than it’s ever been before and, I  promise you I won’t get into sort o f folklore
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and war stories, but when I  was a young constable as a probationer, I  could 
stop a car, well I  suppose there was a degree o f being young and foolish and 
not thinking, but it really wasn't an issue then, I  would stop a car with four 
young men in, I  would search the boot and I  never had the powers that we 
have today, but I'd do all that, just by my personality and to some extent the 
uniform would be enough. It wouldn't happen today I'm sure, you'd be 
calling for backup, rightly so, they would be very careful how they dealt with it 
and rightly so. So I am convinced it is a lot more violent than it was when I 
first joined twenty-four years ago. (R. 42).
Even on the rare occasions that some of my respondents explained that 
incidents of disorder were no more violent now than in the past, the way they 
expressed the view was ambiguous. For example,
It's difficult to say, I  think we've been through the mill with this really, going 
right back to things like Grosvenor Square. Yes okay we've had petrol bombs, 
we've had scaffolding poles, we’ve had all sorts o f very, very unpleasant 
treatment o f police officers; televisions dropped off o f balconies, things like 
that. But we seem to have come through it. I  don't think they're particularly 
more violent now, and in some ways I  think because of our expertise and 
undoubted professionalism, because we put a lot o f resources into training 
and indeed equipping, and if you think back to the days o f the St Paul's riots 
when policemen were fending off missiles with milk crates, we've gone on a 
long, long way since then. And we have got our medics, we have got the fire 
extinguishers, we have got the shields, we've got the flameproof clothing. I 
think that investment I  suppose has paid off, even if it is more violent, I  think 
we're in a very, very much better position to deal with it. (R. 45).
Not at this stage, but I'm wondering what the next stage may be. We are I  
think in control again to a certain extent, but that is only for now and whether 
tactics on the opposition side may change in the next riots, certainly I'm 
aware of, we've now covered the petrol bomb situation, they're no longer, 
everybody was worried about petrol bombing. It really isn't a problem 
anymore, when we talk to our Support Units now. They're trained in it, they
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haven't got a problem, but they are worried about certain other areas, they 
are worried about crossbows, things like that and that isn't an area which has 
come to the fore in our public order, but it wouldn't take too many idiots to 
discover that that might be a way of causing us mayhem. (R. 46).
These examples were typical of incidents that occurred at a local level. What 
about large-scale incidents at a national level?
In the, when you're talking about the reactive type o f public disorder, it 
happens in pubs and clubs, it's becoming serious in the way that people are 
generally armed with weapons or either knives or that sort o f thing or with 
firearms. And I  think that's the serious side o f it, and that then brings in the 
vicious element o f it as well. (R. 34).
If the reality was that people were more likely to resort to more violent means 
to achieve their aims then one could reasonably expect the police to adopt a more co­
ordinated, structured and disciplined approach to tackle these types of disorders, 
where weapons were now more likely to be used.
UPPING THE ANTE: TOWARDS A MILITARISTIC STYLE OF POLICING.
The police response to disorder has become more sophisticated, robust and forceful in 
recent years, a trend often described as ‘militaristic’ policing. I posed this proposition 
as a given to my respondents and asked them to speculate why it had occurred. The 
majority agreed that the policing of public order incidents had undergone a gradual 
transformation over the years. Developing from what can best be described as 
organised chaos to well briefed and highly disciplined units. Even when some of my 
respondents questioned the usefulness of the term ‘militaristic’ policing, their 
discussion of my proposal highlighted elements of paramilitarism. For example,
I wouldn't necessarily agree with the statement anyway. I f  you go back to the 
Miners' dispute, taking it back that far and working on from there, I can 
understand why people would call that militaristic because we went there as a 
body o f men, and women, and we could have well looked militaristic in the
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way that we would leave the vehicles and approached things. But equally I  
would say with the sort o f violence that a lot o f them were facing that was the 
right way to do it, it was more professional. (R. 4)
The concept of militaristic policing is not restricted to the physical appearance 
of public order policing units. It extends to the training, organisation and deployment 
of these units of officers that receive regular public order training, as well as other 
groups that only receive intermittent training. As some of those respondents that 
agreed with the proposition explained,
Well I  think it’s inevitably because o f the improved equipment, the improved 
training, it’s everything that we would say is good. And I  think the reality is 
that, back in the early part o f *84, we were undisciplined, relatively ill 
equipped to cope with those sorts o f riots. And, it’s the old thing about what 
sort o f a Police Force do you want? You cannot have a Force, which is well 
equipped, well drilled, and disciplined to respond to that without going down 
the sort o f militaristic route. (R. 16).
Responding to public demand and reacting to the increasingly organised 
tactics of demonstrators is only part of the reason for the police’s development of 
more sophisticated measures to deal with incidents of major disorder.
ACPO’s involvement in guiding the service towards paramilitary policing should not 
be underestimated.
It’s not by accident. It may have occurred simply because we’ve now got, for 
example, an ACPO public order manual which for the first time. I  mean that’s 
been there probably about ten years, but that does set out signs and symptoms 
o f disorder and sets out in different sub-chapters all the sorts o f different 
levels o f response you can think about participating in. So there’s now a 
manual, which lays down all the public order options, plus through, I  referred 
to public order when you asked me about courses. I ’ve done a public order 
commander’s course in Kent, an original one, which I think is compulsory for 
the rank and you do the public order courses and you are taught the options. 
So, I  am now familiar with options. Personally, that perhaps years ago people
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in my position wouldn’t have been. So I  think there’s been a heightened 
awareness. The other change there’s been and this was about 1985, we 
introduced shields for the first time and there was a huge debate about shields 
but we’ve introduced shields, we’ve introduced helmets, fireproof overalls. 
Gradually one thing at a time and we’ve gradually got to the point now where 
officers have actually got good protective equipment. They’re trained in its 
use and in this County we even now put, I  think most Forces do, in each o f the 
response cars we actually have a couple o f smaller shields. So, if officers do 
find themselves in a tough situation, with somebody with a weapon of some 
sort, they’ve actually got some immediate protection. So I certainly think 
there’s been just a gradual escalation where we have responded to the 
heightened public order by better equipment and better training, though I ’d 
say it’s been fairly gradual over the past ten or fifteen years. (R. 7).
In the Background section of the Guide to Public Order Policing Manual 
published by the Association of Chief Police Officers in 1993 it is explained that the 
“original Manual was the product of the Community Disorder, Tactical Options Inter- 
Force Working Group, which was set up by ACPO, with Home Office support, after 
the rioting of the summer of 1981.” And that the “Group’s origins arose from an 
agreed need for some national common minimum standards in public order training.”
It explained that the reason for the Manual was because, “Experience of 
extended industrial disputes, violent demonstrations and serious riots has reinforced 
the knowledge that is such matters the police of England and Wales are mutually 
inter-dependent. The use of Mutual Aid reinforcements to bolster individual Force 
resources to cope with such phenomena has amply illustrated the need for common 
standards in order to enable contingents to operate together with effect. Initially 
recognised in the field of tactics and tactical training, there is now recognition that the 
need for a uniform approach extends also to commonality of terminology, planning 
procedure, command structure, logistics, mobilisation and organisation.”
The Manual encouraged the adoption of a systematic method for dealing with 
incidents of public disorder. The general tenet of the Manual was that incidents of 
disorder usually followed a build up of events until a ‘trigger incident’ hastened the
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act of disorder. This reflects the interpretation by Waddington et al. (1989) of how 
public disorders occurred. For example the Manual offered a model showing the 
theoretical progression of incrementally disorderly activities leading to a pinnacle of 
what it described as ‘Lethal Rioting’: “Normality -  High Tension -  Sporadic
Disorder -  Riot -  Serious Riot -  Lethal Riot” and then decreasing to “Immediate Post 
Disorder -  Community Unrest -  Normality.”
This sociological explanation of the causes and stages of public disorders was 
repeated by some of my respondents. Clearly, a product of similar training received 
by most of them. However, the main reason expressed by the majority of them for the 
sophisticated equipment that officers can now use to police public disorders was the 
need to protect them. As the following quotes illustrate,
Well I  think it's evolved because o f the level o f violence that was shown to the 
police and officers were found to be inadequately protected. You look at, 
started probably with Toxteth and Brixton in 1981, where officers were 
picking dustbin lids to protect themselves and they got more and more police 
issue helmets on and they were being hit on the face, officers in danger of 
being seriously hurt. The trouble is when you move to protective equipment, 
you escalate the situation as well; it's the delicate balance o f how we put that 
on. I  think it's absolutely necessary when we start looking at Health and 
Safety issues, we've got a duty to protect the young men and women that we 
ask to police in difficult situations. In a perfect world, I wouldn't want to see 
officers with shields and Nato helmets and flameproof overalls. But if we’ve 
got to go out to meet violence, where they are petrol bombing and throwing 
bricks at us, then its incumbent on me as a senior manager to make sure my 
officers go out properly trained and properly equipped to meet that. But I  
think as a senior officer and I  think it's seen many times in the demonstrations 
in London, will always start off with officers in normal uniform and we’ll have 
a contingency whereby we’ve got public order equipped officers to respond. 
(R. 19).
Health and safety is one o f the reasons. The emphasis change from trying to 
maintain the traditional Bobbies that have nothing but just a short truncheon
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and your helmet and perhaps little more etc. It was desperate measures in the 
early days in my service. Now the emphasis is very much, oh we have to 
protect our men to the ultimate, it means you are giving longer staffs and 
better handcuffs and more protection etc. And the inevitable result o f that is 
you change how they appear. (R. 23).
I  think the primary is probably officer protection, probably. I f  you’re 
expecting people to be involved in violent confrontations, and particularly 
bear in mind what I ’ve just said about having the usual programme methods, 
you know if there are definite limits to what force or reasonable force we can 
use, we need to have some sort o f protection ourselves to ensure that people 
who are using unreasonable force against us don’t get the upper hand. 
Protective clothing, which is what it is, it’s not aggressive clothing, but it can 
only be accommodated to a certain extent within the traditional uniform, sort 
o f presentation o f an officer. (R. 25).
Self-preservation I think, more than anything else. I f  you put people into 
large-scale conflict, or even smaller conflict actually, might be better 
prepared. I f  it’s not controlled in an objective and rational way, human 
nature will actually allow police officers, they’re no different, to actually go 
over the top. I f  they’re poorly trained, poorly controlled and poorly equipped, 
you ’11 have problems. (R. 27).
In publishing the Guide to Public Order Policing in 1983 ACPO clearly 
recognised that the nature of public protest and demonstration was changing. The 
extent of the change was such that the police needed to make significant and 
fundamental alteration to the way they dealt with public disorder incidents, if they 
were to retain the ‘high ground’. Since the publication of the Manual, it has been 
revised and updated and the service has gained greater knowledge and experience in 
dealing the disorders. To the present day these changes, on both sides, continue as the 
different methods used to police the demonstrations against global capitalism in the 
City of London in 1999 and the Metropolitan Police area in 2001 have shown.
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Although both these demonstrations occurred a long time after I had discussed 
the subject with my respondents, at the time of our discussions they were attuned to 
the changing and evolving nature public conflict and disorder. This is shown by the 
following quotes, which were responses to the question of whether they thought the 
trend of militaristic policing of public disorder would continue.
I regret to say I ’m sure it will. I  mean there*s got to be a point where it stops. 
I*d hate to get to the point where we use water cannons, I*d hate to get to the 
point where we actually had or regularly were using plastic bullets or CS gas 
in riots, but if things don*t calm down from a protestors point of view, then I  
regret there may be. (R. 7).
Regrettably I  do, I  do and I don*t see it as too far off until police officers as a 
routine are carrying firearms, wearing stab-proof vests and all the rest o f it, I  
think it*s regrettable but it will come to that I*m sure o f it. (R. 17).
Yes I  hope it does, because we need to be professional, we have to be very, 
very careful and we see it on the television, we train and train and train, it*s 
when that bloody red mist comes down and please, I haven*t been in any 
situations like they have in London and it must be frightening for the police 
officers but I ’ve seen some o f them flailing on a bloody staffs and whatsits 
round and I think, oh my goodness me, the red, you know, the red mist really 
has come down and once we get to that stage, we’ve lost it. We have to be 
effective, we have to be positive, we have to go forward, but we’ve got to stop, 
we’ve got to train so that bloody red mist doesn’t come down. (R. 30).
As this last quote illustrates, like most of his contemporaries this senior police 
manager believed that it is inevitable that the trend of moving towards a more 
militaristic style of policing of public disorder would continue. However, he 
expressed more overtly the underlying feeling of his colleagues, which was that the 
intention of moving towards this style of public order policing was to reduce the level 
of harm caused to the demonstrators and the police. They saw the increased 
militarisation of public order policing as altruistic.
241
Discussion.
The policing and management of incidents of public disorder has changed 
dramatically over recent years. For the officers that police incidents of disorder their 
training has become more regular, sophisticated and intense. Their equipment, both 
for personal group use, has become more sophisticated and is now more openly 
displayed. For example, the code of dress for officers policing potential public order 
situations is to wear their utility belts with their equipment attached over their 
reflective jackets. This public and overt display of the ‘tools’ with which they can 
quell a disturbance has prevented rather than exacerbated encounters that in the past 
could have developed into incidents of disorder. The improved and structured 
training now given to operational officers, together with the improved and more 
effective equipment with which they can deal with incidents of disorder have made 
the management of such incidents more complex for senior managers.
Although most of my respondents did not have recent operational experience 
of dealing with incidents of major public disorder, they were acutely aware of the 
nature and extent of lower-level incidents of disorder that had occurred in their Force 
area. Part of the reason for this is because some of them would have had to manage 
officers who had either had to deal with local incidents of disorder or suffered as 
victims at the hands of local groups or people that have been engaged in local 
incidents of disorder. Regardless of the means by which they had gained their 
experiences of incidents of public disorder, as a group my respondents had 
accumulated very similar experiences of incidents of public disorder, and through 
their responses to my questions it was evident that they had developed a very similar 
outlook to problems associated with dealing with and managing incidents of disorder. 
The relevance of this for the purpose of this study is that the information gleaned from 
my respondents showed that there had been a substantial amount of common shared 
experiences and learning around the policing of public disorder, which had been 
translated into common language in the way they expressed their views about the 
topic. Clearly, this area of policing has been one that has helped senior police 
managers develop some of the components of a group culture.
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Chapter 10
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, 
INTRODUCTION.
The year of birth and consequently the formative years of my respondents cover a 
period of great social and political change. The oldest was bom in 1942 and the 
youngest in 1958. However, the majority, 57% were bom between 1944 and 1948. 
This means that the social and political conditions that prevailed during the time span 
my respondents were bom were very different. From the austere and difficult social 
conditions of the pre Second World War years to the relatively wealthy, liberal and 
easy-going social conditions of the post war years (Morgan 1989). Over half of them 
were bom during the time of war when their fathers and other able-bodied adult male 
relatives would have been away defending the nation and their mothers, grand parents 
and neighbours would have been experiencing very difficult times coping on limited 
incomes and resources, while still expected to do their bit for the War effort. 
Politically, the situation for the parents of my respondents would have been just as 
difficult and demanding as it was socially.
Although the specific social and political conditions would have been different 
for groups of them, one constant for all them would have been the continuous shift in 
the social and political environment. All would have experienced a similar 
continuous flux in their professional environment during their managerial period in 
the police service.
How would their experience of the different social, political and economical 
conditions of their childhood, coupled with their experience of similar occupational 
backgrounds shape their outlook as professional senior police managers? I explored 
the potential effects of these factors with my respondents by discussing social 
harmony, social inequality and the concept of the rule of law.
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SOCIAL HARMONY.
For the decades of the ‘70s, ‘80s and part of the ‘90s the police service experienced a 
significant amount of social, legal and professional change. Socially, during this 
period there appeared to be continuous social conflict, which was typified by a 
number of major public disorders. In 1976 and 1977 there were serious public 
disorders at the Notting Hill carnival. In 1979, there was the death of Blair Peach 
during a pubic demonstration in Southall. In 1980, there were riots in St Pauls, 
Bristol. In 1981 there were rioting in Toxteth, Liverpool; Brixton, London; and 
Handsworth, Birmingham. In 1984, there was the Miners’ Strike. In 1985, there 
were incidents of serious disorder during the industrial dispute in Wapping, East 
London; serious public disorders in a number of areas in London: Broadwater Farm, 
Tottenham and Brixton.
Legally, the successes that the police service had achieved in convicting the 
Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven and the Birmingham pub bombers were publicly 
and humiliatingly overturned through successful challenges in the early 90s by the 
‘guilty’ perpetrators of these offences at the Court of Appeal. Concerns about the 
integrity of the police service were raised and debated publicly.
These were some of the specific challenges that confronted my respondents as 
they progressed from Bobbies on the beat to senior police managers. More generally, 
both in their social and occupational capacities, they would have grown up in a period 
in history when, “most working class people, the vast majority of the population, 
viewed the years since 1945 as much the best that had been generally known since the 
late-Victorian heyday. Wages rose to 30 per cent above their 1938 level. There were 
higher living standards, guaranteed employment, more satisfying environmental and 
educational facilities” (Morgan 1989: 119). With this backdrop, how did my 
respondents view my assertion that society was more harmonious now than in the 
past?
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Well, a hell o f an assumption about whether it ever was. Trick questions 
there. I  wouldn't have thought that there's been any change. No society is 
harmonious, I  mean that's looking at the past through rose-coloured 
spectacles. Society is and has always been a hotchpotch o f competing 
interests. So I  don't see that as being the case. (R. 1).
Well can I come back with, who says it was a harmonious society? I mean 
have I  got to accept that to start with ?
[No]
You see we're not are we? We've got this United Kingdom o f Great Britain, 
all those bits. We're not harmonious at all are we? We've got Northern 
Ireland who've got a distinct identity. We've got Scotland that has got a 
distinct identity. We've got Wales who are something different, and then if you 
go to Birmingham, that's something different from — . So I've never seen 
that we have been a harmonious society. I  see what's happening, is that it's 
become more apparent that we're not, because o f the communications thing. 
Because it's all there for us to see, and it's splashed across our television 
screens, we are brought into contact with the other, if you like, sort o f sub­
cultures within the country. Far more than we ever were before. I f we go 
back fifty years, someone who lived in — [SE town] had no idea o f what 
happened in Yorkshire, because they didn't have the communications means. 
So I don't think we ever were, and I  don't think we've changed very much. (R. 
5).
Well that assumes that Britain, say, *do you still beat your wife?
That's my response. Used to be a harmonious society? Well I'm not sure 
that’s true. Yeah I mean we were a very class ridden society. I  mean nobody 
would dispute that and can a class-ridden society be a harmonious society? 
People have a very, very simplistic view o f society. I  think the nature of the 
relationships has changed, different things have become more relevant or 
more pertinent. Class probably has become less important, it's still 
important, but less important. Race has become more o f an issue, as has sex, 
no I didn't say gender, sex. So I think the focus has probably changed. (R. 
12).
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Although the majority of my respondents expressed the view that society was 
no more violent today than it was in the past, they were keen to emphasise that there 
was a difference in contemporary society, which made such simple comparison 
unrealistic. For example, with the vastly developed methods of communication it was 
now easier and quicker to convey news of significant events to the populace. 
However, this is not to suggest that there were no tensions in society today, there 
certainly are, and some of these are responsible for creating social divisions.
My respondents were promoted to the position of superintendents during the 
time of the Thatcher governments. In fact they spent a sizeable proportion of their 
time in a managerial position during the period of her different governments, and 
therefore would have been attuned to the legacy of her governments’ social policy 
over the years.
The historian Kenneth Morgan described one of her government’s legacies as 
follows. “In the June 1987 election, despite a vigorous Labour campaign under the 
new leader, Neil Kinnock, the Conservatives again won an easy victory with 375 seats 
as against 229 for Labour and only 22 for a flagging and disintegrating Liberal/Social 
Democrat Alliance...The Conservatives made much in the campaign for their claims 
to have restored national prosperity... However, the regional gulf in Britain revealed 
by the election returns was very plain. The sweeping Conservative gains came in the 
South and the Midlands. They lost ground in the industrial cities of the North; there 
was a 5 per cent swing to Labour in Wales; and a 7.5 per cent swing in Scotland. 
Indeed, in Scotland, where devolutionist or separatist sentiment remained strong, the 
Conservatives came close to total annihilation. There was much talk of a basic social 
divide in the land, between an increasingly prosperous and complacent South, and a 
decaying, declining North, with endemic unemployment, urban dereliction, and 
collapsing public services. All political parties, the victorious Conservatives no less 
than Labour, recognised the need to bridge the inequalities deep within British 
society. The ‘two nations’, described in Disraeli’s novels in the 1840s, were still 
much in evidence” (Morgan 1989: 141).
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SOCIAL INEQUALITY.
In our discussion of this point, my respondents mentioned a number of social features 
that they considered were responsible for creating social divisions. The two that they 
mentioned most frequently were the wealth gap, the difference between the haves and 
have-nots. Other features that they mentioned were racial prejudice and the social 
disadvantage that results from it. For example,
I think contemporary racism is a problem and without making a big judgement 
about the cause o f that I  mean I think it is a problem. I  suppose another one 
would be the 'have and have-nots' really. (R. 1).
Those that have and those that haven't. Again within the county there don't 
seem to be the extremes, but there are extremes around the country. There is 
depravation, poverty and I  feel that it's the poverty, the person who haven't, 
compared with people like us, those that have. I  can't think o f anything more 
significant. (R. 6).
Wealth, as I  said the haves and the have-nots. I mean I think that's probably 
the one, yes certainly if you maybe look in other areas, you may talk about the 
race, or social depravation, which is obviously an aspect o f wealth, but 
certainly there aren't too many racial problems in this part o f the world. (R. 
16).
/  think race remains an issue, particularly in those disharmonious areas. 
Unemployment, poverty, is a big social division. I  think that the sort o f gender 
issue is less o f a division than it used to be, certainly sexuality I  think is much 
less o f a division than it used to be. You know, lesbian, gay, all sorts of 
approaches to sexuality are much more open now and much more acceptable 
to the general public. I  think that's been a major, quite how it's been achieved 
I  don't know, but it's been a major improvement in recent years. And you 
know I would hope that the race issue has become more harmonious, but I'm 
conscious that in certain, sort o f hard line areas it is still a major issue. And 
then the poverty, unemployment seems to pervade everywhere really. (R. 25).
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Some of the other features that were mentioned by my respondents as creating 
social divisions included such things as, social class, education, and employment. 
Other social factors that were mentioned include the following.
Social Class, Education and Employment.
The inequalities in terms of employment, wealth, educational attainment, power and 
influence and in gaining the social and professional skills with which to achieve social 
mobility, caused by differences in social class was seen as a significant factor in 
creating social division. The difference in wealth exacerbated policing problems, 
with the suggestion that those at the lower end of the class system, the notional 
‘underclass’, were being forced to commit acquisitive crimes, which increased the 
level of crime and pressure on police managers to solve them. On the flip side, the 
potential misuse by some people of their social position also caused my respondents 
real concerns. For example,
I think class is still a real problem, there is still a class barrier in Britain, 
when you come out into the shire county o f— , you know, and I mean it’s still 
a shire county and there are, we have some people who because o f their role 
in society have disproportionate power in their hands and it really pisses me 
off, nothing annoys me more. (R. 9).
As far as I ’m concerned it’s not ethnic, it’s class. I ’ll never forget, I  was a DC 
and I  was in the —  Police Choir and we were going to Cornwall on tour for 
the weekend, and one o f the superintendents, I  think he was in Personnel, no 
he wasn’t he was an inspector then and had a Bramshill Scholarship, and he 
brought this chap down who was on the Course with him at the College and he 
was an American and he came to me and said, would you look after him for 
the weekend, he’s going on tour with you. I  said, yeah, in this coach going 
down to Cornwall and I pose a question to him and I  said to him, what’s the 
biggest difference between society here and in the States? And he said, I ’ve 
no doubt, it smacks you in the face as soon as you get here or within a very 
short time he said, it’s your class, they told me about it, I  didn’t realise the 
extent o f it. He said the vast difference between the classes, and he said, it 
doesn’t help, it doesn’t help at all. I had this raised consciousness then about
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how divisive and, I mean my father was a socialist and I ’ve always been a 
socialist, I'm still a socialist, but there was this awareness, this heightening of 
awareness, o f this big gap and I  can remember being in, he's just retired the 
superintendent. I  was working with a DC who was a staunch blue 
Conservative, and we used to have dreadful rows about the juxtaposition 
between him and me and society and class and what have you. But this really 
brought it home to me, and yeah I  could see it in people. People believing it 
was something they've earned, and this underclass, and we've got this 
underclass there's no doubt about it, and even more so now since 1979, since 
Maggie Thatcher. (R. 30).
Social divisions I would put mainly, it's becoming more and more apparent, 
those who are in work and those who aren't. Within those who are not in 
work, there is a high proportion o f people who are inner city. Who have 
attended what are perceived to be poor schools... and I think that is leading 
towards difficulty as well, lack o f discipline. (R. 34).
Yeah, I  think it's the disenfranchised. I think it's those who are in a cycle of 
depravation, poor education, poor motivation, poor likelihood o f jobs. And 
what do you do for a 16 year old lad or lass who's got no qualifications, who 
comes from parents who never had any qualifications? Regardless o f what 
their intelligence or intellect might actually be, their potential might be. How 
do you drag people out o f that?. (R. 39).
Trends in social divisions.
I asked my respondents whether the social divisions were becoming greater, less great
or remaining the same. Concerning wealth and race, the majority of them felt that
inequality was becoming greater.
I  think the haves and have-nots are becoming greater. The people who have- 
not, the unemployed for instance, have been unemployed a hell o f a long time. 
And are now getting more comfortable being unemployed, I say more 
comfortable, more used to being unemployed, I  think that's going to get worse
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rather than better. I  think more people are likely to end up in the have-nots 
pile, the unemployed pile than not. (R. 36).
I  think it’s getting greater, again if I  look back over my lifetime I was never, 
and perhaps again it was how I  was brought up and the area I  was brought up 
in, but I  certainly wasn’t aware as a lad o f between 15 and 20 o f the 
depravation that exists around the country. Now again it may be because the 
media is now in a position where it highlights that more than it ever did 
before. But, you know, I lived in Battersea for 15 years, now there’s an area 
now where you could actually say, is that a deprived area, or certainly if 
you ’re talking about Balham, Brixton and Vauxhall, places like that, is that a 
deprived area? I would never have considered it as a deprived area when I 
was there, but I  might do now in comparison with what we’ve got out here. 
So, you know, I  think the gulf is getting wider and certainly whether or not the 
percentage in each grouping has changed I don ’t know. But I  do think the gulf 
o f those that, take my life style and compare it with other people’s right at the 
bottom end if you like o f the social scale, there’s a tremendous gap. (R. 6).
On the other features, class, employment and education, the sentiments were 
the same. These divisions were getting greater.
I f  you go into every Police Force they’ll have areas that are deprived where 
the vast majority o f people that live in them are decent folks. Just because 
you’re unemployed and haven’t got any money, doesn’t necessarily mean 
you’re a criminal, but there are elements within those societies that are 
vigorous on the crime front, which gets the society tarred with the same brush. 
The Government never like to admit it but if more jobs were available for 
young people, and I ’m talking about young people who haven ’t done quite so 
well at school, they want a manual job and if they could get them with a 
reasonable rate of pay it would keep them out o f the criminal fraternity. There 
are elements in our society that are always committing crimes, if you had full 
employment they’d be people who were committing crimes wouldn’t there? 
Because that’s by the very nature of how they’re made up, but I  think that’s 
one o f the problems o f the country, there is an underclass developing. The
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rich seem to be getting richer and the poor seem to be standing still or getting 
worse, but the Government never like to admit it do they? (R. 19).
I  think they're getting greater. Money comes to money. I f  you've got the 
money you can afford to look after it, keep it. So yeah, I feel that they're 
getting worse and I  think that in the future employment will become 
increasingly difficult. Take us to information technology and you will have 
two distinct classes o f employment, you will have high tech, high skill, 
probably high reward and you will have a labouring class and you'll have 
unemployed. I  hope it doesn't sound too bleak a picture but I think that's 
inevitable and I think we should be planning for that. (R. 31).
I  think money and education is greater. Yeah I mean we're trying to put more 
people through university but all we're doing is probably diluting the worth of 
a lot o f Degrees, you know, by just introducing more and more. But I  think 
money rules far more than it should now, you can get a decent education if 
you've got the money. And the divisions in inner cities and the rural areas, I  
think are becoming more and more marked. Race, yeah. I  think there's a lot 
o f perception issues there as well. You know if you're looking at black versus 
white, yes I  think there's a real division, but there's a lot o f others I  mean 
Kurds, and Turks and everything else, and there's a lot o f factions who've 
come in and brought a lot o f their traditional disharmony with them. So it 
isn't necessarily just because o f British society, I  think it's just the way it's 
evolved and it's historical. But I  think the two biggies for me are the division 
of poverty and education. (R. 51).
THE RULE OF LAW.
I asked my respondents if they thought there was any truth in the adage that ‘there is
one law for the rich and one for the poor?’
I think the political answer would be no, but I'm not so sure if that's right. I  
think the rich have access to advice that the poor don't have. I  think there are 
various examples that could be cited that you think now how the devil did that
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individual get away with that? Whereas if it had been somebody that did not 
have the means to defend themselves, they would go and get legal advice 
under the legal aid system and probably be told just put your hands up. So 
whilst there might not be a law for one and a law for the other, I  think the 
quality o f the advice that they get is significantly different, which leads it on to 
the fact that there must be a law for one and one for the other. (R. 6).
The only thing that I  feel there is is a rule for the rich and a rule for the poor, 
is the fact that if you’ve got a lot o f money you can object to something, you 
can take an injunction out. I f  you haven’t got any money you can sometimes 
still do, because everyone helps you with legal aid. The people in the middle, 
usually the people like you and me, who haven’t got that much money that we 
can fight for a cause, can’t get legal aid because we’re earning too much 
money, we have to poke up with it and it’s actually middle England who suffer, 
not the poor and the rich, I  think when it comes to things like that, there is a 
way for poor people to prosecute if they want to and it they’re advised right 
and there’s a way for rich people, there always has been and always will be, 
but it’s the people in the middle who are disfranchised or whatever you call it, 
inasmuch as they can’t afford to prosecute but they’ve got too much money to 
get legal aid, so they have to poke up with it and it’s those sort o f people 
which is your majority and that’s why it’s always annoying because they have 
to poke up with it and they’re the ones who always feel they get bum advice 
and no help, so I  don’t think there’s one rule for the rich and one for the poor, 
I  think there’s a rule for the rich and the poor and a rule for the rest o f us in 
the middle because they’re the ones who are disadvantaged. Perhaps that’s 
how it should be I don’t know, perhaps it should be that the majority o f people 
should not be given access to millions and millions o f legal aid, I  don’t know, 
we should be intelligent enough to deal with a problem I suppose, that’s the 
way to look at it, interesting isn’t it. (R. 9).
The sentiments expressed by this respondent are similar to those expressed by 
the overwhelming majority. They felt that the law was the same for everyone, but the 
rich had better and easier access to resources of knowledge and influence with which 
to use or manipulate the rules for administering the law.
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This view chimes with Cotterrell’s discussion on the concept of the rule of 
law. He explained that, “Weber, followed by many more recent observers, stressed 
the fundamental difference in the quality of justice dispensed to different social 
classes by the higher English courts and the lowly justices’ (magistrates’) courts. 
While the upper and rising middle classes could make use of the relatively rational 
legal processes of the former, the lower classes met ‘the law’ only in caricature form 
in the processes of the latter, which Weber scathingly termed ‘Khadi justice’ -  
decision-making based on subjective reaction to the individual case rather than on the 
careful application of known legal rules and procedures. For Weber, this two-tier 
system amounted to a systematic denial of justice to the poor.” He continues, “That 
the professional expertise necessary to ensure that legal procedures are governed by 
the highest legal standards is more likely to be found at higher levels of the court 
system, and that those with greater resources of knowledge, wealth and influence are 
most likely to be able to make use of those higher levels, seems obvious. In this way 
the rule of law is available to the ‘haves’ to a far greater extent than to the ‘have- 
nots’” (Cotterrell 1984: 169).
I  think there are occasions, it's not what you know it's who you know, but 
whether money has anything to do with it I  don't know. Let's try and test that. 
Let's have a look at someone who commits a fraud and gets away with several 
million pounds, if they get convicted they actually get quite a short sentence 
compared with someone who's got perhaps a long conviction o f thefts. Long 
conviction o f thefts might actually end up with eight years for some 
shoplifting, because o f their record, and the total o f what they've done and 
they might not have harmed any particular person, might only be Marks and 
Sparks who suffered as a result o f all these years. But someone has done a 
long term fraud because they turn round is this a white-collar crime, might 
only get three years, yes Saunders the Guinness man, yes there is! I'm off the 
fence, I'm there! Yes. (R. 39).
I'm almost certain. The people who can afford good representation, the 
people who can afford to, you know, circumvent things or have people speak 
on their behalf, it exists, it's there and to say otherwise is flying in the face o f
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truth. But like I say, experience tells you that if they're well represented, 
they're well connected, the chances are that they're going to walk. And that's 
from a jury's point o f view as well. I f you've got a jury trial and you get a 
CPS appointed Barrister who's on £25 a day and the other guy is Michael 
Mansfield, QC, then it doesn't matter what the evidence is. (R. 40).
Though my respondents were prepared to accept manipulation of the law at 
the court proceedings level of the legal process, they had some reservation about 
accepting that the manipulation can occur so easily at the enforcement level. In their 
view, police officers enforced the law impartially, and although this might not always 
have been the case in the past, it is less likely to happen today. In any event, my 
respondents suggested that were other officers who may not have acted impartially, 
they would never have done.
I  suppose there is really, I  have to say that I mean it would be nonsense to say 
otherwise wouldn't it? Yeah I mean I  can't think o f any Chief Officers who 
would want to know the general man whose shotgun certificate has run out, 
and yet does if it's say, titled nobility, and things get properly squared. That's 
just very small beer indeed, you know, what I  mean look at the whole policing 
they get, it's the future o f any society without a shadow o f a doubt and if 
you're right on the bottom end o f the scale you have to go through far more 
shit than anybody else, no doubt about that. (R. 20).
Absolutely. Prime example? You won't remember it I don't suppose: Sir 
Gerald Nabarro, an MP, bid handlebar moustache. Sir Gerald was 
disqualified from driving, he got disqualified for drinking and driving. He had 
a chauffeur, he had a Bentley and he had some company or other, engineering 
works or wood yards or whatever. Police officer saw him driving his Bentley 
to work with his chauffeur sat at the side o f him. You could not mistake Sir 
Gerald Nabarro and his chauffeur, they were like chalk and cheese, and, 
because Sir Gerald has a handlebar moustache, like an RAF-type moustache. 
Two police officers saw it, they arrested him for driving whilst disqualified, he 
denied it, he pleaded ‘no guilty', he got good counsel, went to court and 
convinced the jury that he wasn't driving. He came out o f court, on the steps
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his comment was, a rich man will always secure justice, a poor man rarely. 
And I ’ve always remembered that, and I ’ve seen it happen so many times. The 
Maxwells, kids, they have it made, it happens all the time. And that again is 
another reason that it undermines, it undermines what we do and what other 
social agencies do, because people look at it and say, ahh yes o f course it's 
happening again. (R. 41).
Yes. I  think the majority o f police officers try to enforce the law impartially, 
you get the odd one who won't, but I  think the vast majority will. And perhaps 
as the majority of police officers come from middle or lower classes I believe 
in society, they might actually get a secret grin for arresting somebody in a 
Rolls Royce. I  think the change comes when you actually get into the justice 
system, and your unemployed guy is relying on your local Legal Aid, your rich 
citizen is employing the best legal brains in the country, and like most things 
in life you actually get what you pay for. I f you pay for £50 quid an hour, you 
won't get walloped than if you pay £5,000 an hour. Depressing isn't it? (R. 
31).
Yes I  mean again it's a simplistic statement that you've got to really dismantle, 
but just to take the lid off o f that a little bit, I don't think that it's the law 
because the law is the law, but there is work in the system and how, or one 
works within the legal framework that you are given, that actually makes the 
difference. So if you are Builder Joe and you are in a position where you find 
yourself in front o f the judicial process, you will only have through the 
layperson probably a limited amount o f help to you. Whereas if you are 
British Gas Chief Executive and you find yourself in exactly the same position, 
then through your financial status, you have a tremendous amount of 
resources that you can call upon to extricate yourself from that position or at 
least lessen the impact o f it. Same law it's just how you work within it. (R. 
43).
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Discussion.
My respondents were erudite pragmatic managers who can aptly be described as 
individuals with a soft social centre covered by a hard exterior police vernacular. 
They were attuned to contemporary social problems with which different sections of 
society have to deal and which have significant impact on policework.
The broad age-range of my respondents provided variety and subtlety to their 
social outlook, while similarity of social background offered cohesion and 
consistency to that outlook. In terms of social harmony, they were firm in their view 
that society was no more harmonious today than it was in the past. One major factor 
that influenced this perception of contemporary society was modem methods of 
communication, which they saw as bringing information to the masses instantly: the 
familiar concept of the global village.
Modem methods of communication may have improved social awareness but 
it had not improved social inequality. My respondents felt that there was a real 
division between the wealthy and the poor; the haves and the have-nots. One social 
consequence of this division, which they perceived was getting wider, was that the 
poor, whose lowly status was exacerbated by poor education and unemployment, 
were being forced into committing crimes to try and alleviate their circumstances.
Equally, they expressed the view that the rich were not only getting richer but 
that they could and did use their position to manipulate the legal system to their 
advantage. This did not mean that the haves were privileged to a different legal code. 
However, when they did fall foul to the law they had ready access to those with the 
knowledge and power to manipulate the system to their advantage. As my 
respondents saw it, it was a case of the haves enjoying a condition of double 
advantage.
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Chapter 11
POLICE MANAGEMENT CULTURE and CONCLUSION.
POLICE MANAGEMENT CULTURE.
With the structural, legal and procedural changes that have been forced upon and 
undertaken by the great social institution that is the police over the last three decades, 
senior police managers are today more than ever before seen as leaders (Blunkett 
2001). Leaders of an institution that will continue to face intense and frequent calls 
for change and adaptation to the demands of contemporary communities.
The changes and the call for them are not merely external. The reduced 
‘perks’ of the job and the changed occupational outlook of new recruits has created 
career expectations for contemporary joiners that are vastly different from those of 
most of my respondents. For example, the loss of housing allowance or the 
alternative free police accommodation, coupled with the option (as opposed to what 
was previously mandatory) to join the police pension scheme (a scheme that was good 
enough for officers to describe themselves as ‘pension slaves’, because once they had 
served a certain amount of years it would have resulted in a substantial personal 
financial loss if the individual left the Service), meant that today’s recruits see the 
police more as an occupation than a vocation.
These issues and problems of contemporary policing were common to all my 
respondents regardless of where in the country they worked or the functional post 
they held. I analysed the culture of this group of officers by examining, through using 
a structured interview technique, how they dealt with the dual problems of survival in 
and adaptation to a changing external environment, and integration of the internal 
processes of the service to ensure the capacity to continue to deliver an efficient and 
effective service.
The relevance of studying the culture of this group of officers is that as leaders 
of major functional areas in their respective Forces, they now occupy a pivotal
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position in the Service, which leaves them well placed, collectively, to change the 
culture of the police. As Schein explains, “the dynamic processes of culture creation 
and management are the essence of leadership and this makes one realise that 
leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin”, and adds, “that the creation 
and management of culture is uniquely associated with leadership” (Schein 1992: 2).
He believes “that cultures begin with leaders who impose their own values and 
assumptions on a group. If that group is successful and the assumptions come to be 
taken for granted, we have then a culture that will define for later generations of 
members what kinds of leadership are acceptable. The culture now defines 
leadership. However, as the group encounters adaptive difficulties, as its environment 
changes to the point where some of its assumptions are no longer valid, leadership 
comes into play once more. Leadership is the ability to step outside the culture that 
created the leader and to start evolutionary change processes that are more adaptive. 
This ability to perceive the limitations of one’s own culture and to develop the culture 
adaptively is the essence and ultimate challenge of leadership” (ibid).
I found from my study that there were certain components of the culture that 
were not only shared or held in common by my group of senior police managers, but 
were shared or held in common with the lower and higher ranks in the service. Reiner 
has claimed of the police that, “the values, norms, perspective and craft rules -  which 
inform their conduct is, of course, neither monolithic, universal nor unchanging” 
(Reiner 1985:86). However, from my study and using Schein’s explanation of the 
different levels of culture, I would argue that police culture and its sub-cultures could 
at the ‘basic assumption’ level be consistent, universal and unchanging. Various 
studies on police have listed the core elements of its culture and sub-cultures, such as 
mission, isolation, solidarity, conservatism and pragmatism. (Skolnick 2005; Van 
Maanen 2005; Reuss-Ianni and Ianni 1983; Chan 1996; Waddington 1999a; Reiner 
2000: Ch. 3) However, for the purpose of the study, the relevance is whether these 
elements have enabled police superintendents, over the years, to develop and adapt, 
chameleon-like, to meet the demands that have been placed on them, or whether they 
have constrained them to maintaining the status quo? Before examining the effects of 
some of these elements in more detail, I shall elaborate on my conceptual and 
figurative use of the terms chameleon and dinosaur in describing the cultural and sub­
258
cultural changes that superintendents have gone through to meet contemporary 
demands for change that have been placed on them.
Chameleon or Dinosaur.
Chameleon, “fig. (esp. = inconstant or variable person.). He was a 
chameleon to the hand that fed him. He coloured himself, as it were, with the 
King’s character.
Conscience is then your plea...But yours is much of the chameleon hue, to 
change the dye with every different view” (Simpson and Weiner 1989(1): 5).
Dinosaur. “Someone or something that has not adapted to changing 
circumstances...” (Simpson and Weiner 1989(2): 685).
The question of whether senior police managers responded to external threats 
to the Service or the need for internal integration to enable the provision of a better 
policing service either in a chameleonic or dinosaurian way did not arise as a 
hypothesis to be tested through qualitative research. Rather, from the analysis of the 
first set of interviews with my respondents, it arose as an ideological explanation of 
the way they claimed to have responded to the demands for change over the years.
The calls for change in police culture and sub-cultures and in its management 
style to enable this change have come from different quarters. It has come directly 
from central government, specific groups in contemporary society and the combined 
changing social and educational make up of new recruits with their different concept 
of employment as police officers. Additionally, the need for change has also come, 
indirectly, from changes in the social and political environment.
I shall outline some of the changes that have been made to address concerns 
raised about the quality of management control and the culture and sub-cultures of the 
service, before discussing how senior police managers have responded, whether 
chameleonic or dinosaurian, to these calls. The call for change in the style of 
management of the service dates back to the post Second World War period. As one 
commentator noted, “The last six decades have seen three royal commissions consider 
aspects of policing -  though only one direcdy on the police -  and numerous other
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inquiries that have sought to explore and, in some respect, reform policing. 
Legislation affecting policing has been so extensive as to be almost impossible to 
summarise.” (Newbum 2003: 84) However, I shall contain the discussion to the 
changes that have occurred during the professional lifetime of my respondents, 
because these would have directly influenced their experience of policing what 
became, during their service, a multi-cultural and increasingly challenging public.
The first of the major changes that were implemented during this period came 
from a Royal Commission on the Police. In January 1960 a Royal Commission was 
appointed under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Willink, Q.C., with a terms of 
reference that included,
“To review the constitutional position of the police throughout Great Britain, 
the arrangements for their control and administration and, in particular, to 
consider:
1) the status and accountability of members of police forces, including chief 
officers of police;
2) the relationship of the police with the public and the means of ensuring 
that complaints by the public against the police are effectively dealt with; 
and
3) the broad principles which should govern the remuneration of the 
constable, having regard to the nature and extent of police duties and 
responsibilities and the need to attract and retain an adequate number of 
recruits with proper qualifications” (Critchley 1967: 275).
There were a number of incidents that led to the eventual appointment of the 
Commission and the first of these occurred in 1956. It concerned the disciplinary 
action taken against the Chief Constable of Cardiganshire following allegations that 
his force was not being properly administered. The outcome was the amalgamation of 
the Cardigan and Carmarthen police forces. The following year criminal proceedings 
were taken against the Chief Constable of Brighton and senior members of his force. 
Two of the senior managers were found guilty on charges of corruption and sentenced 
to imprisonment. Another incident occurred in December 1958 when a PC Eastmond 
stopped the actor-manager of the Whitehall Theatre, Mr Brian Rix, for exceeding the 
speed limit across Putney Heath. Mr Garratt, a civil servant, who had been driving
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behind the police car stopped and spoke to Mr Rix. “An argument developed, 
followed by mutual allegations of assault. Mr Garratt was taken to the police station 
to be charged with an offence, but the station officer refused to accept the charge and 
Mr Garratt was released. He instituted civil proceedings against PC Eastmond, 
claiming damages for assault and battery and for false imprisonment. The facts were 
never established, because the Metropolitan Police Commissioner paid £300 into 
Court without admission of liability, and the plaintiff took, the sum in settlement of the 
claim. It was then announced that no disciplinary proceedings would be taken against 
PC Eastmond” (Critchley: 273). The matter was debated in Parliament in November 
1959 and the main point of concern was why £300 of public money had been paid out 
unless PC Eastmond had done wrong, and if he had done wrong why he had not been 
disciplined. The cumulative effect of these incidents was the appointment of the 
Royal Commission, which was to inquire into, amongst other things, “concern about 
the means of controlling the police and bringing them to account when things went 
wrong...” (Critchley: 274).
Government intervention in policing dates back to the inception of the modem 
police. According to Newbum, “In some respects the most obvious and consistent 
trend in the history of policing since 1829 is the gradual centralisation of control as 
government, largely through the Home Office, established greater control over chief 
officers and their constabularies” (Newbum 2003: 91). He points out that there are at 
least four major ways in which this process of centralisation may be seen in the post 
war years, and one of the four is, “The increase in government oversight of, and 
influence over, policing via legislative change and new managerial reforms.” (ibid.)
Another source of change in police managerialism, culture and sub-culture has 
been the changing nature of the relationship between the service and people from 
Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities. The most widely researched and 
documented groups within BME communities, and the ones to which most of the 
comments will be referred are people whose ancestry lies in Asia, Africa and the 
‘islands of the sea* (Bowling and Phillips 2003: 528). Bowling and Phillips point out 
that “The experience of black and Asian communities in British society has 
undergone a fundamental transformation in recent years.” Furthermore, The 
communities’, and consequently, central government’s reaction to these experiences
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have resulted in significant changes in the number of people from BME communities 
joining the police service, and also in police procedures and management styles. 
These authors add that, “Until well into the 1960s while there were a few people from 
ethnic minority communities represented in sport, business, politics and the civil 
service, there were no black and Asian police officers whatsoever.” (ibid.) One 
author has argued that the reason for this was a deliberate policy decision by senior 
officers in the 1950s and ‘60s not to employ black and Asian people in the police 
service. (Whitfield 2004).
The strained relationship between the police and BME communities continued 
through the 1970s and collapsed in the early 1980s, resulting in violent public 
disorders in Bristol in 1980, in the London neighbourhood of Brixton in 1981, 
followed by Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham later that year. Lord Scarman 
(1986) was appointed to chair the public inquiry into the riots in Brixton. According 
to Bowling and Phillips “He interpreted the cause of the riots as, ‘essentially an 
outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police*. Although 
he noted that not all the people involved in the disturbance were black, Scarman 
identified a problem of policing ‘a multi-racial community in a deprived inner city 
area where unemployment, especially among young black people, is high and hopes 
are low’”. Bowling and Phillips add that, “Scarman recommended identifying racial 
prejudice among police recruits, efforts to recruit more ethnic minority police officers, 
improving community relations and handling public disorder, closer supervision of 
front-line constables, improvements in the management training of inspectors and 
sergeants (especially conducting stop and search operations), and making display of 
racially prejudiced behaviour a dismissal offence.” (Bowling and Phillips: 531). The 
consequent changes included wider police accountability to the public through 
Community Consultative Groups and greater scrutiny of police practice through the 
use of lay visitors to examine the conditions under which detained people were held in 
police cells. It should be noted that the effectiveness of Police Community 
Consultative Groups in expanding police accountability has been called into question 
by research into their implementation and operation. (Morgan and Maggs 1984 and 
1985).
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Just over a decade after the Scarman Inquiry, in 1993 an 18-year old black 
man, Stephen Lawrence, was stabbed to death in Eltham, South London. This gave 
rise four years later to another significant inquiry into policing. Newbum notes that, 
“the verdict of the inquest jury was that ‘Stephen Lawrence was unlawfully killed in a 
completely unprovoked attack by five white youths’. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry 
concluded memorably, and in contrast with Scarman, that: ‘There is no doubt but that 
there were fundamental errors. The investigation was marred by a combination of 
professional incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior 
officers’” (Bowling and Phillips: 531).
The link between leadership and management style and the nature and quality 
of treatment of people from BME communities, in this case employees, was 
highlighted in another public inquiry into the police. The Morris Inquiry (2004), 
which was an independent inquiry established by the Metropolitan Police Authority 
(MPA) to consider professional standards and employment matters in the 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), strongly criticised the force’s management style. 
The inquiry accused the MPS of discriminating against ethnic minority officers, its 
lack of understanding of diversity issues and the way it handled disciplinary and 
communications issues. (Morris Inquiry 2004). Although the Inquiry was on the 
MPS, its findings and comments could easily and accurately be directed at any of the 
other 42 Home Office police forces.
The Inquiry highlighted discriminatory practices inside the police service, 
which added to the list of well documented accounts of discriminatory attitudes of 
officers towards people from BME communities. Some authors have argued these 
attitudes are not translated into action when officers interact with people from BME 
communities (Waddington 1999(1); Smith and Gray 1985: Ch. XV), whilst some are 
equivocal about racially discriminatory behaviour (Greenhill 1985; Bowling and 
Phillips 2003) and others are unequivocal about discriminatory actions and practices 
by officers (Cashmore 2000; Chan 1996; Holdaway and Barron 1997; HMIC 1997). 
One point on which there is widespread agreement is that that police officers 
stereotype people from BME communities, and the language that they use to describe 
BME people is openly expressed in the workplace. Therefore, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that senior officers would be aware of the use of stereotypical language to
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describe people from BME communities. Consequently, it becomes an issue that they 
have a professional and managerial obligation to address if the Service was going to 
be able to create an image that would attract and retain people from BME 
communities as employees.
The changes in the way officers behaved towards BME people, in the 
relationship between the police service and people from BME communities (some of 
which resulted in public inquiries into mishandling of major incidents), in the more 
intrusive and interventionist involvement in police management by central 
government, the structural changes within the service, and in the social and political 
circumstances of different groups in society have created challenges and demands on 
the senior managers to adapt their management styles, and the culture and sub­
cultures of the service to meet these demands and challenges. That there have been 
significant changes in the environment -  both internally and externally -  in which the 
police operate and consequently pressure on senior managers to adapt to meet these 
changes cannot be underestimated.
The police manager in the 1970s faced the problem of managing public 
disquiet from the revelations of police malpractice in the late ‘50s and ‘60s, and 
dealing with some of the most significant industrial disputes in modem times. In the 
wake of the oil crisis of the early ‘70s Britain experienced soaring inflation, rising 
unemployment, and -  following the terms set by the International Monetary Fund for 
its ‘bail-out’ loan to the Labour government in 1976 -  retrenchment in public service 
and government demands for pay restraint. “The decade witnessed mounting levels 
of industrial and social conflict. A power workers’ strike in the early 1970s resulted 
in cuts in supply and a three-day week. The miners went on strike in 1972 and 1974, 
contributing on the latter occasion to the fall of the Conservative government. In 
1977, a bitter and protracted dispute over union recognition took place at the 
Grunwick film processing plant in London. And a series of strikes by low-paid public 
sector workers in 1978-9 (in what was dubbed ‘the winter of discontent’) helped 
bring about the demise in May 1979 of James Callaghan’s minority Labour 
administration. By the time that government left office, the far right had come to 
acquire a foothold in electoral politics and violent clashes between racist and anti­
racist groups -  in Red Lion Square, Lewisham, Southall -  had returned to the streets
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of Britain.” (Loader and Mulcahy 2003:9). In addition to the experiences that senior 
managers gained from dealing with these industrial disputes and violent disorders, and 
the knowledge acquired from learning lessons from them, throughout the 1970s the 
police lobbied with increasing vociferousness for more powers to deal with ‘the fight 
against crime’ and to resist ‘political’ control. This period witnessed a change in 
overall policing tactic towards a more coercive ‘fire brigade’ style. (Reiner 1985: 
197).
In the 1980s, when 25 per cent of my respondents were promoted to the rank 
of superintendent, senior managers faced a number of dilemmas, and according to one 
commentator, foremost among which was the increasing pressure to account for the 
use of expensive resources when they were conscious that their control of those 
resources were, at best, tenuous and their mission unclear and controversial. 
(Plumridge 1985: 173). Plumridge grouped the scenarios from which the dilemma 
sprang into different sections. For example, they consisted of,
1. “A rapidly changing society that presented a range of new policing problems”. 
He then listed the changes, some of which included, “the development of 
pluralism in society bringing an increased number of often vociferous minority 
groups into being, and increasing pressure from representatives of the public at 
a local level for more police accountability and more consultation over 
policing strategies” (Plumridge: 174).
2. “The rapid development of information processing potential leading to a 
greatly enhanced research effort, both within and outside the Service, which 
ensures a better informed public and demands research conscious police 
managers. Decisions taken intuitively or on the basis of experience alone are 
becoming increasingly vulnerable to both internal and external validation.
3. “As problems become more complex, and as the body of knowledge grows, so 
the myth of the omniscient, omnipotent police managers evaporates. Police 
organisations become more differentiated and more complex and the role of 
the manager shift from that of the unilateral decision-maker to that of the co­
ordinator and team leader who can develop collaborative and creative 
decision-making.
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4. “As the volume and diversity of information penetrates all homes and 
workplaces through the medium of radio and television more and more police 
officers become drawn into the public debates on organisational and 
management effectiveness, and their knowledge of, and interest in managerial 
methods has been aroused.
5. “The enhancement of the status of the police officer in recent years, coupled 
with the growth of unemployment in society, has created a highly favourable 
recruiting situation. The resultant selectivity is leading to the recruitment of a 
new generation of well-educated, questioning constables” (ibid.)
A decade of trouble, as one commentator described it (Graef 1989: 24), the 
problems that originated in the ‘80s continued into the 1900s. In the 1990s, when 75 
per cent of my respondents were promoted in to and within the superintending ranks, 
the call for root-and-branch review of the police service that was made in the 1980s 
continued. “There were repeated calls for a Royal Commission to be established to 
lead the process, as in the case of previous police reforms.” Leishman et al 1996: 12). 
Although the then Conservative government did not favour the appointment of a 
Royal Commission, it did introduce forms of New Public Management (NPM) to the 
police. Leishman et al suggested that the introduction of forms of NPM to the police 
reflected a “quantum change from the halcyon days of the early 1980s when the 
police enjoyed not merely the confidence but the largesse of the first Thatcher 
administration” (ibid.) The 1990s was the decade of police reform. It started with the 
Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards by Sir Patrick Sheehy (Sheehy 
Inquiry 1993) and ended with the publication of the Report of the Stephen Lawrence 
Inquiry.
During the period from when some of my respondents joined the police 
service to the time I interviewed them for this study, there had been significant 
changes in police management style, the structure of the service and changes in its 
culture and sub-cultures. Structural changes were due, predominantly, to the 
intervention of central government through measures such as the Sheehy Inquiry. 
Whereas the change in management style and possibly culture and sub-cultures have 
been attributed to change that were taking place in society anyway. As modem social 
formations have been altered by the pluralizing and fragmenting forces of
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postmodemity so the police has come to reflect this process, which has been the 
hallmarks of the postmodern. (Reiner 2005). However, another commentator has 
argued the converse, stating that “some of the changes now being attributed to 
postmodern influences are intelligible not as the impact of postmodemity on 
modernist organisations but more plausibly as the effect of managerially led efforts to 
turn police into a modem institution.” (O’Malley 2005: 700).
In summarising the decades of the ‘80s and ‘90s one commentator observed, 
“In the early 1990s the police stood at a lower ebb in public trust and esteem 
than at any other time since they were established in the nineteenth century. 
They had been rocked by scandals revealing gross miscarriages of justice. At 
the same time the police appeared increasingly less able to protect people from 
criminal victimization, which was rising at record speed. Serious disorder, on 
a scale without precedent since the Second World War, developed during the 
1980s in a variety of contexts, including political and industrial conflict and a 
miscellany of leisure pursuits from football to ‘joyriding’, and continued in the 
1990s, although more spasmodically. The militarization of the police in 
response undermined police legitimacy without stemming the rise of disorder. 
In the first half of the 1980s, the police were pigs in the middle of sharply 
polarized political debate. They were the darlings of the Tories and in conflict 
with Labour-controlled police authorities, to which the national Labour Party 
threatened to make them more accountable. Gone were the halcyon days of 
consensus, when the police stood above the party fray as beloved totems of the 
nation.” (Reiner 2000: 11).
By the time of my field work in 1996, “the configuration had changed. 
Seeking to be ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’, New Labour 
courted police assiduously, while the Tories sought to apply tough 
‘businesslike’ market-based rigours to their management and accountability. 
There was good news and bad news for the police. The good news was the 
return of a degree of consensus about policing, and about their symbolic 
importance to a vital objective for any government. This was reflected in a 
stabilisation of public confidence in the police, following its precipitous 
decline up to the early 1990s. The bad news was the new consensus view that
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the police were failing badly on almost every front, and in need of drastic 
reform. It was increasingly apparent that the police feel trapped in a time 
warp. They were intent on reform. However, the impact of reforms on public 
perceptions of the police is continuously being undercut by scandalous 
revelations, as well as unrealistic expectations of performance and probity 
built up in the bygone era when the lid was shut tight on scandals” (ibid.) This 
was the context in which the participants had been managing policing services 
as supervisors, junior and senior managers.
Changing police culture (Chan 1996). ‘Field’ and ‘habitus’. It is undeniable 
that the ‘field’ of policing has undergone a tremendous change during the professional 
lifetime of my respondents. This has been the case not only within the locale of their 
immediate managerial experience in the United Kingdom, but wider, including areas 
with similar social and political environments. As Jones and Newbum explain, “In 
recent years, there has been growing consensus that the policing systems of Western 
industrial societies are experiencing profound changes”, and these have included “the 
expansion of private security, the growing importance of ‘transnational’ policing 
organisations and practices, changes in the organisation and management of public 
police forces, the impact of new technologies upon policing and crime control and the 
emergence of new ‘risk-based’ policing strategies.” Crucially, the authors note that, 
“it has been suggested that we are currently seeing a transformation in policing of a 
magnitude at least as great as occurred with the introduction of the New Police in the 
early nineteenth century.” (Jones and Newbum 2005: 733). The knowledge and 
experiences senior managers gained of how to manage this changing environment 
came from UK policing and beyond.
The transformational idea advocated by Bayley and Shearing (2005) advocates 
an epochal change that it characterised by the two developments of, pluralizing of 
policing and the search for identity by the public police for an appropriate role. They 
explain that “policing is no longer monopolised by the public police, that is, the police 
created by government. Policing is now being widely offered by institutions other 
than the state, most importantly by private companies on a commercial basis and by 
communities on a volunteer basis. Secondly, the public police are going through an 
intense period of self-questioning, indeed, a true identity crisis. No longer confident
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that they are either effective or efficient in controlling crime, they are anxiously 
examining every aspect of their performance -  objectives, strategies, organisation, 
management, discipline, and accountability. These movements, one inside and the 
other outside the police, amount to the restructuring of policing in contemporary 
democratic societies.” (Bayley and Shearing: 715).
The change in the ‘habitus’ has been equally dramatic. From the erosion of 
the image of an efficient, disciplined bureaucracy following the major corruption 
scandals in the late 1950s (Reiner 1985 and 2005) to the dilution of police ‘authority’ 
in the pluralizing of policing in the 1990s (Bayley and Shearing). The police service 
has shown a willingness to learn from these incidents; setting up procedures, such as 
tenure policies that restrict the length of time officers spend in specialist posts to 
prevent repetition of the types of corruption scandals revealed in the 1950s, and the 
establishment of Independent Advisory Groups by many forces, which is intended to 
improve the quality of interaction between the service and predominantly Black and 
Minority Ethnic communities.
Police (Canteen) Sub-culture. (Waddington 1999b). Like with the ‘field’ 
and ‘habitus’, there has been tremendous change in the ‘canteen sub-culture’ of the 
police. The overt use of racist language in the presence of researchers experienced by 
Smith and Gray in their seminal work in the Metropolitan Police in 1983, 
Waddington’s study in 1999, would not be heard today. Today a researcher would 
have to go undercover to elicit language of a similar tone. (Daly 2003). Waddington 
argues that the discriminatory and offensive language used in private by officers is not 
converted into discriminatory action on the street. This implausible argument is 
rendered incomprehensible by the revelations in the Secret Policeman(b) 
documentary. He explains that, “Because the canteen is a ‘backstage’ area it does not 
mean that officers are not staging performances. On the contrary, the canteen offers 
one of the rare opportunities for officers, whose actions on the street are normally 
‘invisible’, to engage in displays before their colleagues. Here officers retail versions 
of events that affirm their worldview: the canteen is the ‘repair shop’ of policing and 
jokes, banter and anecdotes the tools” (Waddington 1999b: 295). From professional 
experience, the reality is not so sanguine. The canteen is the ‘backstage’ area in
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which officers fine tune their skills for the ‘performance’ on the street. It is the 
‘repair shop’ of mistakes and easy candour, secrecy and trust the tools.
These are the changing and fluid ‘field’, ‘habitus’ and ‘canteen’ in which 
contemporary senior managers are required to manage the complex social institution 
that is the police. The fact that my respondents occupied the positions they did, it’s 
arguable this meant that they had been able to meet most of these challenges. But had 
they done so in a chameleonic or dinosaurian way? I shall use some of the core 
referents of police culture and sub-cultures (Mission/Action/Cynicism; Racial 
Prejudice; and Pragmatism (Reiner 2000:89)) to examine how they have managed the 
demands and challenges.
Mission-Action-Cynicism.
Mission is described as a core feature of cop culture. Reiner suggests that it is the 
“feeling that policing is not just a job but a way of life with a worthwhile purpose, at 
least in principle” (Reiner 2000:89). The realisation of the sense of mission is the 
protection of life, and of the weak against the predatory. This element of police 
culture is common in equal measure in the main groups in the service. For example,
“PCI: We get Police Orders twice a week, and usually the front page on that 
will be a commendation for a successful trial, or saving a life, outstanding 
bravery, dedication to duty. It’s not actually in our job description, you know, 
we don’t come into the job saying ‘I will definitely put my life on the line to 
save other people’
“WPC 1: Three lads on our relief went to a fire. One of them ended up getting 
carried out by a fireman because he was overcome by smoke. They couldn’t 
go in any further. The other two had gone in and rescued this woman. 
Actually all three of them got up to the top floor and threw the woman out of 
the window. That was about four floors up. The other two PCs then jumped 
and one of them was really quite badly injured. It took a lot of nerve. It’s 
quite a way up. The jumped from two floors up and one of them ended up 
with a shattered leg and a lot of internal injuries. There was a little bit in the 
Standard the next day: ‘Three Paddington officers save a woman’s life ...
270
‘but that was it.” A group of Met PCs and WPCs, average age 23, average 
service two years. (Graef: 39).
“Yeah I'm head o f Operational Support Department. Part o f the problem is 
that I'm responsible, the area's responsibility now was previously the 
responsibility o f a chief superintendent, two superintendents and a number of 
chief inspectors. It's now me and one chief inspector, now that does pose me a 
lot o f problems because I've got such a wide area o f responsibility, along a 
number o f major policy making areas such as firearms, public order I'm 
responsible for, Force Control Room, Traffic Department, Dog Section, 
Emergency Planning. Now to keep a grip on all those things, the policy 
making level is pretty difficult quite frankly and because o f the slimming down 
of the ranks, that has certainly posed I think problems for those senior 
managers who are left. ” My respondent. (R. 28).
“As a superintendent I have to say that the responsibilities now placed upon 
the rank are far more now than they were when I was first promoted even 4 
years ago. There are far fewer superintendents about now. This Force had in 
1990 or thereabouts, 25-plus superintending ranks, that included Chief 
Superintendent, we've now got 13. The workload hasn't gone away, in fact 
we're doing more work now than we did before. So I think far, far more is 
expected now of superintendents than ever was the case before. ” My 
respondent. (R. 17)
“Time, there's just too much to do and no time to do it. When you've got that 
conflict, quality must go... I'm herefrom 7.30/8 o'clock nearly every morning.. 
I  don't object to the work, work is exciting and vibrant, it's great fun and it's 
stimulating and it's given me a new lease of life, but... ” My respondent. (R. 
11)
The stress caused by the increased workload on the superintending ranks 
reflect the typical comments above made by my respondents. “By contrast, 
superintendent in England and Wales were more likely to complain...about having to 
take work home, conflicting demands, changes in the way the job is done and
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problems to do with the organisation’s structure. As one officer commented: ‘An 
organisation that is in a constant state of flux can only invoke in its employees 
feelings of instability and uncertainty. We exist on adrenalin, anti-depressants and 
tranquillisers. We are asked to achieve the unachievable -  and then criticised because 
of our inadequacies.” (Brown 1992).
Nonetheless, despite being expected to achieve the unachievable and engaging 
in life threatening activities, officers at the ‘street cop’ and ‘management’ levels still 
commit themselves to the job in ways that clearly show that it is “not just a job but a 
way of life with a worthwhile purpose, at least in principle”. (Reiner 2000: 89). The 
driver for this similar behaviour between both groups, I would argue, is the same; the 
sense of mission, which is ‘fun’, ‘challenging’, ‘exciting’ (ibid), however, it manifests 
itself differently in both groups. At the street level, it is action-centred, although 
officers are cynical about the level of appreciation shown by the ‘public’. At the 
management level, it is displayed as an unflinching commitment to the cause despite 
the genuine threat to the officers’ health and well being. At the basic assumption 
level the elements of ‘cop’ and ‘management’ culture are the same, but at the artefact 
and espoused levels, the visible elements of the culture of both groups is clearly 
different.
Racial Prejudice.
The incidents that led to the seminal report by Lord Scarman in 1981 and the 
publication of the report of the public inquiry into the imperfect investigation of the 
murder of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence nearly two decades later were 
arguably caused by police racist attitude. For Scarman the emphasis was on 
individual racist attitude whereas for Macpherson it was institutionalised. The reality 
is that it was both. It was real, attitudinal and behavioural. As expressed by police 
officers themselves,
“One night a call came over the radio to stop a purple Cortina. All the 
message said was that it was suspected of being involved in drugs. So I 
stopped it and there were four West Indians in the car and there weren’t very 
happy. All I said was, ‘Look here, I’ve stopped you because a police officer 
has asked me to do so. The police officer is going to come and have a word
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with you.’ The police officer got on the radio and said, ‘Oh, just turn the car 
over will you? I think they’ve got drugs on them.’ I said, ‘No, I won’t. You 
saw the car, you get down here and do it.’ He wouldn’t, but another police 
officer I was working with came over and we did a check driver’s licence and 
things like that. These people were thoroughly annoyed by this. I said, ‘You 
were seen coming out of a club in Greek Street.’ They said they hadn’t been 
anywhere near there. They had just come down from Luton. The driver 
pulled out a slip showing he’d been stopped by police earlier that night on the 
Al -  literally half an hour earlier, the time was written on the form -  so they 
couldn’t have been anywhere near the club. The other people in the car were 
getting really stroppy because they felt the police were victimizing them -  and 
essentially we were! They said, ‘We’re not puttin’ up with this. We’re 
going.’
“Because West Indians are a very physical race, they stand too close to police 
officers. They were standing too near to the face of the police officer I was 
with. They were pointing their fingers in his face and he just lost his nerve. 
He flipped and called for ‘Urgent Assistance’. So half the Met turned up, you 
know, at three in the morning. Then it was, ‘Right, you’re all nicked for a 
drugs search -  everybody into the back of the van.’
“We got back to the station and dragged these people into the charge room. 
They were lived. The Station Officer asked me what these people were in for 
and I said, ‘Don’t ask me. They have got nothing to do with me. As far as 
I’m concerned, they haven’t done anything.’ He said, ‘Get elsewhere.’ It’s 
his job to find out why they’d all been arrested. The original PC made up 
some story about drugs, I don’t know whether it was true or not. I suspect it 
wasn’t. Anyway, they were searched and the car was turned over and there 
were no drugs. I had a stand-up row with this PC who had put up the message 
on the radio. He said, ‘You should never let these West Indians take the piss 
out of you. You are a police officer in uniform.’ Basically, he had asked me 
to stop that car because it was four coons driving along at three in the 
morning.
“Later I bumped into one of these chaps. I was off duty at St Thomas’ 
Hospital, he recognised me and I thought, ‘Oh my God!’ He was a doctor! 
Anyway he came up and said I was the only decent police officer he’d met
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that night. I’d thought he was going to hit me because they were really mad 
when they left the police station. I said, ‘Yeah, the whole thing was really 
unfortunate.’ He said, ‘Do you realize what happened when we left the police 
station?’ They had gone through Trafalgar Square and down Whitehall and 
were stopped! Four coons in a car. They were stopped three times in less than 
four hours!” Met PC, age 25, seven years service. Now in South London. 
(Graef: 126)
“Coloured policemen get a hard time. There are racists -  a lot of policemen 
are very racist.
“An Indian PC that I worked with came onto Crime Squad shortly after me. 
The first day he walked into the police station. The first day he walked into 
the police station, an old Inspector called him a ‘black fucking gupta’. I’ve 
never ever known him to be called anything since then -  just ‘Gupta’! The 
guy came onto the Crime Squad and immediately was gunned for, to get him 
off. On a Crime Squad you work a partner system. A lot of people go through 
their whole Crime Squad with the same partner. This guy had about six 
partners, because nobody would work with him. No reflection on his ability, 
in fact he’s just been promoted. It’s got to be all credit to the guy, because he 
is a brilliant copper.” Met Detective Constable, age 28, six years service. 
Now in South London. (Graef: 135).
“As far as blacks are concerned, I suppose they would argue that they’re 
picked on. But in a particular area, if the officers are happy that it is the 
greater likelihood that a particular colour, race, or dress is more likely to be 
carrying drugs, or dangerous implements, one must expect those people to be 
stopped more than others. It’s just a fact of life.. .These are not new problems. 
The Jewish community in London and various other immigrant groups had 
problems but you grow through those in generations. But I’m not sure the 
colour problem can be grown through. I mean, white Jews and Hungarians 
and Poles can be assimilated within a prejudiced society -  and let’s make no 
doubt about it, we are a prejudiced society -  because of their looks. They are 
no longer fairly apparent. But it’s a problem we’re going to have for many 
years. It’s all worse because of the deprived situation within the inner cities
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where these people tend to congregate or reside ... Yes, there are racial 
attacks. But they are what I call football hooligan type of thing, and they’re 
given a label ‘race’ because colours are involved. We had one here last 
Saturday night: six coloureds against six whites. If they were Coventry 
supporters and Liverpool supporters, it would have been the same sort of 
thing. I think there is much more racial hatred from coloureds for whites ... 
The basis of racial hatred in many ways is a threat, when one sees a different 
race as a threat. I don’t think these white youths see the West Indians as a 
threat. They see the Indians as more of a threat, in terms of education. And 
they have that facility for making money and pulling themselves out of the 
community to live a prosperous life. It’s a pity there can’t be a great sort of 
assimilation within the population. Because if you go to places like Norfolk 
and some places like that you don’t see coloured people. And places here 
where we’ve got them there’s not much of a problem because nobody sees 
them as a threat. It’s something I won’t be able to solve.” Chief officer. 
(Reiner1992: 206).
In response to a question of whether it would clear up more crimes if a 
particular social group that with disproportionately more criminal records were more 
often stopped and questioned and searched, of the 44 people that answered the 
question an equal number, 23 per cent, answered unequivocally ‘yes’ as answered 
unequivocally ‘no’. A higher number, 43 per cent qualified their ‘no’ than thell per 
cent that qualified their ‘yes’ reply. Typically my respondents replied,
“Well I  suppose in theory if you had a straight correlation, if you believe 
correlations, yes. I  mean if you are talking about the problem in London of 
young blacks and the problem of yes we stop more o f them, because they 
commit more o f the crime. I  think it might be a little bit o f a vicious circle, I 
mean which comes first, you know is it the stopping o f the crime or is it? So, 
maybe I  don't know enough myself but I  don't think society does as well. ” My 
respondent. (R. 51)
“If you accept all the publicity o f the Met. and their stop and search policy. I 
suppose if I  sat here and was really blunt and said, well you know if, we used
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to do the same to gypsies and to all sorts o f groups; someone driving certain 
types o f car, hippies, beatniks, the rockers, the mods and o f course you go on 
to race and colour as well. I  suppose what you can't stop is the belief that a 
group is responsible for crime. When I was a 20-year old policeman, no one 
would have convinced me that gypsies didn't go out and steal everyday. Now 
that was a very unfair judgement because a lot o f them are very, very hard 
working and did whatever, but you got indoctrinated with the feeling the 
gypsies steal. So if I  saw a vehicle that was obviously o f a gypsy type going 
down the road I'd stop it, and have a look at it. I  suppose in a way you can't 
stop that and I  suppose if you take it on to the publicity in London, if you can't 
seem to extract from the minds o f the officers that a certain race or colour o f 
people are responsible for crime, they will pursue that angle, and the rights 
and wrongs of it actually get almost dismissed out o f hand. ” My respondent. 
(R. 10)
The majority of my respondents, 66 per cent, did not support the proposition 
that stopping a particular social more often would help solve more crime if that group 
had disproportionately more criminal record. It should be noted that the majority of 
the chief officers that Reiner interviewed also did not support the proposition. From 
the quoted example of the behaviour of the ‘street cops’ it is clear that not all officers 
directly put into action their racist attitude. In this example it was done by proxy. 
The fact is, even though the racist attitude manifests itself in different ways, it is 
evident that officers at the three different levels -  Federated ranks, superintending 
ranks and ACPO -  have at best vestigial racist attitudes, however, this is visible 
differently at the espoused value and artefact levels to the observer.
Pragmatism.
Police officers, at whatever level, are pragmatic people. They have a down-to-earth 
attitude, with an emphasis on getting things done. Action, results and outcomes are 
preferable to theory, reflection and prevarication. Like the Nike strap line, which I 
believe must have been coined by a police officer, officers believe in, ‘Just do it’. 
You might be doing it the wrong way, but we are pragmatic people, so just do it. For 
example,
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“For years and years they said: ‘We wont issue women with truncheons 
because there’s a danger that they could be taken off them and uses against 
them.’ Now everybody’s decided: ‘We’ll give them a little one -  so it will 
only hurt them a little bit if it’s used against them.’ Bollocks -  no one’s told 
me how to use it, though they’ve shown us how to wear it. I’m not taking it 
out -  I’d rather use a good kick in the groin to protect myself.” WPC in a 
Midlands force, age 30, eight years service. Now in racially mixed 
suburb. (Graef: 195).
“I think we've just got so many powers at times, and there's one of bit o f 
legislation after another and no sooner than we try to introduce the one 
before. I  don't honestly feel that as practical people it's additional powers that 
we need, I  actually believe we need less. But I  would like to think that by 
producing less we can bring a bit o f clarity to the...we're just overwhelmed 
with police powers, rules, regulations, if we could just have, if you like codes 
of conduct, and some very very simple set o f rules and regulations that 
everybody could work to, that everybody could understood, that had clarity, 
not only in terms o f policing but also throughout the criminal justice system. ” 
My respondent. (R. 3)
The core element of pragmatism drives police officers, at whatever level, to do 
the right thing within the prevailing social and political environment. However, at 
times getting things right has been the more appropriate approach to achieve 
sustainable change, but it has not always been the approach that was followed. 
(ACPO 1993a)
These are some examples of the similarity in the core element of police culture 
and sub-cultures, and consequently similarities in the basic assumptions level of the 
three main groups in the service. I believe with more research on ACPO, the 
additional data can be used to make a more in-depth comparative analysis of its 
culture and sub-cultures with that of the lower ranks. The difference in oudook 
within police forces and according to such individual variables as personality, 
generation or career trajectory, and structured variations according to rank,
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assignment and specialisation are due to differences in espoused values and artefacts 
of the different sub-groups, and not down to differences in the basic assumptions.
The similarity in the core elements that form the basic assumption level of 
police culture and sub-cultures has enabled senior police managers to sustain 
operational credibility in the eyes of some of those under their charge, which has 
helped them gain their officers’ support in driving through necessary changes. The 
flip side is that it has in some areas of police activity left them hidebound, and they 
appear not be able to change police attitude and behaviour in relation to aspects such 
as racial prejudice. They have appeared dinosaurian in their response to this aspect 
of police behaviour.
The proposition by Waddington (1999b) of focusing on the explanatory power 
of police culture rather than relying on its condemnatory potential is one with which I 
concur unreservedly because it provides a powerful driver for forcing the police 
service to continue to reflect and evaluate its activities and performance. Importantly, 
to do so from an explanatory perspective rather than a condemnatory and defensive 
one.
Senior police managers have shown themselves willing and capable of 
adapting chameleon-like to the tremendous amount of changes that have occurred, 
both internally and externally, in their professional lifetime. They have done this 
through changes at the artefact and espoused value levels of their sub-culture. Sadly, 
the lack of substantial change in some aspects of police activity, which has come from 
the dinosaurian adherence to some core elements of the sub-culture (racial prejudice) 
have raised doubts about their ability and willingness to change, fully.
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CONCLUSION.
The starting point for this study was the question of whether there is a management 
culture in the British police service, because the majority of the literature on police 
culture has concentrated on examinations and explanations of rank and file ‘cop 
culture’. Quite clearly, the concept of management culture generally in organisations 
and specifically in the police service is a recognised and accepted one. However, the 
relationship between cop culture and management culture is an uncertain one. 
Interesting as it would have been to analyse the basis of the difference, what I wanted 
to examine through this study was how management culture, at the superintending 
level, affected and reflected the changes that the police service was undergoing and 
had been undergoing since the late 1950s. The structural and legal changes that 
created operationally self-sufficient Basic Command Units headed by 
superintendents, made officers in the rank ideal candidates for an in-depth 
sociological study.
The literature on the rank-and-file is voluminous, while that on chief officers, 
though considerably smaller, was increasing. However, there remained very little on 
this now increasingly powerful and influential group of senior managers in the 
important social institution that is the police. The contemporary changes in police 
organisational structure has placed this group of officers in leadership positions, with 
the opportunity to change both the culture of the organisation as well as within their 
own peer group.
Though they are influential and powerful, they are, at present, not sufficiently 
powerful to be considered a power elite, according to the criteria suggested by Mills. 
“In his classic study, The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills suggested three criteria for 
concluding that a number of elite individuals at the top of different institutions in fact 
constituted a unitary elite. The first is a ‘psychological similarity and social 
intermingling’. The second criterion is ‘structural blending of commanding position 
and common interest’. Finally, Mills asks, is there a ‘unity of a more explicit co­
ordination’ between the elites?’ Do the factors of common background, career 
patterns, social intermingling, and shared interest produce a common outlook, and 
sometimes coalesce into united action?” (Reiner 1992: 346). Similar to his findings in 
his study of chief officers, the evidence from my study suggests that my respondents
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had developed common outlooks on a variety of policing and social issues. Equally, 
there was evidence to suggest that some factors of a common background, and shared 
interest had produced a common outlook that could coalesce into united action.
Most of my respondents came from a manual working-class background and 
had modest educational achievement. However, what they lacked in educational 
qualification they made up for in determination and hard work. They made up for 
their lack of educational qualification before joining the police by obtaining 
secondary and tertiary qualifications in service.
The reasons why they joined the police varied from the pragmatic (did not 
have the qualification to pursue another career, or only joined to obtain good 
housing), to a complex combination of reasons, such as excitement, variety and 
childhood ambition. Whatever the reason, they all expressed a considerable degree of 
satisfaction with their careers. They are a group of pragmatic realists, who used then- 
modest social origins to achieve significant positions of influence in their chosen 
career. Importantly, their successful progression in their careers can be attributed to 
achievement rather than ascription.
On aspects of operational policing issues they expressed a common view, 
which was that the police function was a complex and multifaceted task that required 
a holistic approach to have any success in delivering the service that the public 
wanted and deserved. Although they discussed the solutions to contemporary 
policing problems in an idealistic and proactive way, the practical methods that they 
adopted to deal with these issues were typically reactive and conventional, which led 
me to label the apparent contradiction as ‘elegant denial’. Contemporary policing 
issues were covered in chapter 7.
Chapters 8 and 9 covered their views on the core police tasks of crime and 
public order respectively. Crime and its control are complex problems for society in 
general and the police in particular, and this point was clearly articulated by my 
respondents in our discussion of the different causes and solutions to crime. Actually, 
my respondents’ expressed views on crime were sophisticated compared with those of 
senior officers from previous generations (Reiner 1991). My respondents showed a
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good deal of theoretical and social awareness of the complexities of finding solutions 
to the causes and effects of crime. However, this greater awareness does not appear 
to have been translated into operational practices when judged, for example, by the 
police figures on stops and searches.
On public order, my respondents thought the problems were more complex to 
deal with now than in the past, rather than being more frequent. Some of the reasons 
for this included the fact that the media attention was far greater now, which exposed 
officers dealing with public order situation to instant public scrutiny, and people from 
all walks of life were more prone to take to the street and demonstrate about a variety 
of issues, which did not happen so often in the past. The fact that officers were now 
better trained and equipped to deal with local small-scale public disturbances as well 
as large-scale public disorders did not make policing public disorders any easier to 
manage for senior officers.
In chapter 10,1 explored with my respondents their social philosophy, through 
discussing such topic as social harmony, social inequality and the rule of law. They 
were well aware of contemporary social problems with which different sections of 
society had to contend, and which had significant impact on policework. My 
respondents could aptly be described as individuals with a soft social centre covered 
by a hard exterior police vernacular. They were socially articulate professionals with 
a sound understanding and acceptance of the constraints created by limited budgets 
and the real requirements to adhere to stringent performance measures.
The topics of police management and managing change were covered in 
chapters 5 and 6 respectively. On the topic of police managerialism, structural 
changes to the police organisation, legislative changes in police procedures, and 
changes in contemporary social attitudes had created a very different working 
environment for modem day senior police managers. The consequent relaxation in 
disciplinary styles, which some of my respondents found difficult to come to terms 
with, had forced them to adopt a more participative and consultative style of 
management.
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Although the reduction in the number of superintendents, the increased 
workload and the change in emphasis on the matters on which they were required to 
concentrate, such as a greater involvement in budget management, objective setting 
and wider public consultation and participation in the provision of policing services at 
a local level had proved very demanding for most of them, nonetheless, they were all 
determined to do the work that they, in their words, were being paid good money to 
carry out. On the topic of management of change, my respondents were no strangers 
to the process of change and there were in no doubt that the variety of external 
demands for change had had some success, and that it would continue.
One of the methods that the service had tried to use to manage change 
proactively was the adoption of the principles of organisational values. The efficacy 
of using defined organisational values to implement change worked on a number of 
levels. These included enhancing the professional integrity of individuals and the 
organisation; standardising the behaviour of officers, in order to ensure that they 
consistently delivered high quality policing services; and gaining some consensus on 
the core function of the police.
The promulgation of organisational values had brought about changes to 
management styles. However, it appeared that the changes had occurred mainly 
where the organisational values matched those of the individual practitioners. Even 
where this was the case, many officers still expressed disappointment that the service 
had to tell them what they already knew and practised.
As managers, my respondents have always had to deal with calls for change, 
from both external and internal sources. Over the years, they have developed 
mechanisms to cope with and manage the changes. Operationally some of these 
mechanisms for coping have been reactive and unsophisticated, but on the matter of 
the changing social, political and occupational environment, they had maintained an 
astute awareness of what had been happening. The demands and problems that they 
faced in the rank of superintendent had given them a common outlook on coping with 
the relentless call to adapt and change. Although some of them had found some of the 
demands problematic, this had not diminished their desire to continue what has been 
for the majority a successful and enjoyable career.
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In conclusion, as a group they had adapted well to contemporary social and 
policing problems. There is evidence of dinosaurian attitudes and behaviours is some 
police activities and the management of those activities, however, the predominant 
view of senior police managers is one mainly of chameleons adapting with varying 
ease to the changing social, legal and political landscape.
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NOTES and APPENDICES.
Chapter 1 -  Introduction.
(1). In suggesting types of structural reorganisation in provincial police forces, the 
Audit Commission describes the structures of Basic Command Units as follows. 
“Beats and section stations can be combined into basic command units (BCUs) which 
are self-sufficient to meet day-to-day policing needs without becoming so large that 
effective management control cannot be maintained, contact with the local 
community is lost, and service standards suffer unacceptably.
“The lowest level in the organisation which has the capacity required in these respects 
is the sub-division in many forces. Whatever the basic command unit is called, the 
existence of an intermediary layer of line management between it and force 
headquarters should be questioned. Where the function of divisional management is 
purely to act as a filter between BCU commanders and the ACC (Ops), its rationale 
should be carefully reconsidered: it is unlikely to make a convincing case except in 
very large forces.” (Audit Commission 1991: 24).
Chapter 2 - Methodology
(1). The Bramshill Fellowship Scheme is designed to encourage police officers (at 
the time negotiations were in hand for the Scheme to be extended to police support 
staff) of any rank to register with a bona fide research establishment in order to 
conduct research into current police problems. The research must lead to a higher 
degree awarded by the research establishment.
(2). QSR stands for Qualitative Solutions and Research, a software development 
company in Melbourne, Australia.
NUD*IST stands for Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and 
Theorising.
QSR NUD*IST is a computer package designed to aid users in handling Non- 
numerical and Unstructured Data in qualitative analysis, by supporting processes of 
coding data in an Index System, Searching text or searching patterns of coding and 
Theorising about the data.
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Chapter 3 -  Culture -  an analytical paradigm.
(a) Cop It Sweet was a television documentary, made in 1992, that depicted the
harsh reality of police work in Redfem, one of the most socially disadvantaged 
areas in inner Sydney with a high concentration of Aboriginal population.
Chapter 4 -  Social background
(a) These figures are taken from The Blue Coated Worker. A sociological study of 
police unionism. Robert Reiner. 1978. P I50. Cambridge University Press. 
Although the categories used by Reiner are not identical to mine, the main 
class divisions, which form the basis of the comparison and discussion, are the 
same. Reiner poses the question “Are the police a separate or distinctive 
group in the community, in terms of social background and career 
experiences?” Because, “It has often been alleged that the police stand apart 
from the rest of society, and that this gulf is encouraged by peculiarities of 
origin.”
He found that,” Policemen today [1977] are drawn primarily from working- 
class origins, most often skilled ones. Their backgrounds, in terms of social 
class of their fathers, roughly mirror the population as a whole...The majority 
of the men came from social class ID, mainly from the manual rather than 
non-manual sections of it. By comparison with the general population, the top 
and bottom of the social scale are somewhat under-represented.” (p. 149)
(b) These figures are taken from Chief Constable. Robert Reiner. 1992. P 57. 
Oxford University Press. The main categories of social class used by Reiner 
are the same as mine. He found that “The social class backgrounds are 
broadly representative of the population as a whole for their generation.” (p. 
57)
(c) These figures are taken from The Blue Coated Worker, by R. Reiner.
(d) These figures are taken from Chief Constables by R. Reiner. Page 76.
(e) Institutional Racism. In chapter 6 of The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report by 
Sir William Macpherson, paragraph 6.34, the Inquiry team expressed their 
concept of institutional racism as;
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The collective failure of an organisation to provide appropriate and 
professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or 
ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and 
behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting 
prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which 
disadvantage minority ethnic people.
In paragraph 6.46, the Inquiry team stresses that,
We hope and believe that the average police officer and average 
member o f the public will accept that we do not suggest that all police 
officers are racist and will both understand and accept the distinction 
we draw between overt individual racism and the pernicious and 
persistent institutional racism which we have described.
Further, in paragraph 6.47, they add that, “Nor do we say that in its policies 
the MPS is racist.”
As can be seen police officers’ interpretation and meaning of institutional 
racism is the opposite of the meaning given the phrase by the Inquiry team.
Chapter 7 -  Policing Issues.
(a) This is one example of this uncertainty and confusion; what to call civilian 
employees in the police. In some forces they are referred to as ‘civilian 
support staff, while in others they are ‘support staff. These are the formal 
terms for civilians in the service, the informal terms are, predictably, less 
flattering, supportive on inclusive. Terms some officers would sooner explain 
away as banter than acknowledge are offensive and degrading.
Terms such as ‘stinking civvies’ and fucking civvies’. Just banter!
(b) In describing the use of “links, extension and prose style” in the construction 
of compound sentences in his book Guide to Written English, Aitchison 
explains that, “As a general rule, it is normally safer to use the simplest, least 
demonstrative linking device. If you strive for more elaborate links your prose 
style may begin to seem strained and contrived. You may also fall into the 
trap known ironically as ‘elegant’ variation, that is, a determination to avoid
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repeating a key word or phrase, even when the result of the avoidance is more 
obvious and more stilted than the repetition.” He goes on to give the 
following example, “a newspaper reporter writing about a photographer 
colleague who had won an award referred to the man first as a prize-winning 
photographer, a factual statement in standard English; then as the ace 
lensman, which is an instant journalistic cliche; as the super snapper, which is 
catchy, alliterative and colloquial but not standard English; and finally as the 
prince o f the pics, a phrase chosen for its alliteration rather than its meaning. 
The news item would have been more effective if the reporter had avoided 
variation and instead had repeated the word photographer, the photographer’s 
name and the personal pronoun he. As you can see from that example, the 
term ‘elegant’ variation is ironic because the variation is inelegant.” 
(Aitchison 1994: 200).
The analogy with the police service is that senior managers use so many 
variations of a standard explanation to deny the reality of what is happening or 
not happening in terms of policing styles and consequent outcomes that the 
denials become obvious and stilted. What appears elegant on the surface is in 
fact on examination, inelegant.
Chapter 8 -  Crime.
(a) For a fuller discussion of the different definitions of crime, see The Problem of 
Crime. Edited by John Muncie and Eugene McLaughlin (1996), especially 
Chapter 2 titled What is Crime? Competing definitions.
Chapter 11 -  Discussion -  Police Management Culture, and Conclusion
(a) These factsheets, which were designed to inform the public of the success the 
police were achieving and to explain the reasons where the service was not 
achieving in certain areas, included the following titles. Your Police: The 
evidence, the factsheet concentrated on crime, and the financial and social cost 
of it; Your Police: A Service to Value, which covered a broad area, comparing 
the cost of public and private policing, more officers on the beat, core policing
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tasks, and coping with change; Your Police: Your police are making a 
difference, which addressed how the police was managing the increased 
demand for its service, the fear of crime and working in partnership with other 
organisations.
(b) The Secret Policeman. In 2002 a BBC undercover journalist -  Mark Daly - 
joined Greater Manchester Police to find out the extent of racism amongst 
police officers. In 1999 the Macpherson Report branded London's 
Metropolitan Police institutionally racist. The report, which followed the Met's 
failure to successfully prosecute a gang of white youths for the murder of 
Stephen Lawrence, found ethnic minorities in Britain felt under-protected as 
victims and over-policed as suspects. The year before, the then chief constable 
of Greater Manchester Police took the bold step of admitting that his own 
force was institutionally racist.
The BBC/journalist wanted to see what steps were being taken to eradicate 
this. But more importantly, “we needed to see if they were working. The only 
way we could find out what was really happening was to become a police 
officer - asking questions openly as a journalist would not have uncovered the 
truth.
Working undercover using the latest hi-tech covert filming equipment meant I 
could expose any of my fellow officers who held racist views or behaved in a 
racist manner.
And on 27 January this year, I had my first day of training as PC 2210 Daly. 
After five months of intensive training I was, for eight weeks, a fully 
operational PC working the beat.”
(http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/magazine/3210614.stml. The documentary which 
was shown on BBC 1 in 2004 contained some of the most shocking scenes of 
racist language and behaviour by serving police officers.
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Telephone:
Our Ref:
Your Ref:
Fax: 0 1 7 1 - 6 0 1 - 2 2 5 7
OLISA/QRU
0 1 7 1 - 6 0 1 -2 2 7 2
CITY OF LONDON 
POLICE
Management Services 
26 Old Jewry
15 September 1995
London 
EC2R 8DJ
Mr A T Burden, E sq ., Q.P .M.
Chief Constable
Gwent Constabulary
Croesyceiliog
Cwmbran
Gwent NP44 2XJ
Dear Mr Burden
Under the Bramshill Fellowship Scheme, I am currently researching the Culture of Police Management 
and its Responsiveness to Change.
The study, which is in support of the various work being carried out on the ACPO Quality of Service 
Committee's initiative " Getting Things R ight", will be supervised by Professor Robert Reiner at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science.
A major part of the research will involve the use of self-completion questionnaires to find out the level 
of officers' perception of the initiative, and to what extent it has affected the quality of service officers 
give to colleagues. A questionnaire will take, on average, fifteen minutes to complete.
I plan to follow up the self-completion questionnaire survey of 3250 officers from 14 forces, with one 
hour interviews of 50 Superintendents from the same forces. A summary of the results will be forwarded 
to the participating forces by September 1996, with a full report to follow at a later date.
This letter is to obtain your permission to conduct a survey of officers up to ACPO level by use of 
self-completion questionnaires, and to interview officers of superintendent rank.
The number of officers to be surveyed will be one in ten of the total police personnel (110) and the 
number of Superintendents will be either 3 or 4, and both surveys will be carried out at a time arranged 
with a nominated officer in your Force.
I would like to assure you that all information obtained will be treated in the strictest confidence, and non 
of it can lead to the identification of an individual officer or the Force.
I look forward to hearing from your force shortly.
Yours sincerely,
Victor Olisa, Inspector
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Telephone:
Our Ref:
Your Ref:
Fax:
0 1 7 1 - 6 0 1 -2 0 0 1
OLISA/QRU
0 1 7 1 - 6 0 1 - 2 0 6 0
CITY OF LONDON 
POLICE
Headquarters 
26 Old Jewry
London 
EC2R 8DJ
William Taylor, QPM 
Commissioner 15 September 1995
Mr B B D Shaw, Esq., B.A.. (Hons)
Chief Constable
Cleveland Constabulary
P.O. Box No. 70
Ladgate Lane
Middlesborough
Cleveland. TSS 9EH.
Enclosed with this letter is a request for assistance on a project which has the support of the 
Quality of Service Committee. It will also give direct help to Inspector Olisa who is studying 
under the Bramshill Fellowship Scheme.
I appreciate we all receive many requests for this type of assistance and we have to take care not 
to burden officers or divert valuable resources. I hope you can agree to help in this case for two 
reasons. First the outcome will be of benefit to the Service as a whole and second there is need to 
support our own officers (perhaps ahead of others) seeking development under a scheme to 
which we all subscribe.
The 'burden' has been kept to a minimum, consistent with a valid survey. I hope you will be able 
to agree this particular research.
/
W"Taylor
Commissioner
292
APPENDIX C
Chameleon or Dinosaur. A study of police management culture
Interview of superintendents
The Question Schedule.
Areas to cover.
A. Work History
B. The Police Function
C. Crime and its Control
D. Public Order
E. Internal Management
F. Management of Change
G. Social Perspective
H. Personal Background
Reduce areas to cover as shown when informing potential interviewees and their 
respective Forces of topics that will be covered in the interviews.
1. Work history and personal background
2. The Police Function
3. Crime control and public order
4. Internal management and management of change
A. WORK HISTORY
To start, I wonder whether you would mind telling me some things about your career 
so far?
1(a) In which year did you join a police force, and which constabulary was it?
(b) Can you recall what attracted you to the police force?
2. Had you previously been employed at all outside the police?
[If yes, ask Q3. I f  No, go to Q4]
3(a) What was the last employment you had before you took up work as a 
policeman/policewoman?
(b) When did you have that job?
(c) For how long did you have it?
(d) Did you have any other jobs before the police?
[If yes: What were these?
When and for how long did you have each job?
4 Did you first enter the police as a cadet?
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5 When were you promoted to superintendent?
[or chief superintendent, where applicable]
6 When were you promoted to the different ranks up to superintendent?
[or chief superintendent]
(i) [Superintendent
(ii) Chief Inspector
(iii) Inspector
(iv) Sergeant
7 In what other police forces have you worked, and what posts did you hold?
[If required: Between what years were these appointments?]
8 In which specialists departments have you worked (i.e. other than territorial 
uniform divisions?)
9 What training courses have you been on, other than probationary training?
10 Have you ever thought seriously about leaving the police at any time during 
your career?
[If yes: When and why?]
B. THE POLICE FUNCTION.
I would like now to discuss your view of what the purpose and priorities of 
policing are.
1. Ideas of the police function can roughly be divided into broad categories, first,
a wider proactive view that the police are a public service agency with a broad 
social control role, perhaps even with a responsibility to remedy the social 
sources of crime; and, a narrow reactive view that the police should limit 
themselves to law enforcement and the control of public order.
Which of these concepts do you favour, and why?
2 What, if anything, does the phrase ‘community policing’ mean to you?
3 Currently, there is much public discussion on maintaining ‘traditional 
policing’.
What does this phrase mean to you?
C CRIME AND ITS CONTROL
In this section, I want to talk about your views of crime, its sources and 
control.
1 Do you feel that crime is now a greater problem than when you joined the
police?
What evidence do you have to support your view?
I f  a greater problem: Why do you think crime has become a greater problem?
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2 Are there any features of our society, which are likely to aggravate crime
problems?
3 A recent study by the Audit Commission has suggested that traditional
methods of patrol and detection have a limited impact on crime, and that 
increasing resources devoted to them would not significantly reduce crime.
Do you agree? Why?
4 Are there any legal powers, which the police require for effective crime
control, but do not have at present?
I f  yes: What powers? Should the police have them?
5 If a particular social group disproportionately have criminal records, would it 
help clear up more offences if they were more often stopped and questioned 
and searched?
D PUBLIC ORDER
I would like to discuss next some issues about the police control of collective 
public disorder.
1 Is the control of public disorder more difficult for the police now than in the 
past?
I f  yes: Why?
2 Has public disorder become -
(a) more frequent?
(b) more serious or violent?
I f  yes: Why had disorder increased?
3 On what evidence do you base your views?
4 The police response to disorder has become more sophisticated, robust, and 
forceful in recent years, a trend often described as militaristic policing.
Why has this occurred?
5 Do you think this trend will continue?
E INTERNAL MANAGEMENT
1 Since the Edmund-Davies Report of 1978, the rank and file, as represented by
the Police Federation, has gained a more significant consultative role in the 
determination of force policy.
Is this desirable?
Has it posed any problems for police management?
I f  yes: In what way?
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2 The style of management and discipline in police forces has been said to have 
relaxed in recent years
What management problems does this pose, if any?
Are there any benefits?
3 What are the main management problems facing you,
(a) generally, as a superintendent, and
(b) in your current post?
4 In what way(s) do you feel that in your current role you are accountable to 
outside bodies (e.g. Police Authority, Consultative Committee, PCA?)
F MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
During the last two/three years there has been a number of Inquiries and
Reports on the police service calling for change in its structure and function. 
(White Paper on Police Reform; Sheehy Inquiry into the Roles and 
Responsibilities of the Police; Posen Enquiry into Core and Ancillary Tasks; 
Audit Commission Report into Uniform Patrol; ACPO Quality of Service 
report ‘Getting Things Right’.)
1 Have these demands resulted in any changes in policing or management
styles?
I f  yes: In what way?
2 In addition to ‘priorities’ and ‘goals’, Forces are now publishing statements on 
‘Values’.
Why has this occurred? AND
What effects have these had on the styles of management?
2 Is your Force working toward a quality of service initiative at present?
[If yes, ask Q4. I f  no, go to Q5.]
3 Which?
How long is it since the Force embarked on the initiative?
What effects has it had on the styles of management?
4 Has the Force considered working toward any quality of service initiative?
I f  yes: Which? AND
Why was it, or were they, not adopted?
G. SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE
1 Britain used to be regarded as a harmonious society. Do you think it is still
so?
What makes you say this?
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2 What are the most important social divisions in our society?
Are they becoming greater, less great, or remaining the same?
3 Is there any truth in the adage, ‘there is one law for the rich and one for the 
poor?
H PERSONAL BACKGROUND
Finally, I would like to ask you a little about your background.
1 In what year were you bom?
2 Are you married?
3 Have you any children?
I f  yes: How many?
How old is each?
What do they do?
4 What was the highest education level you reached?
I f  degree: What subject was it in?
When and where did you do it?
5 What type of school did you attend?
6 When did you leave school?
7 What type of work did you father (or guardian) do when you were 18? 
Had he been in that type of work most of his life?
I f  no: What were the main jobs he had before then?
8 Overall, are you satisfied with your career in the police service?
Would you rejoin if you had your life over?
9 Finally, are there any comments you would like to make about the interview?
May I thank you for your co-operation.
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